7 ideas
17962 | The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
15432 | Structural universals might serve as possible worlds [Forrest, by Lewis] |
2975 | That honey is sweet I do not affirm, but I agree that it appears so [Timon] |