Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Timothy McGrew and Hugh LaFollette

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20 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062 A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16061 If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16060 Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
16064 The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19682 Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
19684 Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew]
19687 Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew]
19688 Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew]
19686 Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew]
19680 Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew]
19681 If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew]
19689 Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
19683 Narrow evidentialism relies wholly on propositions; the wider form includes other items [McGrew]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
19685 Falsificationism would be naive if even a slight discrepancy in evidence killed a theory [McGrew]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
20877 Errors in moral practice might be inconsistent or inappropriate principles, or inappropriate application [LaFollette]
20878 We can discuss the criteria of a judgment, or the weight given to them, or their application [LaFollette]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
20881 The act/omission distinction is important for duties, but less so for consequences [LaFollette]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
20886 Are we only obligated by agreement, or should we always help the weak? [LaFollette]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 2. Moral rights
20879 Too many options may open us to unwanted pressures, like being paid very little [LaFollette]
20880 Should people be forced to make choices? [LaFollette]