10 ideas
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 4304 | Descartes says there are two substance, Spinoza one, and Leibniz infinitely many [Cottingham] |
| 4303 | The notion of substance lies at the heart of rationalist metaphysics [Cottingham] |
| 18088 | Intentionality is the mark of dispositions, not of the mental [Place] |
| 4316 | Either all action is rational, or reason dominates, or reason is only concerned with means [Cottingham] |
| 4306 | For rationalists, it is necessary that effects be deducible from their causes [Cottingham] |
| 18089 | Dispositions are not general laws, but laws of the natures of individual entities [Place] |