89 ideas
20678 | The Scientific Revolution was the discovery of our own ignorance [Harari] |
20686 | For millenia people didn't know how to convert one type of energy into another [Harari] |
18835 | Logic doesn't have a metaphysical basis, but nor can logic give rise to the metaphysics [Rumfitt] |
18819 | The idea that there are unrecognised truths is basic to our concept of truth [Rumfitt] |
18826 | 'True at a possibility' means necessarily true if what is said had obtained [Rumfitt] |
18803 | Semantics for propositions: 1) validity preserves truth 2) non-contradition 3) bivalence 4) truth tables [Rumfitt] |
12204 | The logic of metaphysical necessity is S5 [Rumfitt] |
18814 | 'Absolute necessity' would have to rest on S5 [Rumfitt] |
18798 | It is the second-order part of intuitionistic logic which actually negates some classical theorems [Rumfitt] |
18799 | Intuitionists can accept Double Negation Elimination for decidable propositions [Rumfitt] |
18830 | Most set theorists doubt bivalence for the Continuum Hypothesis, but still use classical logic [Rumfitt] |
18843 | The iterated conception of set requires continual increase in axiom strength [Rumfitt] |
18836 | A set may well not consist of its members; the empty set, for example, is a problem [Rumfitt] |
18837 | A set can be determinate, because of its concept, and still have vague membership [Rumfitt] |
18845 | If the totality of sets is not well-defined, there must be doubt about the Power Set Axiom [Rumfitt] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
18815 | Logic is higher-order laws which can expand the range of any sort of deduction [Rumfitt] |
9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
18804 | The case for classical logic rests on its rules, much more than on the Principle of Bivalence [Rumfitt] |
18805 | Classical logic rules cannot be proved, but various lines of attack can be repelled [Rumfitt] |
18827 | If truth-tables specify the connectives, classical logic must rely on Bivalence [Rumfitt] |
12195 | Soundness in argument varies with context, and may be achieved very informally indeed [Rumfitt] |
12199 | There is a modal element in consequence, in assessing reasoning from suppositions [Rumfitt] |
12201 | We reject deductions by bad consequence, so logical consequence can't be deduction [Rumfitt] |
18813 | Logical consequence is a relation that can extended into further statements [Rumfitt] |
18808 | Normal deduction presupposes the Cut Law [Rumfitt] |
18840 | When faced with vague statements, Bivalence is not a compelling principle [Rumfitt] |
12194 | Contradictions include 'This is red and not coloured', as well as the formal 'B and not-B' [Rumfitt] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
18802 | In specifying a logical constant, use of that constant is quite unavoidable [Rumfitt] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
12198 | Geometrical axioms in logic are nowadays replaced by inference rules (which imply the logical truths) [Rumfitt] |
18800 | Introduction rules give deduction conditions, and Elimination says what can be deduced [Rumfitt] |
18809 | Logical truths are just the assumption-free by-products of logical rules [Rumfitt] |
18807 | Monotonicity means there is a guarantee, rather than mere inductive support [Rumfitt] |
18842 | Maybe an ordinal is a property of isomorphic well-ordered sets, and not itself a set [Rumfitt] |
17462 | A single object must not be counted twice, which needs knowledge of distinctness (negative identity) [Rumfitt] |
18834 | Infinitesimals do not stand in a determinate order relation to zero [Rumfitt] |
18846 | Cantor and Dedekind aimed to give analysis a foundation in set theory (rather than geometry) [Rumfitt] |
17461 | Some 'how many?' answers are not predications of a concept, like 'how many gallons?' [Rumfitt] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
18839 | An object that is not clearly red or orange can still be red-or-orange, which sweeps up problem cases [Rumfitt] |
18838 | The extension of a colour is decided by a concept's place in a network of contraries [Rumfitt] |
14532 | A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
18816 | Metaphysical modalities respect the actual identities of things [Rumfitt] |
12193 | Logical necessity is when 'necessarily A' implies 'not-A is contradictory' [Rumfitt] |
12200 | A logically necessary statement need not be a priori, as it could be unknowable [Rumfitt] |
18825 | S5 is the logic of logical necessity [Rumfitt] |
12202 | Narrow non-modal logical necessity may be metaphysical, but real logical necessity is not [Rumfitt] |
18824 | Since possibilities are properties of the world, calling 'red' the determination of a determinable seems right [Rumfitt] |
18828 | If two possibilities can't share a determiner, they are incompatible [Rumfitt] |
12203 | If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt] |
18821 | Possibilities are like possible worlds, but not fully determinate or complete [Rumfitt] |
18831 | Medieval logicians said understanding A also involved understanding not-A [Rumfitt] |
18820 | In English 'evidence' is a mass term, qualified by 'little' and 'more' [Rumfitt] |
18817 | We understand conditionals, but disagree over their truth-conditions [Rumfitt] |
18829 | The truth grounds for 'not A' are the possibilities incompatible with truth grounds for A [Rumfitt] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
20692 | Money does produce happiness, but only up to a point [Harari] |
20663 | If a group is bound by gossip, the natural size is 150 people [Harari] |
20677 | Since 1500 human population has increased fourteenfold, and consumption far more [Harari] |
20688 | People 300m tons; domesticated animals 700m tons; larger wild animals 100m tons [Harari] |
20674 | The Nazi aim was to encourage progressive evolution, and avoid degeneration [Harari] |
20679 | We stabilise societies with dogmas, either of dubious science, or of non-scientific values [Harari] |
20690 | The state fostered individualism, to break the power of family and community [Harari] |
20689 | In 1750 losing your family and community meant death [Harari] |
20681 | The sacred command of capitalism is that profits must be used to increase production [Harari] |
20682 | The main rule of capitalism is that all other goods depend on economic growth [Harari] |
20683 | The progress of capitalism depends entirely on the new discoveries and gadgets of science [Harari] |
20687 | In capitalism the rich invest, and the rest of us go shopping [Harari] |
20685 | No market is free of political bias, and markets need protection of their freedoms [Harari] |
20693 | Freedom may work against us, as individuals can choose to leave, and make fewer commitments [Harari] |
20691 | Real peace is the implausibility of war (and not just its absence) [Harari] |
20684 | Financing is increasingly through credit rather than taxes; people prefer investing to taxation [Harari] |
20675 | The more you know about history, the harder it becomes to explain [Harari] |
20676 | History teaches us that the present was not inevitable, and shows us the possibilities [Harari] |
20671 | In order to explain both order and evil, a single evil creator is best, but no one favours that [Harari] |
20664 | Animism is belief that every part of nature is aware and feeling, and can communicate [Harari] |
20666 | Most polytheist recognise one supreme power or law, behind the various gods [Harari] |
20667 | Polytheism is open-minded, and rarely persecutes opponents [Harari] |
20665 | Mythologies are usual contracts with the gods, exchanging devotion for control of nature [Harari] |
20669 | Dualist religions see everything as a battleground of good and evil forces [Harari] |
20670 | Dualist religions say the cosmos is a battleground, so can’t explain its order [Harari] |
20673 | Manichaeans and Gnostics: good made spirit, evil made flesh [Harari] |
20668 | Monotheism appeared in Egypt in 1350 BCE, when the god Aten was declared supreme [Harari] |