24 ideas
1507 | We don't have time for infinite quantity, but we do for infinite divisibility, because time is also divisible [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea] |
5109 | The fast runner must always reach the point from which the slower runner started [Zeno of Elea, by Aristotle] |
1512 | Zeno is wrong that one grain of millet makes a sound; why should one grain achieve what the whole bushel does? [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea] |
1508 | Zeno's arrow paradox depends on the assumption that time is composed of nows [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
12132 | Indiscernibility is a necessary and sufficient condition for identity [Brody] |
15834 | Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence [Brody, by Mackie,P] |
12140 | Modern emphasis is on properties had essentially; traditional emphasis is on sort-defining properties [Brody] |
11895 | A sortal essence is a property which once possessed always possessed [Brody, by Mackie,P] |
12141 | Maybe essential properties are those which determine a natural kind? [Brody] |
12137 | De re essentialism standardly says all possible objects identical with a have a's essential properties [Brody] |
12142 | Essentially, a has P, always had P, must have had P, and has never had a future without P [Brody] |
12143 | An object having a property essentially is equivalent to its having it necessarily [Brody] |
12144 | Essentialism is justified if the essential properties of things explain their other properties [Brody] |
12139 | Mereological essentialism says that every part that ensures the existence is essential [Brody] |
12135 | Interrupted objects have two first moments of existence, which could be two beginnings [Brody] |
12130 | a and b share all properties; so they share being-identical-with-a; so a = b [Brody] |
12138 | Identity across possible worlds is prior to rigid designation [Brody] |
454 | If there are many things they must have a finite number, but there must be endless things between them [Zeno of Elea] |
455 | That which moves, moves neither in the place in which it is, nor in that in which it is not [Zeno of Elea] |
1511 | If everything is in a place, what is the place in? Place doesn't exist [Zeno of Elea, by Simplicius] |