Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C, Albert Casullo and Keith Devlin

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33 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
8092 Logic was merely a branch of rhetoric until the scientific 17th century [Devlin]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
8081 'No councillors are bankers' and 'All bankers are athletes' implies 'Some athletes are not councillors' [Devlin]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
8085 Modern propositional inference replaces Aristotle's 19 syllogisms with modus ponens [Devlin]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
8086 Predicate logic retains the axioms of propositional logic [Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
8091 Situation theory is logic that takes account of context [Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
8087 Golden ages: 1900-1960 for pure logic, and 1950-1985 for applied logic [Devlin]
8089 Montague's intensional logic incorporated the notion of meaning [Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 7. Strict Implication
8082 Where a conditional is purely formal, an implication implies a link between premise and conclusion [Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
8072 Sentences of apparent identical form can have different contextual meanings [Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
8075 Space and time are atomic in the arrow, and divisible in the tortoise [Devlin]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
16554 Activities have place, rate, duration, entities, properties, modes, direction, polarity, energy and range [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
16556 Penicillin causes nothing; the cause is what penicillin does [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
20475 Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
20476 If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
16562 We understand something by presenting its low-level entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
20471 Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo]
20477 The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential [Casullo]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
20472 Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification [Casullo]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
3913 Maybe imagination is the source of a priori justification [Casullo]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
20474 'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in [Casullo]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism
8088 People still say the Hopi have no time concepts, despite Whorf's later denial [Devlin]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
16563 The explanation is not the regularity, but the activity sustaining it [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
16555 Functions are not properties of objects, they are activities contributing to mechanisms [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
16528 Mechanisms are not just push-pull systems [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16529 Mechanisms are systems organised to produce regular change [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16530 A mechanism explains a phenomenon by showing how it was produced [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16553 Our account of mechanism combines both entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16559 Descriptions of explanatory mechanisms have a bottom level, where going further is irrelevant [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
16564 There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
16561 We can abstract by taking an exemplary case and ignoring the detail [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
8073 How do we parse 'time flies like an arrow' and 'fruit flies like an apple'? [Devlin]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
8076 The distinction between sentences and abstract propositions is crucial in logic [Devlin]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
16558 Laws of nature have very little application in biology [Machamer/Darden/Craver]