Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C, Edouard Machery and Michael Potter

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95 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy is empty if it does not in some way depend on matters of fact [Machery]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
Impredicative definitions are circular, but fine for picking out, rather than creating something [Potter]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
The Identity Theory says a proposition is true if it coincides with what makes it true [Potter]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
It has been unfortunate that externalism about truth is equated with correspondence [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Set theory's three roles: taming the infinite, subject-matter of mathematics, and modes of reasoning [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
Usually the only reason given for accepting the empty set is convenience [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
Infinity: There is at least one limit level [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
Nowadays we derive our conception of collections from the dependence between them [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
The 'limitation of size' principles say whether properties collectivise depends on the number of objects [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology elides the distinction between the cards in a pack and the suits [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
We can formalize second-order formation rules, but not inference rules [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
Frege's sign |--- meant judgements, but the modern |- turnstile means inference, with intecedents [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Deductivism can't explain how the world supports unconditional conclusions [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 3. Proof from Assumptions
Supposing axioms (rather than accepting them) give truths, but they are conditional [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Modern logical truths are true under all interpretations of the non-logical words [Potter]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
If set theory didn't found mathematics, it is still needed to count infinite sets [Potter]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
It is remarkable that all natural number arithmetic derives from just the Peano Axioms [Potter]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
The formalist defence against Gödel is to reject his metalinguistic concept of truth [Potter]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Why is fictional arithmetic applicable to the real world? [Potter]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Activities have place, rate, duration, entities, properties, modes, direction, polarity, energy and range [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
If 'concrete' is the negative of 'abstract', that means desires and hallucinations are concrete [Potter]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
Do categories store causal knowledge, or typical properties, or knowledge of individuals? [Machery]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
Are quick and slow categorisation the same process, or quite different? [Machery]
For each category of objects (such as 'dog') an individual seems to have several concepts [Machery]
A thing is classified if its features are likely to be generated by that category's causal laws [Machery]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
There may be ad hoc categories, such as the things to pack in your suitcase for a trip [Machery]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
A relation is a set consisting entirely of ordered pairs [Potter]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / c. Ancestral relation
'Greater than', which is the ancestral of 'successor', strictly orders the natural numbers [Potter]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Penicillin causes nothing; the cause is what penicillin does [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
There may be several ways to individuate things like concepts [Machery]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / b. Need for substance
If dependence is well-founded, with no infinite backward chains, this implies substances [Potter]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
Collections have fixed members, but fusions can be carved in innumerable ways [Potter]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
Priority is a modality, arising from collections and members [Potter]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
A material conditional cannot capture counterfactual reasoning [Potter]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
We understand something by presenting its low-level entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
Knowledge from a drunken schoolteacher is from a reliable and unreliable process [Potter]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Horizontal arguments say eliminate a term if it fails to pick out a natural kind [Machery]
If a term doesn't pick out a kind, keeping it may block improvements in classification [Machery]
Vertical arguments say eliminate a term if it picks out different natural kinds in different theories [Machery]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Psychologists use 'induction' as generalising a property from one category to another [Machery]
'Ampliative' induction infers that all members of a category have a feature found in some of them [Machery]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
The explanation is not the regularity, but the activity sustaining it [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
Functions are not properties of objects, they are activities contributing to mechanisms [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Mechanisms are systems organised to produce regular change [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
A mechanism explains a phenomenon by showing how it was produced [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
Our account of mechanism combines both entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
Descriptions of explanatory mechanisms have a bottom level, where going further is irrelevant [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
Mechanisms are not just push-pull systems [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
We can abstract by taking an exemplary case and ignoring the detail [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Connectionists cannot distinguish concept-memories from their background, or the processes [Machery]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
We can identify a set of cognitive capacities which are 'higher order' [Machery]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Traditionally there are twelve categories of judgement, in groups of three [Potter]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Concepts for categorisation and for induction may be quite different [Machery]
Concept theories aim at their knowledge, processes, format, acquisition, and location [Machery]
We should abandon 'concept', and just use 'prototype', 'exemplar' and 'theory' [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / b. Concepts in philosophy
In the philosophy of psychology, concepts are usually introduced as constituents of thoughts [Machery]
In philosophy theories of concepts explain how our propositional attitudes have content [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / c. Concepts in psychology
By 'concept' psychologists mean various sorts of representation or structure [Machery]
Psychologists treat concepts as long-term knowledge bodies which lead to judgements [Machery]
Psychologist treat concepts as categories [Machery]
Concept theorists examine their knowledge, format, processes, acquisition and location [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
The concepts OBJECT or AGENT may be innate [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
The phrase 'the concept "horse"' can't refer to a concept, because it is saturated [Potter]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Concepts should contain working memory, not long-term, because they control behaviour [Machery]
One hybrid theory combines a core definition with a prototype for identification [Machery]
Heterogeneous concepts might have conflicting judgements, where hybrid theories will not [Machery]
Concepts as definitions was rejected, and concepts as prototypes, exemplars or theories proposed [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
The concepts for a class typically include prototypes, and exemplars, and theories [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
Many categories don't seem to have a definition [Machery]
Classical theory implies variety in processing times, but this does not generally occur [Machery]
Classical theory can't explain facts like typical examples being categorised quicker [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
Knowing typical properties of things is especially useful in induction [Machery]
The term 'prototype' is used for both typical category members, and the representation [Machery]
The prototype view predicts that typical members are easier to categorise [Machery]
Prototype theories are based on computation of similarities with the prototype [Machery]
Prototype theorists don't tell us how we select the appropriate prototype [Machery]
Maybe concepts are not the typical properties, but the ideal properties [Machery]
It is more efficient to remember the prototype, than repeatedly create it from exemplars [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / e. Concepts from exemplars
Concepts as exemplars are based on the knowledge of properties of each particular [Machery]
Exemplar theories need to explain how the relevant properties are selected from a multitude of them [Machery]
In practice, known examples take priority over the rest of the set of exemplars [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
The theory account is sometimes labelled as 'knowledge' or 'explanation' in approach [Machery]
Theory Theory says category concepts are knowledge stores explaining membership [Machery]
Theory Theory says concepts are explanatory knowledge, and concepts form domains [Machery]
Theory theorists rely on best explanation, rather than on similarities [Machery]
If categorisation is not by similarity, it seems to rely on what properties things might have [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
The word 'grandmother' may be two concepts, with a prototype and a definition [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
For behaviourists concepts are dispositions to link category members to names [Machery]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Americans are more inclined to refer causally than the Chinese are [Machery]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Compositionality should rely on the parsing tree, which may contain more than sentence components [Potter]
'Direct compositonality' says the components wholly explain a sentence meaning [Potter]
Compositionality is more welcome in logic than in linguistics (which is more contextual) [Potter]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Artifacts can be natural kinds, when they are the object of historical enquiry [Machery]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
Laws of nature have very little application in biology [Machamer/Darden/Craver]