Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C, Mark Jago and Peter F. Strawson

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34 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
7920 Descriptive metaphysics aims at actual structure, revisionary metaphysics at a better structure [Strawson,P]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
7922 Descriptive metaphysics concerns unchanging core concepts and categories [Strawson,P]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
7921 Close examination of actual word usage is the only sure way in philosophy [Strawson,P]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
10842 The fact which is stated by a true sentence is not something in the world [Strawson,P]
10843 Facts aren't exactly true statements, but they are what those statements say [Strawson,P]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
10844 The statement that it is raining perfectly fits the fact that it is raining [Strawson,P]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
10841 The word 'true' always refers to a possible statement [Strawson,P]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 7. Paraconsistency
15382 Paraconsistent reasoning can just mean responding sensibly to inconsistencies [Jago]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
8358 There are no rules for the exact logic of ordinary language, because that doesn't exist [Strawson,P]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
6413 'The present King of France is bald' presupposes existence, rather than stating it [Strawson,P, by Grayling]
8354 Russell asks when 'The King of France is wise' would be a true assertion [Strawson,P]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
16554 Activities have place, rate, duration, entities, properties, modes, direction, polarity, energy and range [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
16556 Penicillin causes nothing; the cause is what penicillin does [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
16980 We need a logical use of 'object' as predicate-worthy, and an 'ontological' use [Strawson,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
16979 It makes no sense to ask of some individual thing what it is that makes it that individual [Strawson,P]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
16562 We understand something by presenting its low-level entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
16563 The explanation is not the regularity, but the activity sustaining it [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
16555 Functions are not properties of objects, they are activities contributing to mechanisms [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
16528 Mechanisms are not just push-pull systems [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16529 Mechanisms are systems organised to produce regular change [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16530 A mechanism explains a phenomenon by showing how it was produced [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16553 Our account of mechanism combines both entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16559 Descriptions of explanatory mechanisms have a bottom level, where going further is irrelevant [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
16564 There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
9282 I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others [Strawson,P]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
16561 We can abstract by taking an exemplary case and ignoring the detail [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
9263 A person is an entity to which we can ascribe predicates of consciousness and corporeality [Strawson,P]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
8356 The meaning of an expression or sentence is general directions for its use, to refer or to assert [Strawson,P]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
10430 Reference is mainly a social phenomenon [Strawson,P, by Sainsbury]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
10448 If an expression can refer to anything, it may still instrinsically refer, but relative to a context [Bach on Strawson,P]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
8355 Expressions don't refer; people use expressions to refer [Strawson,P]
8357 If an utterance fails to refer then it is a pseudo-use, though a speaker may think they assert something [Strawson,P]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
9281 The idea of a predicate matches a range of things to which it can be applied [Strawson,P]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
16558 Laws of nature have very little application in biology [Machamer/Darden/Craver]