47 ideas
16554 | Activities have place, rate, duration, entities, properties, modes, direction, polarity, energy and range [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
16050 | The goodness of a picture supervenes on the picture; duplicates must be equally good [Hare] |
16556 | Penicillin causes nothing; the cause is what penicillin does [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
16562 | We understand something by presenting its low-level entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
6685 | 'Subjectivism' is an extension of relativism from the social group to the individual [Graham] |
16563 | The explanation is not the regularity, but the activity sustaining it [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
16555 | Functions are not properties of objects, they are activities contributing to mechanisms [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
16528 | Mechanisms are not just push-pull systems [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
16529 | Mechanisms are systems organised to produce regular change [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
16530 | A mechanism explains a phenomenon by showing how it was produced [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
16553 | Our account of mechanism combines both entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
16559 | Descriptions of explanatory mechanisms have a bottom level, where going further is irrelevant [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
16564 | There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
16561 | We can abstract by taking an exemplary case and ignoring the detail [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
6699 | The chain of consequences may not be the same as the chain of responsibility [Graham] |
2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
2855 | In primary evaluative words like 'ought' prescription is constant but description can vary [Hare, by Hooker,B] |
22331 | Moral statements are imperatives rather than the avowals of emotion - but universalisable [Hare, by Glock] |
22484 | Universalised prescriptivism could be seen as implying utilitarianism [Hare, by Foot] |
4125 | Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism [Hare, by Williams,B] |
4126 | If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views [Williams,B on Hare] |
4127 | If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors [Williams,B on Hare] |
22483 | A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on [Hare] |
2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
6698 | Negative consequences are very hard (and possibly impossible) to assess [Graham] |
6700 | We can't criticise people because of unforeseeable consequences [Graham] |
6704 | Egoism submits to desires, but cannot help form them [Graham] |
4360 | By far the easiest way of seeming upright is to be upright [Hare] |
6701 | Rescue operations need spontaneous benevolence, not careful thought [Graham] |
2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
6449 | The categorical imperative leads to utilitarianism [Hare, by Nagel] |
6693 | 'What if everybody did that?' rather misses the point as an objection to cheating [Graham] |
6691 | It is more plausible to say people can choose between values, than that they can create them [Graham] |
6688 | Life is only absurd if you expected an explanation and none turns up [Graham] |
6705 | Existentialism may transcend our nature, unlike eudaimonism [Graham] |
6690 | A standard problem for existentialism is the 'sincere Nazi' [Graham] |
6689 | The key to existentialism: the way you make choices is more important than what you choose [Graham] |
16558 | Laws of nature have very little application in biology [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
6706 | The great religions are much more concerned with the religious life than with ethics [Graham] |
6709 | Western religion saves us from death; Eastern religion saves us from immortality [Graham] |