38 ideas
| 17818 | How many? must first partition an aggregate into sets, and then logic fixes its number [Yourgrau] |
| 17822 | Nothing is 'intrinsically' numbered [Yourgrau] |
| 17817 | Defining 'three' as the principle of collection or property of threes explains set theory definitions [Yourgrau] |
| 17815 | We can't use sets as foundations for mathematics if we must await results from the upper reaches [Yourgrau] |
| 17821 | You can ask all sorts of numerical questions about any one given set [Yourgrau] |
| 16554 | Activities have place, rate, duration, entities, properties, modes, direction, polarity, energy and range [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16050 | The goodness of a picture supervenes on the picture; duplicates must be equally good [Hare] |
| 16556 | Penicillin causes nothing; the cause is what penicillin does [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16562 | We understand something by presenting its low-level entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16563 | The explanation is not the regularity, but the activity sustaining it [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16555 | Functions are not properties of objects, they are activities contributing to mechanisms [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16528 | Mechanisms are not just push-pull systems [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16529 | Mechanisms are systems organised to produce regular change [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16530 | A mechanism explains a phenomenon by showing how it was produced [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16553 | Our account of mechanism combines both entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16559 | Descriptions of explanatory mechanisms have a bottom level, where going further is irrelevant [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16564 | There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16561 | We can abstract by taking an exemplary case and ignoring the detail [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
| 2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
| 2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
| 2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
| 2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
| 2855 | In primary evaluative words like 'ought' prescription is constant but description can vary [Hare, by Hooker,B] |
| 22331 | Moral statements are imperatives rather than the avowals of emotion - but universalisable [Hare, by Glock] |
| 22484 | Universalised prescriptivism could be seen as implying utilitarianism [Hare, by Foot] |
| 4125 | Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism [Hare, by Williams,B] |
| 4126 | If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views [Williams,B on Hare] |
| 4127 | If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors [Williams,B on Hare] |
| 22483 | A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on [Hare] |
| 2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
| 2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
| 2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
| 2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
| 4360 | By far the easiest way of seeming upright is to be upright [Hare] |
| 2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
| 6449 | The categorical imperative leads to utilitarianism [Hare, by Nagel] |
| 16558 | Laws of nature have very little application in biology [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |