124 ideas
| 16227 | Philosophers are good at denying the obvious [Hawley] |
| 23657 | The existence of tensed verbs shows that not all truths are necessary truths [Reid] |
| 23655 | An ad hominem argument is good, if it is shown that the man's principles are inconsistent [Reid] |
| 16216 | Part of the sense of a proper name is a criterion of the thing's identity [Hawley] |
| 23634 | Accepting the existence of anything presupposes the notion of existence [Reid] |
| 16554 | Activities have place, rate, duration, entities, properties, modes, direction, polarity, energy and range [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16211 | A homogeneous rotating disc should be undetectable according to Humean supervenience [Hawley] |
| 16219 | Non-linguistic things cannot be indeterminate, because they don't have truth-values at all [Hawley] |
| 16223 | Maybe for the world to be vague, it must be vague in its foundations? [Hawley] |
| 16226 | Epistemic vagueness seems right in the case of persons [Hawley] |
| 16208 | Supervaluation refers to one vaguely specified thing, through satisfaction by everything in some range [Hawley] |
| 16221 | Supervaluationism takes what the truth-value would have been if indecision was resolved [Hawley] |
| 16230 | Maybe the only properties are basic ones like charge, mass and spin [Hawley] |
| 16556 | Penicillin causes nothing; the cause is what penicillin does [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 23664 | Powers are quite distinct and simple, and so cannot be defined [Reid] |
| 23669 | Thinkers say that matter has intrinsic powers, but is also passive and acted upon [Reid] |
| 23666 | It is obvious that there could not be a power without a subject which possesses it [Reid] |
| 23651 | Universals are not objects of sense and cannot be imagined - but can be conceived [Reid] |
| 23650 | Only individuals exist [Reid] |
| 23649 | No one thinks two sheets possess a single whiteness, but all agree they are both white [Reid] |
| 16232 | An object is 'natural' if its stages are linked by certain non-supervenient relations [Hawley] |
| 16200 | Are sortals spatially maximal - so no cat part is allowed to be a cat? [Hawley] |
| 16237 | The modal features of statue and lump are disputed; when does it stop being that statue? [Hawley] |
| 16238 | Perdurantists can adopt counterpart theory, to explain modal differences of identical part-sums [Hawley] |
| 16220 | Vagueness is either in our knowledge, in our talk, or in reality [Hawley] |
| 16222 | Indeterminacy in objects and in properties are not distinct cases [Hawley] |
| 16228 | The constitution theory is endurantism plus more than one object in a place [Hawley] |
| 16229 | Constitution theory needs sortal properties like 'being a sweater' to distinguish it from its thread [Hawley] |
| 14492 | If the constitution view says thread and sweater are two things, why do we talk of one thing? [Hawley] |
| 23647 | Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid] |
| 1350 | Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist [Reid] |
| 16193 | 'Adverbialism' explains change by saying an object has-at-some-time a given property [Hawley] |
| 16195 | Presentism solves the change problem: the green banana ceases, so can't 'relate' to the yellow one [Hawley] |
| 16202 | The problem of change arises if there must be 'identity' of a thing over time [Hawley] |
| 16192 | Endurance theory can relate properties to times, or timed instantiations to properties [Hawley] |
| 16196 | Endurance is a sophisticated theory, covering properties, instantiation and time [Hawley] |
| 16197 | How does perdurance theory explain our concern for our own future selves? [Hawley] |
| 16199 | If an object is the sum of all of its temporal parts, its mass is staggeringly large! [Hawley] |
| 16201 | Perdurance says things are sums of stages; Stage Theory says each stage is the thing [Hawley] |
| 16240 | If a life is essentially the sum of its temporal parts, it couldn't be shorter or longer than it was? [Hawley] |
| 16191 | Perdurance needs an atemporal perspective, to say that the object 'has' different temporal parts [Hawley] |
| 16203 | Stage Theory seems to miss out the link between stages of the same object [Hawley] |
| 16204 | Stage Theory says every stage is a distinct object, which gives too many objects [Hawley] |
| 16212 | An isolated stage can't be a banana (which involves suitable relations to other stages) [Hawley] |
| 16213 | Stages of one thing are related by extrinsic counterfactual and causal relations [Hawley] |
| 16205 | The stages of Stage Theory seem too thin to populate the world, or to be referred to [Hawley] |
| 16206 | Stages must be as fine-grained in length as change itself, so any change is a new stage [Hawley] |
| 21322 | We treat slowly changing things as identical for the sake of economy in language [Reid] |
| 21320 | Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid] |
| 1367 | Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid] |
| 11874 | Real identity admits of no degrees [Reid] |
| 16225 | If two things might be identical, there can't be something true of one and false of the other [Hawley] |
| 11958 | Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar] |
| 16239 | To decide whether something is a counterpart, we need to specify a relevant sortal concept [Hawley] |
| 16562 | We understand something by presenting its low-level entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 23659 | If someone denies that he is thinking when he is conscious of it, we can only laugh [Reid] |
| 23662 | The existence of ideas is no more obvious than the existence of external objects [Reid] |
| 23661 | We are only aware of other beings through our senses; without that, we are alone in the universe [Reid] |
| 23635 | Truths are self-evident to sensible persons who understand them clearly without prejudice [Reid] |
| 7631 | Sensation is not committed to any external object, but perception is [Reid] |
| 23637 | Primary qualities are the object of mathematics [Reid] |
| 23638 | Secondary qualities conjure up, and are confused with, the sensations which produce them [Reid] |
| 23639 | It is unclear whether a toothache is in the mind or in the tooth, but the word has a single meaning [Reid] |
| 6492 | Reid is seen as the main direct realist of the eighteenth century [Reid, by Robinson,H] |
| 23633 | Many truths seem obvious, and point to universal agreement - which is what we find [Reid] |
| 23654 | In obscure matters the few must lead the many, but the many usually lead in common sense [Reid] |
| 23644 | Without memory we could have no concept of duration [Reid] |
| 23643 | We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings) [Reid] |
| 23660 | The theory of ideas, popular with philosophers, means past existence has to be proved [Reid] |
| 23641 | People dislike believing without evidence, and try to avoid it [Reid] |
| 23642 | If non-rational evidence reaches us, it is reason which then makes use of it [Reid] |
| 23549 | We treat testimony with a natural trade off of belief and caution [Reid, by Fricker,M] |
| 16563 | The explanation is not the regularity, but the activity sustaining it [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16555 | Functions are not properties of objects, they are activities contributing to mechanisms [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16528 | Mechanisms are not just push-pull systems [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16529 | Mechanisms are systems organised to produce regular change [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16530 | A mechanism explains a phenomenon by showing how it was produced [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16553 | Our account of mechanism combines both entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16559 | Descriptions of explanatory mechanisms have a bottom level, where going further is irrelevant [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16564 | There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 1356 | A person is a unity, and doesn't come in degrees [Reid] |
| 23658 | Consciousness is an indefinable and unique operation [Reid] |
| 23665 | Consciousness is the power of mind to know itself, and minds are grounded in powers [Reid] |
| 16561 | We can abstract by taking an exemplary case and ignoring the detail [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 1359 | Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility [Reid] |
| 21319 | I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent [Reid] |
| 21323 | The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case [Reid] |
| 21321 | Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses [Reid] |
| 21324 | If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20 [Reid] |
| 21325 | Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten! [Reid] |
| 21327 | If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude [Reid] |
| 1366 | If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing [Reid] |
| 16218 | On any theory of self, it is hard to explain why we should care about our future selves [Hawley] |
| 1352 | Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't [Reid] |
| 23681 | The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid] |
| 23676 | A willed action needs reasonable understanding of what is to be done [Reid] |
| 23668 | Our own nature attributes free determinations to our own will [Reid] |
| 23680 | We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid] |
| 23652 | We must first conceive things before we can consider them [Reid] |
| 23656 | The structure of languages reveals a uniformity in basic human opinions [Reid] |
| 23630 | Only philosophers treat ideas as objects [Reid] |
| 23648 | First we notice and name attributes ('abstracting'); then we notice that subjects share them ('generalising') [Reid] |
| 23653 | If you can't distinguish the features of a complex object, your notion of it would be a muddle [Reid] |
| 23640 | Only mature minds can distinguish the qualities of a body [Reid] |
| 23629 | The ambiguity of words impedes the advancement of knowledge [Reid] |
| 23646 | Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid] |
| 23645 | A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid] |
| 20051 | Reid said that agent causation is a unique type of causation [Reid, by Stout,R] |
| 23678 | A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action [Reid] |
| 23663 | There are axioms of taste - such as a general consensus about a beautiful face [Reid] |
| 23674 | If an attempted poisoning results in benefits, we still judge the agent a poisoner [Reid] |
| 23675 | We shouldn't do to others what would be a wrong to us in similar circumstances [Reid] |
| 23672 | To be virtuous, we must care about duty [Reid] |
| 23673 | Every worthy man has a principle of honour, and knows what is honourable [Reid] |
| 23632 | Similar effects come from similar causes, and causes are only what are sufficient for the effects [Reid] |
| 8383 | Day and night are constantly conjoined, but they don't cause one another [Reid, by Crane] |
| 23677 | We all know that mere priority or constant conjunction do not have to imply causation [Reid] |
| 16215 | Causation is nothing more than the counterfactuals it grounds? [Hawley] |
| 23667 | Regular events don't imply a cause, without an innate conviction of universal causation [Reid] |
| 23679 | The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid] |
| 23670 | Scientists don't know the cause of magnetism, and only discover its regulations [Reid] |
| 23671 | Laws are rules for effects, but these need a cause; rules of navigation don't navigate [Reid] |
| 16558 | Laws of nature have very little application in biology [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16207 | Time could be discrete (like integers) or dense (rationals) or continuous (reals) [Hawley] |