431 ideas
3067 | A philosopher should have principles ready for understanding, like a surgeon with instruments [Aurelius] |
7396 | Hobbes created English-language philosophy [Hobbes, by Tuck] |
16281 | Honesty requires philosophical theories we can commit to with our ordinary commonsense [Lewis] |
17240 | Definitions are the first step in philosophy [Hobbes] |
6211 | Laughter is a sudden glory in realising the infirmity of others, or our own formerly [Hobbes] |
21461 | I tried to be unsystematic and piecemeal, but failed; my papers presuppose my other views [Lewis] |
16288 | Analysis reduces primitives and makes understanding explicit (without adding new knowledge) [Lewis] |
15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
8014 | Resolve a complex into simple elements, then reconstruct the complex by using them [Hobbes, by MacIntyre] |
8605 | In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive [Lewis] |
15457 | Interdefinition is useless by itself, but if we grasp one separately, we have them both [Lewis] |
15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
17237 | Definitions of things that are caused must express their manner of generation [Hobbes] |
17239 | Definition is resolution of names into successive genera, and finally the difference [Hobbes] |
17241 | A defined name should not appear in the definition [Hobbes] |
3993 | Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis] |
17242 | 'Petitio principii' is reusing the idea to be defined, in disguised words [Hobbes] |
10845 | To be true a sentence must express a proposition, and not be ambiguous or vague or just expressive [Lewis] |
9651 | Verisimilitude might be explained as being close to the possible world where the truth is exact [Lewis] |
15557 | Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis] |
10847 | Truthmakers are about existential grounding, not about truth [Lewis] |
15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
15549 | If it were true that nothing at all existed, would that have a truthmaker? [Lewis] |
14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
10846 | Truthmaker is correspondence, but without the requirement to be one-to-one [Lewis] |
16456 | For modality Lewis rejected boxes and diamonds, preferring worlds, and an index for the actual one [Lewis, by Stalnaker] |
18395 | Sets are mereological sums of the singletons of their members [Lewis, by Armstrong] |
15496 | We can build set theory on singletons: classes are then fusions of subclasses, membership is the singleton [Lewis] |
10807 | Mathematics reduces to set theory, which reduces, with some mereology, to the singleton function [Lewis] |
15500 | Classes divide into subclasses in many ways, but into members in only one way [Lewis] |
15499 | A subclass of a subclass is itself a subclass; a member of a member is not in general a member [Lewis] |
15503 | We needn't accept this speck of nothingness, this black hole in the fabric of Reality! [Lewis] |
15498 | We can accept the null set, but there is no null class of anything [Lewis] |
15502 | There are four main reasons for asserting that there is an empty set [Lewis] |
10809 | We can accept the null set, but not a null class, a class lacking members [Lewis] |
10811 | The null set plays the role of last resort, for class abstracts and for existence [Lewis] |
10812 | The null set is not a little speck of sheer nothingness, a black hole in Reality [Lewis] |
15506 | If we don't understand the singleton, then we don't understand classes [Lewis] |
15497 | We can replace the membership relation with the member-singleton relation (plus mereology) [Lewis] |
15511 | If singleton membership is external, why is an object a member of one rather than another? [Lewis] |
15513 | Maybe singletons have a structure, of a thing and a lasso? [Lewis] |
10813 | What on earth is the relationship between a singleton and an element? [Lewis] |
10814 | Are all singletons exact intrinsic duplicates? [Lewis] |
15507 | Set theory has some unofficial axioms, generalisations about how to understand it [Lewis] |
10191 | Set theory reduces to a mereological theory with singletons as the only atoms [Lewis, by MacBride] |
15508 | If singletons are where their members are, then so are all sets [Lewis] |
15514 | A huge part of Reality is only accepted as existing if you have accepted set theory [Lewis] |
15523 | Set theory isn't innocent; it generates infinities from a single thing; but mathematics needs it [Lewis] |
10806 | Megethology is the result of adding plural quantification to mereology [Lewis] |
17245 | A part of a part is a part of a whole [Hobbes] |
10816 | We can use mereology to simulate quantification over relations [Lewis] |
15533 | We can quantify over fictions by quantifying for real over their names [Lewis] |
15731 | Quantification sometimes commits to 'sets', but sometimes just to pluralities (or 'classes') [Lewis] |
15525 | Plural quantification lacks a complete axiom system [Lewis] |
15518 | I like plural quantification, but am not convinced of its connection with second-order logic [Lewis] |
15534 | We could quantify over impossible objects - as bundles of properties [Lewis] |
14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
17258 | If we just say one, one, one, one, we don't know where we have got to [Hobbes] |
10808 | Mathematics is generalisations about singleton functions [Lewis] |
15524 | Zermelo's model of arithmetic is distinctive because it rests on a primitive of set theory [Lewis] |
15517 | Giving up classes means giving up successful mathematics because of dubious philosophy [Lewis] |
15515 | To be a structuralist, you quantify over relations [Lewis] |
10815 | We don't need 'abstract structures' to have structural truths about successor functions [Lewis] |
15532 | 'Allists' embrace the existence of all controversial entities; 'noneists' reject all but the obvious ones [Lewis] |
15535 | We can't accept a use of 'existence' that says only some of the things there are actually exist [Lewis] |
15789 | Lewis's distinction of 'existing' from 'being actual' is Meinong's between 'existing' and 'subsisting' [Lycan on Lewis] |
10470 | There are only two kinds: sets, and possibilia (actual and possible particulars) [Lewis, by Oliver] |
15520 | Existence doesn't come in degrees; once asserted, it can't then be qualified [Lewis] |
16789 | Only supernatural means could annihilate anything once it had being [Hobbes] |
14401 | Every proposition is entirely about being [Lewis] |
3072 | Everything is changing, including yourself and the whole universe [Aurelius] |
17253 | Change is nothing but movement [Hobbes] |
15540 | You can't deny temporary intrinsic properties by saying the properties are relations (to times) [Lewis] |
15561 | The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation [Lewis] |
15565 | Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence [Lewis] |
15566 | Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts [Lewis] |
15567 | Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges [Lewis] |
15564 | An event is a property of a unique space-time region [Lewis] |
8607 | Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability [Lewis] |
3990 | The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis] |
9650 | Supervenience concerns whether things could differ, so it is a modal notion [Lewis] |
3991 | Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis] |
8606 | A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation [Lewis] |
16210 | Humean supervenience says the world is just a vast mosaic of qualities in space-time [Lewis] |
15501 | We have no idea of a third sort of thing, that isn't an individual, a class, or their mixture [Lewis] |
15504 | Atomless gunk is an individual whose parts all have further proper parts [Lewis] |
14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
8580 | Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically [Lewis] |
7559 | Every part of the universe is body, and non-body is not part of it [Hobbes] |
8909 | Abstractions may well be verbal fictions, in which we ignore some features of an object [Lewis] |
15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
16458 | Semantic vagueness involves alternative and equal precisifications of the language [Lewis] |
9057 | Vagueness is semantic indecision: we haven't settled quite what our words are meant to express [Lewis] |
9671 | Whether or not France is hexagonal depends on your standards of precision [Lewis] |
15538 | Semantic indecision explains vagueness (if we have precisifications to be undecided about) [Lewis] |
15751 | Surely 'slept in by Washington' is a property of some bed? [Lewis] |
8571 | Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around [Lewis] |
15735 | Properties don't have degree; they are determinate, and things have varying relations to them [Lewis] |
9656 | The 'abundant' properties are just any bizarre property you fancy [Lewis] |
15737 | To be a 'property' is to suit a theoretical role [Lewis] |
14979 | Being alone doesn't guarantee intrinsic properties; 'being alone' is itself extrinsic [Lewis, by Sider] |
15454 | Extrinsic properties come in degrees, with 'brother' less extrinsic than 'sibling' [Lewis] |
15742 | A disjunctive property can be unnatural, but intrinsic if its disjuncts are intrinsic [Lewis] |
15397 | If a global intrinsic never varies between possible duplicates, all necessary properties are intrinsic [Cameron on Lewis] |
15398 | Global intrinsic may make necessarily coextensive properties both intrinsic or both extrinsic [Cameron on Lewis] |
15435 | If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate [Lewis] |
15400 | We must avoid circularity between what is intrinsic and what is natural [Lewis, by Cameron] |
15458 | A property is 'intrinsic' iff it can never differ between duplicates [Lewis] |
15459 | Ellipsoidal stars seem to have an intrinsic property which depends on other objects [Lewis] |
15741 | All of the natural properties are included among the intrinsic properties [Lewis] |
15752 | We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them [Lewis] |
10717 | Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Lewis, by Oliver] |
16217 | Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Lewis, by Hawley] |
8613 | Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated [Lewis] |
8585 | Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties [Lewis] |
8586 | Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains [Lewis] |
8589 | For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes [Lewis] |
15460 | All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis, by Lewis] |
15726 | Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals [Lewis] |
14996 | Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity... [Lewis] |
15744 | We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance [Lewis] |
15743 | Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular [Lewis] |
15740 | I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world [Lewis] |
16262 | Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness [Lewis, by Maudlin] |
15451 | I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis] |
7031 | Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Lewis, by Heil] |
8572 | Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis] |
15464 | The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion [Lewis] |
16670 | Accidents are just modes of thinking about bodies [Hobbes] |
18433 | There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify [Lewis] |
8604 | We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions [Lewis] |
15739 | There is the property of belonging to a set, so abundant properties are as numerous as the sets [Lewis] |
15563 | Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables [Lewis] |
10723 | A property is the set of its actual and possible instances [Lewis, by Oliver] |
14499 | Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki] |
4038 | Properties are sets of their possible instances (which separates 'renate' from 'cordate') [Lewis, by Mellor/Oliver] |
15399 | The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F [Lewis, by Cameron] |
15732 | Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set [Lewis] |
15733 | Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances [Lewis] |
15734 | If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too [Lewis] |
15516 | A property is any class of possibilia [Lewis] |
9655 | Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds [Lewis] |
16290 | I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals [Lewis] |
9653 | It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances [Lewis] |
16621 | Accidents are not parts of bodies (like blood in a cloth); they have accidents as things have a size [Hobbes] |
9657 | You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it [Lewis] |
15433 | Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis] |
15750 | Tropes need a similarity primitive, so they cannot be used to explain similarity [Lewis] |
15749 | Trope theory (unlike universals) needs a primitive notion of being duplicates [Lewis] |
15748 | Trope theory needs a primitive notion for what unites some tropes [Lewis] |
9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
15463 | All dispositions must have causal bases [Lewis] |
16734 | The complete power of an event is just the aggregate of the qualities that produced it [Hobbes] |
15120 | Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne] |
15554 | A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis] |
15461 | A 'finkish' disposition is real, but disappears when the stimulus occurs [Lewis] |
8573 | Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis] |
8569 | I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done [Lewis] |
15745 | Universals recur, are multiply located, wholly present, make things overlap, and are held in common [Lewis] |
15453 | The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory [Lewis] |
15746 | If particles were just made of universals, similar particles would be the same particle [Lewis] |
15436 | Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance [Lewis] |
21961 | Physics aims to discover which universals actually exist [Lewis, by Moore,AW] |
15747 | Universals aren't parts of things, because that relationship is transitive, and universals need not be [Lewis] |
17247 | The only generalities or universals are names or signs [Hobbes] |
8576 | The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches) [Lewis] |
15438 | We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis] |
8570 | To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things [Lewis] |
8574 | Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same [Lewis] |
15455 | Total intrinsic properties give us what a thing is [Lewis] |
14960 | Bodies are independent of thought, and coincide with part of space [Hobbes] |
17250 | If you separate the two places of one thing, you will also separate the thing [Hobbes] |
17249 | If you separated two things in the same place, you would also separate the places [Hobbes] |
17248 | If a whole body is moved, its parts must move with it [Hobbes] |
15537 | If cats are vague, we deny that the many cats are one, or deny that the one cat is many [Lewis] |
15536 | We have one cloud, but many possible boundaries and aggregates for it [Lewis] |
15452 | We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures [Lewis] |
15448 | The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts [Lewis] |
15449 | If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals [Lewis] |
15439 | The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis] |
15441 | The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over [Lewis] |
15445 | Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures [Lewis] |
15434 | Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts [Lewis] |
15437 | We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals [Lewis] |
16620 | A chair is wood, and its shape is the form; it isn't 'compounded' of the matter and form [Hobbes] |
15446 | Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples [Lewis] |
14748 | The many are many and the one is one, so they can't be identical [Lewis] |
6129 | Lewis affirms 'composition as identity' - that an object is no more than its parts [Lewis, by Merricks] |
16790 | A body is always the same, whether the parts are together or dispersed [Hobbes] |
14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
15512 | In mereology no two things consist of the same atoms [Lewis] |
15519 | Trout-turkeys exist, despite lacking cohesion, natural joints and united causal power [Lewis] |
15521 | Given cats, a fusion of cats adds nothing further to reality [Lewis] |
15522 | The one has different truths from the many; it is one rather than many, one rather than six [Lewis] |
17244 | To make a whole, parts needn't be put together, but can be united in the mind [Hobbes] |
14244 | Lewis only uses fusions to create unities, but fusions notoriously flatten our distinctions [Oliver/Smiley on Lewis] |
10660 | A commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment; it is them and they are it [Lewis] |
10810 | I say that absolutely any things can have a mereological fusion [Lewis] |
9667 | Mereological composition is unrestricted: any class of things has a mereological sum [Lewis] |
13268 | There are no restrictions on composition, because they would be vague, and composition can't be vague [Lewis, by Sider] |
15440 | A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology [Lewis] |
15444 | Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times [Lewis] |
10566 | Lewis prefers giving up singletons to giving up sums [Lewis, by Fine,K] |
11976 | Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis] |
17233 | Particulars contain universal things [Hobbes] |
13793 | An essential property is one possessed by all counterparts [Lewis, by Elder] |
17246 | Some accidental features are permanent, unless the object perishes [Hobbes] |
17251 | The feature which picks out or names a thing is usually called its 'essence' [Hobbes] |
16622 | Essence is just an artificial word from logic, giving a way of thinking about substances [Hobbes] |
9663 | A thing 'perdures' if it has separate temporal parts, and 'endures' if it is wholly present at different times [Lewis] |
14737 | Properties cannot be relations to times, if there are temporary properties which are intrinsic [Lewis, by Sider] |
9664 | Endurance is the wrong account, because things change intrinsic properties like shape [Lewis] |
9665 | There are three responses to the problem that intrinsic shapes do not endure [Lewis] |
17257 | It is the same river if it has the same source, no matter what flows in it [Hobbes] |
12853 | Some individuate the ship by unity of matter, and others by unity of form [Hobbes] |
17256 | If a new ship were made of the discarded planks, would two ships be numerically the same? [Hobbes] |
19280 | I can ask questions which create a context in which origin ceases to be essential [Lewis] |
16794 | As an infant, Socrates was not the same body, but he was the same human being [Hobbes] |
15968 | Identity is simple - absolutely everything is self-identical, and nothing is identical to another thing [Lewis] |
15969 | Two things can never be identical, so there is no problem [Lewis] |
17255 | Two bodies differ when (at some time) you can say something of one you can't say of the other [Hobbes] |
16079 | De re modal predicates are ambiguous [Lewis, by Rudder Baker] |
11978 | Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis] |
6215 | 'Contingent' means that the cause is unperceived, not that there is no cause [Hobbes] |
15560 | We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis] |
14283 | A conditional probability does not measure the probability of the truth of any proposition [Lewis, by Edgington] |
14361 | Lewis says indicative conditionals are truth-functional [Lewis, by Jackson] |
8434 | In good counterfactuals the consequent holds in world like ours except that the antecedent is true [Lewis, by Horwich] |
8425 | For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis] |
15462 | Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents [Lewis] |
16582 | We can imagine a point swelling and contracting - but not how this could be done [Hobbes] |
9660 | The impossible can be imagined as long as it is a bit vague [Lewis] |
9669 | There are no free-floating possibilia; they have mates in a world, giving them extrinsic properties [Lewis] |
16133 | Possible worlds can contain contradictions if such worlds are seen as fictions [Lewis] |
16132 | On mountains or in worlds, reporting contradictions is contradictory, so no such truths can be reported [Lewis] |
16283 | For me, all worlds are equal, with each being actual relative to itself [Lewis] |
12255 | For Lewis there is no real possibility, since all possibilities are actual [Oderberg on Lewis] |
9219 | Lewis posits possible worlds just as Quine says that physics needs numbers and sets [Lewis, by Sider] |
15022 | If possible worlds really exist, then they are part of actuality [Sider on Lewis] |
10469 | A world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated things [Lewis] |
15790 | Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible [Lycan on Lewis] |
18415 | The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
15791 | What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? [Lycan on Lewis] |
16441 | Lewis rejects actualism because he identifies properties with sets [Lewis, by Stalnaker] |
16282 | Ersatzers say we have one world, and abstract representations of how it might have been [Lewis] |
16284 | Ersatz worlds represent either through language, or by models, or magically [Lewis] |
16286 | Linguistic possible worlds need a complete supply of unique names for each thing [Lewis] |
16287 | Maximal consistency for a world seems a modal distinction, concerning what could be true together [Lewis] |
9662 | Linguistic possible worlds have problems of inconsistencies, no indiscernibles, and vocabulary [Lewis] |
7690 | If sets exist, then defining worlds as proposition sets implies an odd distinction between existing and actual [Jacquette on Lewis] |
11979 | It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis] |
15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
16994 | Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis] |
11974 | Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis] |
11975 | If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis] |
11977 | Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis] |
14404 | The counterpart relation is sortal-relative, so objects need not be a certain way [Lewis, by Merricks] |
5440 | A counterpart in a possible world is sufficiently similar, and more similar than anything else [Lewis, by Mautner] |
5441 | Why should statements about what my 'counterpart' could have done interest me? [Mautner on Lewis] |
16291 | In counterpart theory 'Humphrey' doesn't name one being, but a mereological sum of many beings [Lewis] |
11903 | Extreme haecceitists could say I might have been a poached egg, but it is too remote to consider [Lewis, by Mackie,P] |
15129 | Haecceitism implies de re differences but qualitative identity [Lewis] |
9670 | Extreme haecceitism says you might possibly be a poached egg [Lewis] |
16392 | A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property [Lewis, by Recanati] |
12899 | The timid student has knowledge without belief, lacking confidence in their correct answer [Lewis] |
12897 | To say S knows P, but cannot eliminate not-P, sounds like a contradiction [Lewis] |
15509 | Some say qualities are parts of things - as repeatable universals, or as particulars [Lewis] |
16638 | The qualities of the world are mere appearances; reality is the motions which cause them [Hobbes] |
2356 | Appearance and reality can be separated by mirrors and echoes [Hobbes] |
16688 | Evidence is conception, which is imagination, which proceeds from the senses [Hobbes] |
7405 | Experience can't prove universal truths [Hobbes] |
12898 | Justification is neither sufficient nor necessary for knowledge [Lewis] |
16279 | General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics [Lewis] |
12895 | Knowing is context-sensitive because the domain of quantification varies [Lewis, by Cohen,S] |
19562 | We have knowledge if alternatives are eliminated, but appropriate alternatives depend on context [Lewis, by Cohen,S] |
2357 | Dreams must be false because they seem absurd, but dreams don't see waking as absurd [Hobbes] |
15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
9661 | Induction is just reasonable methods of inferring the unobserved from the observed [Lewis] |
9652 | To just expect unexamined emeralds to be grue would be totally unreasonable [Lewis] |
15559 | Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis] |
15556 | Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis] |
15558 | A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis] |
17238 | Science aims to show causes and generation of things [Hobbes] |
9658 | An explanation tells us how an event was caused [Lewis] |
4809 | Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos] |
16280 | Often explanaton seeks fundamental laws, rather than causal histories [Lewis] |
14321 | To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis] |
16274 | If the well-ordering of a pack of cards was by shuffling, the explanation would make it more surprising [Lewis] |
3995 | A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis] |
8209 | Part of the folk concept of qualia is what makes recognition and comparison possible [Lewis] |
17260 | Imagination is just weakened sensation [Hobbes] |
15450 | Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction [Lewis] |
19373 | A 'conatus' is an initial motion, experienced by us as desire or aversion [Hobbes, by Arthur,R] |
2358 | Freedom is absence of opposition to action; the idea of 'free will' is absurd [Hobbes] |
2384 | Those actions that follow immediately the last appetite are voluntary [Hobbes] |
6213 | A man cannot will to will, or will to will to will, so the idea of a voluntary will is absurd [Hobbes] |
2385 | If a man suddenly develops an intention of doing something, the cause is out of his control, not in his will [Hobbes] |
8424 | Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis] |
6214 | Liberty and necessity are consistent, as when water freely flows, by necessity [Hobbes] |
7441 | Experiences are defined by their causal role, and causal roles belong to physical states [Lewis] |
7442 | 'Pain' contingently names the state that occupies the causal role of pain [Lewis] |
7444 | Type-type psychophysical identity is combined with a functional characterisation of pain [Lewis] |
6208 | Conceptions and apparitions are just motion in some internal substance of the head [Hobbes] |
2948 | Sensation is merely internal motion of the sentient being [Hobbes] |
7445 | The application of 'pain' to physical states is non-rigid and contingent [Lewis] |
3994 | Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis] |
8579 | Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism [Lewis] |
3989 | I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis] |
7443 | A theory must be mixed, to cover qualia without behaviour, and behaviour without qualia [Lewis, by PG] |
18416 | Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon] |
23987 | The 'simple passions' are appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief [Hobbes, by Goldie] |
17261 | Apart from pleasure and pain, the only emotions are appetite and aversion [Hobbes] |
3992 | Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis] |
16390 | Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time [Lewis, by Recanati] |
3996 | Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis] |
17236 | Words are not for communication, but as marks for remembering what we have learned [Hobbes] |
3998 | If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis] |
3997 | Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis] |
3999 | A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis] |
4000 | Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis] |
8901 | Abstraction is usually explained either by example, or conflation, or abstraction, or negatively [Lewis] |
8904 | The Way of Abstraction says an incomplete description of a concrete entity is the complete abstraction [Lewis] |
8938 | The Way of Example compares donkeys and numbers, but what is the difference, and what are numbers? [Lewis] |
8903 | Abstracta can be causal: sets can be causes or effects; there can be universal effects; events may be sets [Lewis] |
8902 | If abstractions are non-spatial, then both sets and universals seem to have locations [Lewis] |
8905 | If universals or tropes are parts of things, then abstraction picks out those parts [Lewis] |
8906 | If we can abstract the extrinsic relations and features of objects, abstraction isn't universals or tropes [Lewis] |
8907 | The abstract direction of a line is the equivalence class of it and all lines parallel to it [Lewis] |
8908 | For most sets, the concept of equivalence is too artificial to explain abstraction [Lewis] |
15443 | Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one [Lewis] |
16289 | We can't account for an abstraction as 'from' something if the something doesn't exist [Lewis] |
18418 | A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
16278 | A particular functional role is what gives content to a thought [Lewis] |
14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |
8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
9654 | A proposition is a set of entire possible worlds which instantiate a particular property [Lewis] |
15736 | A proposition is the property of being a possible world where it holds true [Lewis] |
15738 | Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds [Lewis] |
8614 | A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth [Lewis] |
8615 | We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity [Lewis] |
15539 | Basic to pragmatics is taking a message in a way that makes sense of it [Lewis] |
2362 | The will is just the last appetite before action [Hobbes] |
7408 | It is an error that reason should control the passions, which give right guidance on their own [Hobbes, by Tuck] |
2363 | Reason is usually general, but deliberation is of particulars [Hobbes] |
7407 | Good and evil are what please us; goodness and badness the powers causing them [Hobbes] |
2360 | 'Good' is just what we desire, and 'Evil' what we hate [Hobbes] |
7410 | Self-preservation is basic, and people judge differently about that, implying ethical relativism [Hobbes, by Tuck] |
2368 | Men's natural desires are no sin, and neither are their actions, until law makes it so [Hobbes] |
3066 | Nothing is evil which is according to nature [Aurelius] |
6209 | There is no absolute good, for even the goodness of God is goodness to us [Hobbes] |
2359 | Desire and love are the same, but in the desire the object is absent, and in love it is present [Hobbes] |
2370 | All voluntary acts aim at some good for the doer [Hobbes] |
7409 | Hobbes shifted from talk of 'the good' to talk of 'rights' [Hobbes, by Tuck] |
6210 | Life has no end (not even happiness), because we have desires, which presuppose a further end [Hobbes] |
3071 | Justice has no virtue opposed to it, but pleasure has temperance opposed to it [Aurelius] |
2371 | A contract is a mutual transfer of rights [Hobbes] |
2372 | The person who performs first in a contract is said to 'merit' the return, and is owed it [Hobbes] |
8015 | Hobbes wants a contract to found morality, but shared values are needed to make a contract [MacIntyre on Hobbes] |
5337 | For Hobbes the Golden Rule concerns not doing things, whereas Jesus encourages active love [Hobbes, by Flanagan] |
2374 | In the violent state of nature, the merest suspicion is enough to justify breaking a contract [Hobbes] |
8016 | Fear of sanctions is the only motive for acceptance of authority that Hobbes can think of [MacIntyre on Hobbes] |
2375 | Suspicion will not destroy a contract, if there is a common power to enforce it [Hobbes] |
2377 | No one who admitted to not keeping contracts could ever be accepted as a citizen [Hobbes] |
2379 | If there is a good reason for breaking a contract, the same reason should have stopped the making of it [Hobbes] |
2373 | The first performer in a contract is handing himself over to an enemy [Hobbes] |
2382 | Someone who keeps all his contracts when others are breaking them is making himself a prey to others [Hobbes] |
3069 | The art of life is more like the wrestler's than the dancer's [Aurelius] |
2383 | Virtues are a means to peaceful, sociable and comfortable living [Hobbes] |
2376 | Injustice is the failure to keep a contract, and justice is the constant will to give what is owed [Hobbes] |
3065 | Humans are naturally made for co-operation [Aurelius] |
2367 | In time of war the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short [Hobbes] |
19764 | Hobbes attributed to savages the passions which arise in a law-bound society [Hobbes, by Rousseau] |
20566 | Hobbes says the people voluntarily give up their sovereignty, in a contract with a ruler [Hobbes, by Oksala] |
2366 | There is not enough difference between people for one to claim more benefit than another [Hobbes] |
20485 | Hobbes says people are roughly equal; Locke says there is no right to impose inequality [Hobbes, by Wolff,J] |
2369 | If we seek peace and defend ourselves, we must compromise on our rights [Hobbes] |
20484 | We should obey the laws of nature, provided other people are also obeying them [Hobbes, by Wolff,J] |
7573 | The legal positivism of Hobbes said law is just formal or procedural [Hobbes, by Jolley] |
2380 | Punishment should only be for reform or deterrence [Hobbes] |
23609 | I act justly if I follow my Prince in an apparently unjust war, and refusing to fight would be injustice [Hobbes] |
2361 | If fear of unknown powers is legal it is religion, if it is illegal it is superstition [Hobbes] |
6212 | Lust involves pleasure, and also the sense of power in pleasing others [Hobbes] |
16600 | Prime matter is body considered with mere size and extension, and potential [Hobbes] |
15562 | Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence [Lewis] |
17252 | Acting on a body is either creating or destroying a property in it [Hobbes] |
15555 | Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis] |
8405 | A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H] |
8427 | I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis] |
8433 | There are few traces of an event before it happens, but many afterwards [Lewis, by Horwich] |
17254 | An effect needs a sufficient and necessary cause [Hobbes] |
10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
15551 | Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis] |
15552 | We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis] |
8421 | Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis] |
2364 | Causation is only observation of similar events following each other, with nothing visible in between [Hobbes] |
17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
15553 | Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis] |
8608 | Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past [Lewis] |
8584 | Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption [Lewis] |
9659 | Causation is when at the closest world without the cause, there is no effect either [Lewis] |
17235 | A cause is the complete sum of the features which necessitate the effect [Hobbes] |
8581 | Physics discovers laws and causal explanations, and also the natural properties required [Lewis] |
15727 | Physics aims for a list of natural properties [Lewis] |
9409 | Laws are the best axiomatization of the total history of world events or facts [Lewis, by Mumford] |
9423 | If simplicity and strength are criteria for laws of nature, that introduces a subjective element [Mumford on Lewis] |
9424 | A number of systematizations might tie as the best and most coherent system [Mumford on Lewis] |
9419 | A law of nature is a general axiom of the deductive system that is best for simplicity and strength [Lewis] |
9425 | Lewis later proposed the axioms at the intersection of the best theories (which may be few) [Mumford on Lewis] |
8611 | A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system [Lewis] |
4398 | An event causes another just if the second event would not have happened without the first [Lewis, by Psillos] |
4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |
9426 | The world is just a vast mosaic of little matters of local particular fact [Lewis] |
17234 | Motion is losing one place and acquiring another [Hobbes] |
17259 | 'Force' is the quantity of movement imposed on something [Hobbes] |
9666 | It is quite implausible that the future is unreal, as that would terminate everything [Lewis] |
23019 | The interesting time travel is when personal and external time come apart [Lewis, by Baron/Miller] |
23021 | Lewis said it might just be that travellers to the past can't kill their grandfathers [Lewis, by Baron/Miller] |
17243 | Past times can't exist anywhere, apart from in our memories [Hobbes] |
7411 | The attributes of God just show our inability to conceive his nature [Hobbes] |
2365 | Religion is built on ignorance and misinterpretation of what is unknown or frightening [Hobbes] |
2378 | Belief in an afterlife is based on poorly founded gossip [Hobbes] |