Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Marga Reimer, Alvin I. Goldman and Michal Walicki

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36 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
If the only aim was consistent beliefs then new evidence and experiments would be irrelevant [Goldman]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Post proved the consistency of propositional logic in 1921 [Walicki]
Propositional language can only relate statements as the same or as different [Walicki]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Boolean connectives are interpreted as functions on the set {1,0} [Walicki]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
The empty set is useful for defining sets by properties, when the members are not yet known [Walicki]
The empty set avoids having to take special precautions in case members vanish [Walicki]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 6. Ordering in Sets
Ordinals play the central role in set theory, providing the model of well-ordering [Walicki]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
To determine the patterns in logic, one must identify its 'building blocks' [Walicki]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
A 'model' of a theory specifies interpreting a language in a domain to make all theorems true [Walicki]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
The L-S Theorem says no theory (even of reals) says more than a natural number theory [Walicki]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
A compact axiomatisation makes it possible to understand a field as a whole [Walicki]
Axiomatic systems are purely syntactic, and do not presuppose any interpretation [Walicki]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Ordinals are transitive sets of transitive sets; or transitive sets totally ordered by inclusion [Walicki]
Ordinals are the empty set, union with the singleton, and any arbitrary union of ordinals [Walicki]
The union of finite ordinals is the first 'limit ordinal'; 2ω is the second... [Walicki]
Two infinite ordinals can represent a single infinite cardinal [Walicki]
Members of ordinals are ordinals, and also subsets of ordinals [Walicki]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Children may have three innate principles which enable them to learn to count [Goldman]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
In non-Euclidean geometry, all Euclidean theorems are valid that avoid the fifth postulate [Walicki]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
Inductive proof depends on the choice of the ordering [Walicki]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Rat behaviour reveals a considerable ability to count [Goldman]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
Infant brains appear to have inbuilt ontological categories [Goldman]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Scotus based modality on semantic consistency, instead of on what the future could allow [Walicki]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Elephants can be correctly identified from as few as three primitive shapes [Goldman]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
The way in which colour experiences are evoked is physically odd and unpredictable [Goldman]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Gestalt psychology proposes inbuilt proximity, similarity, smoothness and closure principles [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
A belief can be justified when the person has forgotten the evidence for it [Goldman]
We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman]
Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman]
Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
If justified beliefs are well-formed beliefs, then animals and young children have them [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Justification depends on the reliability of its cause, where reliable processes tend to produce truth [Goldman]
Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman]