Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Marga Reimer, Catherine Z. Elgin and John Hawthorne

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21 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
8616 How can multiple statements, none of which is tenable, conjoin to yield a tenable conclusion? [Elgin]
8617 Statements that are consistent, cotenable and supportive are roughly true [Elgin]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
18946 Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
15127 A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own [Hawthorne]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
15123 Is the causal profile of a property its essence? [Hawthorne]
15122 Could two different properties have the same causal profile? [Hawthorne]
15124 If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power [Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / a. Scattered objects
14590 If we accept scattered objects such as archipelagos, why not think of cars that way? [Hawthorne]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
15128 We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
15121 An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
14591 Four-dimensionalists say instantaneous objects are more fundamental than long-lived ones [Hawthorne]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
8970 Our notion of identical sets involves identical members, which needs absolute identity [Hawthorne]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
14589 A modal can reverse meaning if the context is seen differently, so maybe context is all? [Hawthorne]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
19553 Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
19551 How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
19552 We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
19554 Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
8618 Coherence is a justification if truth is its best explanation (not skill in creating fiction) [Elgin]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
15126 Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns [Hawthorne]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 6. Laws as Numerical
15125 We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else [Hawthorne]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
14588 Modern metaphysicians tend to think space-time points are more fundamental than space-time regions [Hawthorne]