Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Mark Colyvan, Simon Critchley and John Hawthorne

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


62 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
Philosophy really got started as the rival mode of discourse to tragedy [Critchley]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
Philosophy begins in disappointment, notably in religion and politics [Critchley]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Humour can give a phenomenological account of existence, and point to change [Critchley]
Humour is practically enacted philosophy [Critchley]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
If infatuation with science leads to bad scientism, its rejection leads to obscurantism [Critchley]
Scientism is the view that everything can be explained causally through scientific method [Critchley]
Science gives us an excessively theoretical view of life [Critchley]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
To meet the division in our life, try the Subject, Nature, Spirit, Will, Power, Praxis, Unconscious, or Being [Critchley]
The French keep returning, to Hegel or Nietzsche or Marx [Critchley]
German idealism aimed to find a unifying principle for Kant's various dualisms [Critchley]
Since Hegel, continental philosophy has been linked with social and historical enquiry. [Critchley]
Continental philosophy fights the threatened nihilism in the critique of reason [Critchley]
Continental philosophy is based on critique, praxis and emancipation [Critchley]
Continental philosophy has a bad tendency to offer 'one big thing' to explain everything [Critchley]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
Phenomenology is a technique of redescription which clarifies our social world [Critchley]
Phenomenology uncovers and redescribes the pre-theoretical layer of life [Critchley]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
Showing a disproof is impossible is not a proof, so don't eliminate double negation [Colyvan]
Rejecting double negation elimination undermines reductio proofs [Colyvan]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded middle says P or not-P; bivalence says P is either true or false [Colyvan]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
Löwenheim proved his result for a first-order sentence, and Skolem generalised it [Colyvan]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Axioms are 'categorical' if all of their models are isomorphic [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Ordinal numbers represent order relations [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Intuitionists only accept a few safe infinities [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / j. Infinite divisibility
Infinitesimals were sometimes zero, and sometimes close to zero [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
Reducing real numbers to rationals suggested arithmetic as the foundation of maths [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
Transfinite induction moves from all cases, up to the limit ordinal [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Most mathematical proofs are using set theory, but without saying so [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Structuralism say only 'up to isomorphism' matters because that is all there is to it [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
If 'in re' structures relies on the world, does the world contain rich enough structures? [Colyvan]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own [Hawthorne]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Is the causal profile of a property its essence? [Hawthorne]
If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power [Hawthorne]
Could two different properties have the same causal profile? [Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / a. Scattered objects
If we accept scattered objects such as archipelagos, why not think of cars that way? [Hawthorne]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
Four-dimensionalists say instantaneous objects are more fundamental than long-lived ones [Hawthorne]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Our notion of identical sets involves identical members, which needs absolute identity [Hawthorne]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
A modal can reverse meaning if the context is seen differently, so maybe context is all? [Hawthorne]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Probability supports Bayesianism better as degrees of belief than as ratios of frequencies [Colyvan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Mathematics can reveal structural similarities in diverse systems [Colyvan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
Mathematics can show why some surprising events have to occur [Colyvan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / m. Explanation by proof
Proof by cases (by 'exhaustion') is said to be unexplanatory [Colyvan]
Reductio proofs do not seem to be very explanatory [Colyvan]
If inductive proofs hold because of the structure of natural numbers, they may explain theorems [Colyvan]
Can a proof that no one understands (of the four-colour theorem) really be a proof? [Colyvan]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Mathematical generalisation is by extending a system, or by abstracting away from it [Colyvan]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
Wallace Stevens is the greatest philosophical poet of the twentieth century in English [Critchley]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Interesting art is always organised around ethical demands [Critchley]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
The problems is not justifying ethics, but motivating it. Why should a self seek its good? [Critchley]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Food first, then ethics [Critchley]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
Perceiving meaninglessness is an achievement, which can transform daily life [Critchley]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
The state, law, bureaucracy and capital are limitations on life, so I prefer federalist anarchism [Critchley]
Anarchism used to be libertarian (especially for sexuality), but now concerns responsibility [Critchley]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
Belief that humans are wicked leads to authoritarian politics [Critchley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns [Hawthorne]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 6. Laws as Numerical
We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else [Hawthorne]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
Modern metaphysicians tend to think space-time points are more fundamental than space-time regions [Hawthorne]