79 ideas
16841 | Good inference has mechanism, precision, scope, simplicity, fertility and background fit [Lipton] |
16854 | Contrary pairs entail contradictions; one member entails negation of the other [Lipton] |
2572 | Logical truth seems much less likely to 'correspond to the facts' than factual truth does [Haack] |
2570 | The same sentence could be true in one language and meaningless in another, so truth is language-relative [Haack] |
17925 | Showing a disproof is impossible is not a proof, so don't eliminate double negation [Colyvan] |
17926 | Rejecting double negation elimination undermines reductio proofs [Colyvan] |
17924 | Excluded middle says P or not-P; bivalence says P is either true or false [Colyvan] |
17929 | Löwenheim proved his result for a first-order sentence, and Skolem generalised it [Colyvan] |
17930 | Axioms are 'categorical' if all of their models are isomorphic [Colyvan] |
17928 | Ordinal numbers represent order relations [Colyvan] |
17923 | Intuitionists only accept a few safe infinities [Colyvan] |
17941 | Infinitesimals were sometimes zero, and sometimes close to zero [Colyvan] |
17922 | Reducing real numbers to rationals suggested arithmetic as the foundation of maths [Colyvan] |
17936 | Transfinite induction moves from all cases, up to the limit ordinal [Colyvan] |
17940 | Most mathematical proofs are using set theory, but without saying so [Colyvan] |
17931 | Structuralism say only 'up to isomorphism' matters because that is all there is to it [Colyvan] |
17932 | If 'in re' structures relies on the world, does the world contain rich enough structures? [Colyvan] |
16814 | Understanding is not mysterious - it is just more knowledge, of causes [Lipton] |
16825 | How do we distinguish negative from irrelevant evidence, if both match the hypothesis? [Lipton] |
16851 | The inference to observables and unobservables is almost the same, so why distinguish them? [Lipton] |
16798 | We infer from evidence by working out what would explain that evidence [Lipton] |
16799 | Inductive inference is not proof, but weighing evidence and probability [Lipton] |
16856 | It is more impressive that relativity predicted Mercury's orbit than if it had accommodated it [Lipton] |
16857 | Predictions are best for finding explanations, because mere accommodations can be fudged [Lipton] |
16827 | If we make a hypothesis about data, then a deduction, where does the hypothesis come from? [Lipton] |
16804 | Induction is repetition, instances, deduction, probability or causation [Lipton] |
16823 | Standard induction does not allow for vertical inferences, to some unobservable lower level [Lipton] |
16858 | We can argue to support our beliefs, so induction will support induction, for believers in induction [Lipton] |
16800 | An inductive inference is underdetermined, by definition [Lipton] |
16832 | If something in ravens makes them black, it may be essential (definitive of ravens) [Lipton] |
16836 | My shoes are not white because they lack some black essence of ravens [Lipton] |
16831 | A theory may explain the blackness of a raven, but say nothing about the whiteness of shoes [Lipton] |
16833 | We can't turn non-black non-ravens into ravens, to test the theory [Lipton] |
16834 | To pick a suitable contrast to ravens, we need a hypothesis about their genes [Lipton] |
16801 | A hypothesis is confirmed if an unlikely prediction comes true [Lipton] |
16802 | Bayes seems to rule out prior evidence, since that has a probability of one [Lipton] |
16803 | Bayes is too liberal, since any logical consequence of a hypothesis confirms it [Lipton] |
16837 | Bayes involves 'prior' probabilities, 'likelihood', 'posterior' probability, and 'conditionalising' [Lipton] |
16839 | Explanation may be an important part of implementing Bayes's Theorem [Lipton] |
17943 | Probability supports Bayesianism better as degrees of belief than as ratios of frequencies [Colyvan] |
16850 | Explanation may describe induction, but may not show how it justifies, or leads to truth [Lipton] |
16807 | An explanation gives the reason the phenomenon occurred [Lipton] |
16808 | An explanation is what makes the unfamiliar familiar to us [Lipton] |
16806 | An explanation is what is added to knowledge to yield understanding [Lipton] |
16822 | Seaching for explanations is a good way to discover the structure of the world [Lipton] |
16816 | In 'contrastive' explanation there is a fact and a foil - why that fact, rather than this foil? [Lipton] |
16826 | With too many causes, find a suitable 'foil' for contrast, and the field narrows right down [Lipton] |
16811 | An explanation unifies a phenomenon with our account of other phenomena [Lipton] |
16810 | Deduction explanation is too easy; any law at all will imply the facts - together with the facts! [Lipton] |
16829 | We reject deductive explanations if they don't explain, not if the deduction is bad [Lipton] |
17939 | Mathematics can reveal structural similarities in diverse systems [Colyvan] |
16809 | Good explanations may involve no laws and no deductions [Lipton] |
17938 | Mathematics can show why some surprising events have to occur [Colyvan] |
16812 | An explanation shows why it was necessary that the effect occurred [Lipton] |
16813 | To explain is to give either the causal history, or the causal mechanism [Lipton] |
16815 | Mathematical and philosophical explanations are not causal [Lipton] |
16846 | A cause may not be an explanation [Lipton] |
16849 | Explanations may be easier to find than causes [Lipton] |
16848 | Causal inferences are clearest when we can manipulate things [Lipton] |
16842 | We want to know not just the cause, but how the cause operated [Lipton] |
16840 | To maximise probability, don't go beyond your data [Lipton] |
17934 | Proof by cases (by 'exhaustion') is said to be unexplanatory [Colyvan] |
17933 | Reductio proofs do not seem to be very explanatory [Colyvan] |
17935 | If inductive proofs hold because of the structure of natural numbers, they may explain theorems [Colyvan] |
17942 | Can a proof that no one understands (of the four-colour theorem) really be a proof? [Colyvan] |
16824 | Is Inference to the Best Explanation nothing more than inferring the likeliest cause? [Lipton] |
16817 | Best Explanation as a guide to inference is preferable to best standard explanations [Lipton] |
16818 | The 'likeliest' explanation is the best supported; the 'loveliest' gives the most understanding [Lipton] |
16820 | Finding the 'loveliest' potential explanation links truth to understanding [Lipton] |
16819 | IBE is inferring that the best potential explanation is the actual explanation [Lipton] |
16828 | IBE is not passive treatment of data, but involves feedback between theory and data search [Lipton] |
16844 | A contrasting difference is the cause if it offers the best explanation [Lipton] |
16853 | We select possible explanations for explanatory reasons, as well as choosing among them [Lipton] |
16821 | Must we only have one explanation, and must all the data be made relevant? [Lipton] |
16838 | Bayesians say best explanations build up an incoherent overall position [Lipton] |
16855 | The best theory is boring: compare 'all planets move elliptically' with 'most of them do' [Lipton] |
16852 | Best explanation can't be a guide to truth, because the truth must precede explanation [Lipton] |
17937 | Mathematical generalisation is by extending a system, or by abstracting away from it [Colyvan] |
16847 | Counterfactual causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient [Lipton] |