29 ideas
10653 | Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi] |
10648 | Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi] |
10655 | Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi] |
10659 | There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi] |
10429 | It is best to say that a name designates iff there is something for it to designate [Sainsbury] |
10425 | Definite descriptions may not be referring expressions, since they can fail to refer [Sainsbury] |
10438 | Definite descriptions are usually rigid in subject, but not in predicate, position [Sainsbury] |
8983 | If 'red' is vague, then membership of the set of red things is vague, so there is no set of red things [Sainsbury] |
8986 | We should abandon classifying by pigeon-holes, and classify around paradigms [Sainsbury] |
8982 | Vague concepts are concepts without boundaries [Sainsbury] |
8984 | If concepts are vague, people avoid boundaries, can't spot them, and don't want them [Sainsbury] |
8985 | Boundaryless concepts tend to come in pairs, such as child/adult, hot/cold [Sainsbury] |
10661 | 'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi] |
10654 | The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi] |
10651 | If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi] |
10649 | 'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi] |
10647 | Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi] |
10658 | Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi] |
3144 | Everything is what it is, and not another thing [Butler] |
21315 | A tree remains the same in the popular sense, but not in the strict philosophical sense [Butler] |
10652 | Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi] |
21317 | Despite consciousness fluctuating, we are aware that it belongs to one person [Butler] |
21313 | If consciousness of events makes our identity, then if we have forgotten them we didn't exist then [Butler] |
21314 | Consciousness presupposes personal identity, so it cannot constitute it [Butler] |
21318 | If the self changes, we have no responsibilities, and no interest in past or future [Butler] |
10432 | A new usage of a name could arise from a mistaken baptism of nothing [Sainsbury] |
10434 | Even a quantifier like 'someone' can be used referentially [Sainsbury] |
8066 | Butler exalts conscience, but it may be horribly misleading [Anscombe on Butler] |
10431 | Things are thought to have a function, even when they can't perform them [Sainsbury] |