28 ideas
| 4262 | If the only aim was consistent beliefs then new evidence and experiments would be irrelevant [Goldman] |
| 10429 | It is best to say that a name designates iff there is something for it to designate [Sainsbury] |
| 10425 | Definite descriptions may not be referring expressions, since they can fail to refer [Sainsbury] |
| 10438 | Definite descriptions are usually rigid in subject, but not in predicate, position [Sainsbury] |
| 6368 | If my ticket won't win the lottery (and it won't), no other tickets will either [Kyburg, by Pollock/Cruz] |
| 4045 | Children may have three innate principles which enable them to learn to count [Goldman] |
| 4044 | Rat behaviour reveals a considerable ability to count [Goldman] |
| 8983 | If 'red' is vague, then membership of the set of red things is vague, so there is no set of red things [Sainsbury] |
| 4048 | Infant brains appear to have inbuilt ontological categories [Goldman] |
| 8986 | We should abandon classifying by pigeon-holes, and classify around paradigms [Sainsbury] |
| 8982 | Vague concepts are concepts without boundaries [Sainsbury] |
| 8984 | If concepts are vague, people avoid boundaries, can't spot them, and don't want them [Sainsbury] |
| 8985 | Boundaryless concepts tend to come in pairs, such as child/adult, hot/cold [Sainsbury] |
| 4043 | Elephants can be correctly identified from as few as three primitive shapes [Goldman] |
| 4049 | The way in which colour experiences are evoked is physically odd and unpredictable [Goldman] |
| 4047 | Gestalt psychology proposes inbuilt proximity, similarity, smoothness and closure principles [Goldman] |
| 8830 | A belief can be justified when the person has forgotten the evidence for it [Goldman] |
| 6871 | We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman] |
| 6872 | Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman] |
| 6874 | Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman] |
| 8832 | If justified beliefs are well-formed beliefs, then animals and young children have them [Goldman] |
| 6873 | Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman] |
| 8829 | Justification depends on the reliability of its cause, where reliable processes tend to produce truth [Goldman] |
| 6875 | Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman] |
| 8831 | Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman] |
| 10432 | A new usage of a name could arise from a mistaken baptism of nothing [Sainsbury] |
| 10434 | Even a quantifier like 'someone' can be used referentially [Sainsbury] |
| 10431 | Things are thought to have a function, even when they can't perform them [Sainsbury] |