Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Mark Sainsbury, J Pollock / J Cruz and C. Anthony Anderson

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42 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
18767 Free logics has terms that do not designate real things, and even empty domains [Anderson,CA]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
10429 It is best to say that a name designates iff there is something for it to designate [Sainsbury]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
10425 Definite descriptions may not be referring expressions, since they can fail to refer [Sainsbury]
10438 Definite descriptions are usually rigid in subject, but not in predicate, position [Sainsbury]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
18763 Basic variables in second-order logic are taken to range over subsets of the individuals [Anderson,CA]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
18771 Stop calling ∃ the 'existential' quantifier, read it as 'there is...', and range over all entities [Anderson,CA]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
18769 Do mathematicians use 'existence' differently when they say some entity exists? [Anderson,CA]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
8983 If 'red' is vague, then membership of the set of red things is vague, so there is no set of red things [Sainsbury]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
18770 We can distinguish 'ontological' from 'existential' commitment, for different kinds of being [Anderson,CA]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
8986 We should abandon classifying by pigeon-holes, and classify around paradigms [Sainsbury]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
18766 's is non-existent' cannot be said if 's' does not designate [Anderson,CA]
18768 We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
18765 Individuation was a problem for medievals, then Leibniz, then Frege, then Wittgenstein (somewhat) [Anderson,CA]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
8982 Vague concepts are concepts without boundaries [Sainsbury]
8984 If concepts are vague, people avoid boundaries, can't spot them, and don't want them [Sainsbury]
8985 Boundaryless concepts tend to come in pairs, such as child/adult, hot/cold [Sainsbury]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
18764 The notion of 'property' is unclear for a logical version of the Identity of Indiscernibles [Anderson,CA]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
6346 The main epistemological theories are foundationalist, coherence, probabilistic and reliabilist [Pollock/Cruz]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
6351 Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively [Pollock/Cruz]
6374 To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing [Pollock/Cruz]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
6355 Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs [Pollock/Cruz]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
6359 Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential [Pollock/Cruz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
6366 Perception causes beliefs in us, without inference or justification [Pollock/Cruz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
6362 Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
6371 Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable) [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
6373 Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
6353 People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz]
6361 Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
6357 Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
6363 Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
6365 Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
6354 Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz]
6367 Coherence theories isolate justification from the world [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
6370 Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process) [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
6358 One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
6364 We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start [Pollock/Cruz]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
6352 Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion [Pollock/Cruz]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
6372 Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies? [Pollock/Cruz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
6360 Scientific confirmation is best viewed as inference to the best explanation [Pollock/Cruz]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
10432 A new usage of a name could arise from a mistaken baptism of nothing [Sainsbury]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
10434 Even a quantifier like 'someone' can be used referentially [Sainsbury]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
10431 Things are thought to have a function, even when they can't perform them [Sainsbury]