Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Mark Sainsbury, Thomas Grundmann and Karl Jaspers

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29 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
Truth is what unites, and the profound truths create a community [Jaspers]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
It is best to say that a name designates iff there is something for it to designate [Sainsbury]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Definite descriptions may not be referring expressions, since they can fail to refer [Sainsbury]
Definite descriptions are usually rigid in subject, but not in predicate, position [Sainsbury]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
If 'red' is vague, then membership of the set of red things is vague, so there is no set of red things [Sainsbury]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
We should abandon classifying by pigeon-holes, and classify around paradigms [Sainsbury]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vague concepts are concepts without boundaries [Sainsbury]
If concepts are vague, people avoid boundaries, can't spot them, and don't want them [Sainsbury]
Boundaryless concepts tend to come in pairs, such as child/adult, hot/cold [Sainsbury]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Indefeasibility does not imply infallibility [Grundmann]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
Can a defeater itself be defeated? [Grundmann]
Simple reliabilism can't cope with defeaters of reliably produced beliefs [Grundmann]
You can 'rebut' previous beliefs, 'undercut' the power of evidence, or 'reason-defeat' the truth [Grundmann]
Defeasibility theory needs to exclude defeaters which are true but misleading [Grundmann]
Knowledge requires that there are no facts which would defeat its justification [Grundmann]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Freedom needs knowledge, the possibility of arbitrariness, and law [Jaspers]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
I am aware that freedom is possible, and the freedom is not in theory, but in seeking freedom [Jaspers]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
A new usage of a name could arise from a mistaken baptism of nothing [Sainsbury]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
Even a quantifier like 'someone' can be used referentially [Sainsbury]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
My freedom increases as I broaden my vision of possiblities and motives [Jaspers]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
My helplessness in philosophising reveals my being, and begins its upsurge [Jaspers]
The struggle for Existenz is between people who are equals, and are utterly honest [Jaspers]
Once we grasp freedom 'from' things, then freedom 'for' things becomes urgent [Jaspers]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Mundane existence is general, falling under universals, but Existens is unique to individuals [Jaspers]
We want the correct grasp on being that is neither solipsism nor absorption in the crowd [Jaspers]
'Existenz' is the potential being, which I could have, and ought to have [Jaspers]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Every decision I make moves towards or away from fulfilled Existenz [Jaspers]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Things are thought to have a function, even when they can't perform them [Sainsbury]