24 ideas
2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
10429 | It is best to say that a name designates iff there is something for it to designate [Sainsbury] |
10425 | Definite descriptions may not be referring expressions, since they can fail to refer [Sainsbury] |
10438 | Definite descriptions are usually rigid in subject, but not in predicate, position [Sainsbury] |
2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
8983 | If 'red' is vague, then membership of the set of red things is vague, so there is no set of red things [Sainsbury] |
8986 | We should abandon classifying by pigeon-holes, and classify around paradigms [Sainsbury] |
8982 | Vague concepts are concepts without boundaries [Sainsbury] |
8984 | If concepts are vague, people avoid boundaries, can't spot them, and don't want them [Sainsbury] |
8985 | Boundaryless concepts tend to come in pairs, such as child/adult, hot/cold [Sainsbury] |
16978 | If conceivability is a priori coherence, that implies possibility [Tahko] |
2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
16975 | Essences are used to explain natural kinds, modality, and causal powers [Tahko] |
2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
10432 | A new usage of a name could arise from a mistaken baptism of nothing [Sainsbury] |
2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
10434 | Even a quantifier like 'someone' can be used referentially [Sainsbury] |
2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |
10431 | Things are thought to have a function, even when they can't perform them [Sainsbury] |
16976 | Scientific essentialists tend to characterise essence in terms of modality (not vice versa) [Tahko] |
16977 | If essence is modal and laws are necessary, essentialist knowledge is found by scientists [Tahko] |