Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Mary Astell, Joseph Joubert and J Pollock / J Cruz

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38 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Seek wisdom rather than truth; it is easier [Joubert]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
We must think with our entire body and soul [Joubert]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
The love of certainty holds us back in metaphysics [Joubert]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
The truths of reason instruct, but they do not illuminate [Joubert]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Truth consists of having the same idea about something that God has [Joubert]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
The main epistemological theories are foundationalist, coherence, probabilistic and reliabilist [Pollock/Cruz]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively [Pollock/Cruz]
To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing [Pollock/Cruz]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs [Pollock/Cruz]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential [Pollock/Cruz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception causes beliefs in us, without inference or justification [Pollock/Cruz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable) [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
To know is to see inside oneself [Joubert]
Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz]
Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz]
Coherence theories isolate justification from the world [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process) [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start [Pollock/Cruz]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion [Pollock/Cruz]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies? [Pollock/Cruz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
Scientific confirmation is best viewed as inference to the best explanation [Pollock/Cruz]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
The imagination has made more discoveries than the eye [Joubert]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
A thought is as real as a cannon ball [Joubert]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
Where does the bird's idea of a nest come from? [Joubert]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
He gives his body up to pleasure, but not his soul [Joubert]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
What will you think of pleasures when you no longer enjoy them? [Joubert]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Virtue is hard if we are scorned; we need support [Joubert]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / a. Natural freedom
If men are born free, are women born slaves? [Astell]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
In raising a child we must think of his old age [Joubert]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
We can't exactly conceive virtue without the idea of God [Joubert]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
We cannot speak against Christianity without anger, or speak for it without love [Joubert]