71 ideas
12330 | In ontology, logic dominated language, until logic was mathematized [Badiou] |
9808 | Philosophy aims to reveal the grandeur of mathematics [Badiou] |
12318 | The female body, when taken in its entirety, is the Phallus itself [Badiou] |
12325 | Philosophy has been relieved of physics, cosmology, politics, and now must give up ontology [Badiou] |
12324 | Consensus is the enemy of thought [Badiou] |
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
12337 | There is 'transivity' iff membership ∈ also means inclusion ⊆ [Badiou] |
12321 | The axiom of choice must accept an indeterminate, indefinable, unconstructible set [Badiou] |
12342 | Topos theory explains the plurality of possible logics [Badiou] |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
12341 | Logic is a mathematical account of a universe of relations [Badiou] |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
9812 | In mathematics, if a problem can be formulated, it will eventually be solved [Badiou] |
12335 | Numbers are for measuring and for calculating (and the two must be consistent) [Badiou] |
12334 | There is no single unified definition of number [Badiou] |
12333 | Each type of number has its own characteristic procedure of introduction [Badiou] |
12322 | Must we accept numbers as existing when they no longer consist of units? [Badiou] |
9813 | Mathematics shows that thinking is not confined to the finite [Badiou] |
12327 | The undecidability of the Continuum Hypothesis may have ruined or fragmented set theory [Badiou] |
12329 | If mathematics is a logic of the possible, then questions of existence are not intrinsic to it [Badiou] |
12328 | Platonists like axioms and decisions, Aristotelians like definitions, possibilities and logic [Badiou] |
12331 | Logic is definitional, but real mathematics is axiomatic [Badiou] |
12340 | There is no Being as a whole, because there is no set of all sets [Badiou] |
9809 | Mathematics inscribes being as such [Badiou] |
12323 | Existence is Being itself, but only as our thought decides it [Badiou] |
12332 | The modern view of Being comes when we reject numbers as merely successions of One [Badiou] |
12326 | The primitive name of Being is the empty set; in a sense, only the empty set 'is' [Badiou] |
9811 | It is of the essence of being to appear [Badiou] |
12320 | Ontology is (and always has been) Cantorian mathematics [Badiou] |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
20043 | Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual [Stout,R] |
20058 | Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way [Stout,R] |
12338 | We must either assert or deny any single predicate of any single subject [Badiou] |
20035 | Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R] |
20084 | Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R] |
20061 | Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R] |
20079 | Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R] |
20080 | If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R] |
20059 | I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R] |
20081 | Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R] |
20044 | The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R] |
20039 | The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R] |
20047 | Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R] |
20065 | Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R] |
20067 | You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R] |
20078 | The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R] |
20036 | Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R] |
20066 | Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R] |
20073 | Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R] |
20069 | A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R] |
20070 | An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R] |
20071 | An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R] |
20038 | If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R] |
20050 | Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R] |
20052 | If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R] |
20077 | If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R] |
20049 | Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R] |
20046 | For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R] |
20060 | Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R] |
20055 | A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R] |
20056 | In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R] |
20053 | An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R] |
20048 | There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R] |
20068 | Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R] |
9814 | All great poetry is engaged in rivalry with mathematics [Badiou] |
12316 | For Enlightenment philosophers, God was no longer involved in politics [Badiou] |
20083 | Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R] |
12317 | The God of religion results from an encounter, not from a proof [Badiou] |