16 ideas
9327 | Organisms understand their worlds better if they understand themselves [Gulick] |
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
9325 | In contrast with knowledge, the notion of understanding emphasizes practical engagement [Gulick] |
9326 | Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how [Gulick] |
9319 | Is consciousness a type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a way of being conscious? [Gulick] |
9320 | Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick] |
9321 | Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick] |
9322 | Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick] |
6901 | Understanding is needed for imagination, just as much as the other way around [Betteridge] |
9324 | From the teleopragmatic perspective, life is largely an informational process [Gulick] |