67 ideas
23000 | Vicious regresses force you to another level; non-vicious imply another level [Baron/Miller] |
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
23024 | A traveller takes a copy of a picture into the past, gives it the artist, who then creates the original! [Baron/Miller] |
22886 | The modern idea of 'limit' allows infinite quantities to have a finite sum [Bardon] |
22914 | An equally good question would be why there was nothing instead of something [Bardon] |
23008 | Grounding is intended as a relation that fits dependences between things [Baron/Miller] |
23018 | How does a changing object retain identity or have incompatible properties over time? [Baron/Miller] |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
23011 | Modern accounts of causation involve either processes or counterfactuals [Baron/Miller] |
23013 | The main process theory of causation says it is transference of mass, energy, momentum or charge [Baron/Miller] |
23014 | If causes are processes, what is causation by omission? (Distinguish legal from scientific causes?) [Baron/Miller] |
22902 | Why does an effect require a prior event if the prior event isn't a cause? [Bardon] |
23015 | The counterfactual theory of causation handles the problem no matter what causes actually are [Baron/Miller] |
23016 | Counterfactual theories struggle with pre-emption by a causal back-up system [Baron/Miller] |
22905 | Becoming disordered is much easier for a system than becoming ordered [Bardon] |
23009 | There is no second 'law' of thermodynamics; it just reflects probabilities of certain microstates [Baron/Miller] |
22913 | The universe expands, so space-time is enlarging [Bardon] |
23002 | In relativity space and time depend on one's motion, but spacetime gives an invariant metric [Baron/Miller] |
22889 | We should treat time as adverbial, so we don't experience time, we experience things temporally [Bardon, by Bardon] |
22988 | The block universe theory says entities of all times exist, and time is the B-series [Baron/Miller] |
22991 | How can we know this is the present moment, if other times are real? [Baron/Miller] |
22992 | If we are actually in the past then we shouldn't experience time passing [Baron/Miller] |
22994 | Erzatz Presentism allows the existence of other times, with only the present 'actualised' [Baron/Miller] |
22998 | How do presentists explain relations between things existing at different times? [Baron/Miller] |
23017 | Presentism needs endurantism, because other theories imply most of the object doesn't exist [Baron/Miller] |
23023 | How can presentists move to the next future moment, if that doesn't exist? [Baron/Miller] |
22900 | How can we question the passage of time, if the question takes time to ask? [Bardon] |
22995 | Most of the sciences depend on the concept of time [Baron/Miller] |
22993 | For abstractionists past times might still exist, althought their objects don't [Baron/Miller] |
23001 | The error theory of time's passage says it is either a misdescription or a false inference [Baron/Miller] |
22898 | What is time's passage relative to, and how fast does it pass? [Bardon] |
22999 | It is meaningless to measure the rate of time using time itself, and without a rate there is no flow [Baron/Miller] |
22986 | The C-series rejects A and B, and just sees times as order by betweenness, without direction [Baron/Miller] |
22897 | The A-series says a past event is becoming more past, but how can it do that? [Bardon] |
22996 | The A-series has to treat being past, present or future as properties [Baron/Miller] |
22901 | The B-series needs a revised view of causes, laws and explanations [Bardon] |
22896 | The B-series is realist about time, but idealist about its passage [Bardon] |
22903 | The B-series adds directionality when it accepts 'earlier' and 'later' [Bardon] |
23007 | The B-series can have a direction, as long as it does not arise from temporal flow [Baron/Miller] |
22910 | To define time's arrow by causation, we need a timeless definition of causation [Bardon] |
22909 | We judge memories to be of the past because the events cause the memories [Bardon] |
22904 | The psychological arrow of time is the direction from our memories to our anticipations [Bardon] |
22906 | The direction of entropy is probabilistic, not necessary, so cannot be identical to time's arrow [Bardon] |
22907 | It is arbitrary to reverse time in a more orderly universe, but not in a sub-system of it [Bardon] |
23003 | Static theories cannot account for time's obvious asymmetry, so time must be dynamic [Baron/Miller] |
23004 | The direction of time is either primitive, or reducible to something else [Baron/Miller] |
23005 | The kaon does not seem to be time-reversal invariant, unlike the rest of nature [Baron/Miller] |
23006 | Maybe the past is just the direction of decreasing entropy [Baron/Miller] |
23010 | We could explain time's direction by causation: past is the direction of causes, future of effects [Baron/Miller] |
22890 | We experience static states (while walking round a house) and observe change (ship leaving dock) [Bardon] |
22989 | Static time theory presents change as one property at t1, and a different property at t2 [Baron/Miller] |
22883 | It seems hard to understand change without understanding time first [Bardon] |
22884 | The motion of a thing should be a fact in the present moment [Bardon] |
22892 | Experiences of motion may be overlapping, thus stretching out the experience [Bardon] |
22911 | At least eternal time gives time travellers a possible destination [Bardon] |
23020 | If a time traveller kills his youthful grandfather, he both exists and fails to exist [Baron/Miller] |
23022 | Presentism means there no existing past for a time traveller to visit [Baron/Miller] |
22912 | Time travel is not a paradox if we include it in the eternal continuum of events [Bardon] |
22987 | The past (unlike the future) is fixed, along with truths about it, by the existence of past objects [Baron/Miller] |
22882 | We use calendars for the order of events, and clocks for their passing [Bardon] |
22990 | The moving spotlight says entities can have properties of being present, past or future [Baron/Miller] |
22997 | The present moment is a matter of existence, not of acquiring a property [Baron/Miller] |