126 ideas
21970 | Philosophy attains its goal if one person feels perfect accord between their system and experience [Fichte] |
3798 | An overexamined life is as bad as an unexamined one [Dennett] |
22024 | Fichte's subjectivity struggles to then give any account of objectivity [Pinkard on Fichte] |
6912 | For Fichte there is no God outside the ego, and 'our religion is reason' [Fichte, by Feuerbach] |
23247 | The need to act produces consciousness, and practical reason is the root of all reason [Fichte] |
3801 | Rationality requires the assumption that things are either for better or worse [Dennett] |
23232 | Sufficient reason makes the transition from the particular to the general [Fichte] |
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
22017 | Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
23227 | Each object has a precise number of properties, each to a precise degree [Fichte] |
23228 | The principle of activity and generation is found in a self-moving basic force [Fichte] |
14308 | We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier [Dennett, by Mumford] |
7384 | Words are fixed by being attached to similarity clusters, without mention of 'essences' [Dennett] |
22018 | Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
2526 | Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity [Dennett] |
3802 | Why pronounce impossible what you cannot imagine? [Dennett] |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
22062 | Mental presentation are not empirical, but concern the strivings of the self [Fichte] |
22015 | The thing-in-itself is an empty dream [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
22064 | Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |
21973 | Fichte believed in things-in-themselves [Fichte, by Moore,AW] |
21914 | We can deduce experience from self-consciousness, without the thing-in-itself [Fichte] |
23241 | I am myself, but not the external object; so I only sense myself, and not the object [Fichte] |
22032 | Fichte's key claim was that the subjective-objective distinction must itself be subjective [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
20951 | The absolute I divides into consciousness, and a world which is not-I [Fichte, by Bowie] |
21964 | Reason arises from freedom, so philosophy starts from the self, and not from the laws of nature [Fichte] |
21968 | Abandon the thing-in-itself; things only exist in relation to our thinking [Fichte] |
21966 | Self-consciousness is the basis of knowledge, and knowing something is knowing myself [Fichte] |
21967 | There is nothing to say about anything which is outside my consciousness [Fichte] |
21969 | Awareness of reality comes from the free activity of consciousness [Fichte] |
7374 | Light wavelengths entering the eye are only indirectly related to object colours [Dennett] |
23231 | I immediately know myself, and anything beyond that is an inference [Fichte] |
23246 | Faith is not knowledge; it is a decision of the will [Fichte] |
23245 | Knowledge can't be its own foundation; there has to be regress of higher and higher authorities [Fichte] |
2523 | That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations [Dennett] |
3795 | Causal theories require the "right" sort of link (usually unspecified) [Dennett] |
7369 | Brains are essentially anticipation machines [Dennett] |
23242 | Consciousness has two parts, passively receiving sensation, and actively causing productions [Fichte] |
4608 | Minds are hard-wired, or trial-and-error, or experimental, or full self-aware [Dennett, by Heil] |
22020 | We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities [Fichte] |
7393 | We can't draw a clear line between conscious and unconscious [Dennett] |
7367 | Perhaps the brain doesn't 'fill in' gaps in consciousness if no one is looking. [Dennett] |
4880 | Sentience comes in grades from robotic to super-human; we only draw a line for moral reasons [Dennett] |
2528 | Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness? [Dennett] |
2525 | Maybe language is crucial to consciousness [Dennett] |
7394 | Conscious events can only be explained in terms of unconscious events [Dennett] |
7391 | We can know a lot of what it is like to be a bat, and nothing important is unknown [Dennett] |
3158 | Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett] |
2527 | Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind [Dennett] |
6624 | Dennett denies the existence of qualia [Dennett, by Lowe] |
4873 | What is it like to notice an uncomfortable position when you are asleep? [Dennett] |
7387 | "Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states [Dennett] |
7658 | Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett] |
7376 | We can't assume that dispositions will remain normal when qualia have been inverted [Dennett] |
7372 | In peripheral vision we see objects without their details, so blindsight is not that special [Dennett] |
7373 | Blindsight subjects glean very paltry information [Dennett] |
23240 | We can't know by sight or hearing without realising that we are doing so [Fichte] |
3797 | I am the sum total of what I directly control [Dennett] |
22060 | The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep] |
22066 | Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte] |
22016 | The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
23243 | Consciousness of external things is always accompanied by an unnoticed consciousness of self [Fichte] |
7385 | People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing [Dennett] |
22019 | Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte] |
4881 | Being a person must involve having second-order beliefs and desires (about beliefs and desires) [Dennett] |
7383 | The psychological self is an abstraction, not a thing in the brain [Dennett] |
22063 | Effective individuals must posit a specific material body for themselves [Fichte] |
7386 | Selves are not soul-pearls, but artefacts of social processes [Dennett] |
7381 | We tell stories about ourselves, to protect, control and define who we are [Dennett] |
7382 | We spin narratives about ourselves, and the audience posits a centre of gravity for them [Dennett] |
7370 | The brain is controlled by shifting coalitions, guided by good purposeful habits [Dennett] |
7655 | The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett] |
23244 | Forming purposes is absolutely free, and produces something from nothing [Fichte] |
23237 | The capacity for freedom is above the laws of nature, with its own power of purpose and will [Fichte] |
3800 | You can be free even though force would have prevented you doing otherwise [Dennett, by PG] |
3803 | Can we conceive of a being with a will freer than our own? [Dennett] |
3791 | Awareness of thought is a step beyond awareness of the world [Dennett] |
23235 | I want independent control of the fundamental cause of my decisions [Fichte] |
3794 | Foreknowledge permits control [Dennett] |
21965 | Spinoza could not actually believe his determinism, because living requires free will [Fichte] |
23230 | Nature contains a fundamental force of thought [Fichte] |
7379 | If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable [Dennett] |
7365 | Dualism wallows in mystery, and to accept it is to give up [Dennett] |
3159 | Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett] |
3796 | The active self is a fiction created because we are ignorant of our motivations [Dennett] |
3161 | If mind is just an explanation, the explainer must have beliefs [Rey on Dennett] |
3986 | The 'intentional stance' is a way of interpreting an entity by assuming it is rational and self-aware [Dennett] |
2530 | Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett] |
7371 | All functionalism is 'homuncular', of one grain size or another [Dennett] |
4875 | We descend from robots, and our intentionality is composed of billions of crude intentional systems [Dennett] |
4879 | There is no more anger in adrenaline than silliness in a bottle of whiskey [Dennett] |
7657 | Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett] |
7656 | I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett] |
7366 | It is arbitrary to say which moment of brain processing is conscious [Dennett] |
7380 | Visual experience is composed of neural activity, which we find pleasing [Dennett] |
4876 | Maybe there is a minimum brain speed for supporting a mind [Dennett] |
4878 | The materials for a mind only matter because of speed, and a need for transducers and effectors [Dennett] |
3177 | You couldn't drive a car without folk psychology [Dennett] |
3987 | Like the 'centre of gravity', desires and beliefs are abstract concepts with no actual existence [Dennett] |
22061 | Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations [Fichte, by Siep] |
4874 | The predecessor and rival of the language of thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas [Dennett] |
2524 | A language of thought doesn't explain content [Dennett] |
7654 | What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett] |
23803 | States have content if we can predict them well by assuming intentionality [Dennett, by Schulte] |
3984 | The nature of content is entirely based on its functional role [Dennett] |
4882 | Concepts are things we (unlike dogs) can think about, because we have language [Dennett] |
2529 | Maybe there can be non-conscious concepts (e.g. in bees) [Dennett] |
23233 | The will is awareness of one of our inner natural forces [Fichte] |
23234 | I cannot change the nature which has been determined for me [Fichte] |
23239 | The self is, apart from outward behaviour, a drive in your nature [Fichte] |
22023 | Fichte's idea of spontaneity implied that nothing counts unless we give it status [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
23238 | If life lacks love it becomes destruction [Fichte] |
23236 | Freedom means making yourself become true to your essential nature [Fichte] |
3983 | Learning is evolution in the brain [Dennett] |
4872 | Most people see an abortion differently if the foetus lacks a brain [Dennett] |
23229 | Nature is wholly interconnected, and the tiniest change affects everything [Fichte] |
22065 | Fichte reduces nature to a lifeless immobility [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |
7368 | Originally there were no reasons, purposes or functions; since there were no interests, there were only causes [Dennett] |
3985 | Biology is a type of engineering, not a search for laws of nature [Dennett] |
4877 | Maybe plants are very slow (and sentient) animals, overlooked because we are faster? [Dennett] |
3804 | Darwin's idea was the best idea ever [Dennett] |