40 ideas
| 3750 | "It is true that x" means no more than x [Ramsey] |
| 15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
| 15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
| 15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
| 15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
| 13430 | Infinity: there is an infinity of distinguishable individuals [Ramsey] |
| 13428 | Reducibility: to every non-elementary function there is an equivalent elementary function [Ramsey] |
| 11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
| 13427 | Either 'a = b' vacuously names the same thing, or absurdly names different things [Ramsey] |
| 11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
| 13334 | Contradictions are either purely logical or mathematical, or they involved thought and language [Ramsey] |
| 6409 | The 'simple theory of types' distinguishes levels among properties [Ramsey, by Grayling] |
| 13426 | Formalists neglect content, but the logicists have focused on generalizations, and neglected form [Ramsey] |
| 13425 | Formalism is hopeless, because it focuses on propositions and ignores concepts [Ramsey] |
| 8495 | The distinction between particulars and universals is a mistake made because of language [Ramsey] |
| 8493 | We could make universals collections of particulars, or particulars collections of their qualities [Ramsey] |
| 8494 | Obviously 'Socrates is wise' and 'Socrates has wisdom' express the same fact [Ramsey] |
| 13766 | 'If' is the same as 'given that', so the degrees of belief should conform to probability theory [Ramsey, by Ramsey] |
| 10993 | Ramsey's Test: believe the consequent if you believe the antecedent [Ramsey, by Read] |
| 14279 | Asking 'If p, will q?' when p is uncertain, then first add p hypothetically to your knowledge [Ramsey] |
| 15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
| 3212 | Beliefs are maps by which we steer [Ramsey] |
| 22328 | I just confront the evidence, and let it act on me [Ramsey] |
| 22325 | A belief is knowledge if it is true, certain and obtained by a reliable process [Ramsey] |
| 19724 | Belief is knowledge if it is true, certain, and obtained by a reliable process [Ramsey] |
| 6894 | Mental terms can be replaced in a sentence by a variable and an existential quantifier [Ramsey] |
| 19143 | Ramsey gave axioms for an uncertain agent to decide their preferences [Ramsey, by Davidson] |
| 18818 | Sentence meaning is given by the actions to which it would lead [Ramsey] |
| 20086 | Nowadays sovereignty (once the basis of a state) has become relative [Reybrouck] |
| 20090 | Today it seems almost impossible to learn the will of the people [Reybrouck] |
| 20087 | There are no united monolothic 'peoples', and no 'national gut feelings' [Reybrouck] |
| 20089 | Technocrats may be efficient, but they lose legitimacy as soon as they do unpopular things [Reybrouck] |
| 20088 | Technocrats are expert managers, who replace politicians, and can be long-term and unpopular [Reybrouck] |
| 20085 | Democracy is the best compromise between legitimacy and efficiency [Reybrouck] |
| 20095 | A referendum result arises largely from ignorance [Reybrouck] |
| 20094 | You don't really govern people if you don't involve them [Reybrouck] |
| 20093 | In the 18th century democratic lots lost out to elections, that gave us a non-hereditary aristocracy [Reybrouck] |
| 20091 | Representative elections were developed in order to avoid democracy [Reybrouck] |
| 9418 | All knowledge needs systematizing, and the axioms would be the laws of nature [Ramsey] |
| 9420 | Causal laws result from the simplest axioms of a complete deductive system [Ramsey] |