Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Melvin Fitting, G.E. Moore and Gilles Deleuze

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52 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 1. History of Ideas
Nomads are the basis of history, and yet almost unknowable [Deleuze]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
The history of philosophy is an agent of power: how can you think if you haven't read the great names? [Deleuze]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / b. Modern philosophy beginnings
Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism [Moore,GE, by Grayling]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Thought should be thrown like a stone from a war-machine [Deleuze]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims to become the official language, supporting orthodoxy and the state [Deleuze]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
The main aim of philosophy is to describe the whole Universe. [Moore,GE]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language [Moore,GE, by Monk]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
When I meet objections I just move on; they never contribute anything [Deleuze]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
'Difference' refers to that which eludes capture [Deleuze, by May]
We must create new words, and treat them as normal, and as if designating real things. [Deleuze]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Don't assess ideas for truth or justice; look for another idea, and establish a relationship with it [Deleuze]
Dualisms can be undone from within, by tracing connections, and drawing them to a new path [Deleuze]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 8. Intensional Logic
If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting]
Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 9. Awareness Logic
Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 10. Justification Logics
Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
Before we seek solutions, it is important to invent problems [Deleuze]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
'Being' is univocal, but its subject matter is actually 'difference' [Deleuze]
Ontology can be continual creation, not to know being, but to probe the unknowable [Deleuze]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
There is no being beyond becoming [Deleuze]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
Before Being there is politics [Deleuze]
Ontology does not tell what there is; it is just a strange adventure [Deleuze, by May]
Being is a problem to be engaged, not solved, and needs a new mode of thinking [Deleuze, by May]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
We don't want another new set of categories; we want a variety of flexible categories [Deleuze, by May]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
A relation is internal if two things possessing the relation could not fail to be related [Moore,GE, by Heil]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Moore's Paradox: you can't assert 'I believe that p but p is false', but can assert 'You believe p but p is false' [Moore,GE, by Lowe]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
Arguments that my finger does not exist are less certain than your seeing my finger [Moore,GE]
I can prove a hand exists, by holding one up, pointing to it, and saying 'here is one hand' [Moore,GE]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
A meeting of man and animal can be deterritorialization (like a wasp with an orchid) [Deleuze]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
People consist of many undetermined lines, some rigid, some supple, some 'lines of flight' [Deleuze]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down [Moore,GE, by Monk]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter on Moore,GE]
The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good' [Moore,GE]
Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna on Moore,GE]
Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism [Moore,GE, by Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The three main values are good, right and beauty [Moore,GE, by Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross]
'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross on Moore,GE]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
We are currently extending capitalism to the whole of society [Deleuze]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 2. Freedom of belief
Some lines (of flight) are becomings which escape the system [Deleuze]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
The State requires self-preservation, but the war-machine desires destruction [Deleuze]