99 ideas
19579 | The history of philosophy is just experiments in how to do philosophy [Novalis] |
19583 | Philosophy only begins when it studies itself [Novalis] |
22026 | Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis] |
19588 | The highest aim of philosophy is to combine all philosophies into a unity [Novalis] |
19598 | Philosophy relies on our whole system of learning, and can thus never be complete [Novalis] |
19586 | Philosophers feed on problems, hoping they are digestible, and spiced with paradox [Novalis] |
14912 | There is no test for metaphysics, except devising alternative theories [Ladyman/Ross] |
19587 | Philosophy aims to produce a priori an absolute and artistic world system [Novalis] |
14904 | Metaphysics builds consilience networks across science [Ladyman/Ross] |
14907 | Progress in metaphysics must be tied to progress in science [Ladyman/Ross] |
14908 | Metaphysics must involve at least two scientific hypotheses, one fundamental, and add to explanation [Ladyman/Ross] |
14910 | Some science is so general that it is metaphysical [Ladyman/Ross] |
14940 | Cutting-edge physics has little to offer metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14945 | The aim of metaphysics is to unite the special sciences with physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14898 | Modern metaphysics pursues aesthetic criteria like story-writing, and abandons scientific truth [Ladyman/Ross] |
14899 | Why think that conceptual analysis reveals reality, rather than just how people think? [Ladyman/Ross] |
14936 | A metaphysics based on quantum gravity could result in almost anything [Ladyman/Ross] |
14905 | The supremacy of science rests on its iterated error filters [Ladyman/Ross] |
14897 | We should abandon intuitions, especially that the world is made of little things, and made of something [Ladyman/Ross] |
19574 | If man sacrifices truth he sacrifices himself, by acting against his own convictions [Novalis] |
19571 | Delusion and truth differ in their life functions [Novalis] |
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
19597 | Logic (the theory of relations) should be applied to mathematics [Novalis] |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
14943 | Maybe mathematical logic rests on information-processing [Ladyman/Ross] |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
19581 | A problem is a solid mass, which the mind must break up [Novalis] |
19584 | Whoever first counted to two must have seen the possibility of infinite counting [Novalis] |
22025 | Novalis thought self-consciousness cannot disclose 'being', because we are temporal creatures [Novalis, by Pinkard] |
14948 | To be is to be a real pattern [Ladyman/Ross] |
14942 | Only admit into ontology what is explanatory and predictive [Ladyman/Ross] |
14947 | Any process can be described as transfer of measurable information [Ladyman/Ross] |
14941 | We say there is no fundamental level to ontology, and reality is just patterns [Ladyman/Ross] |
10493 | If concrete is spatio-temporal and causal, and abstract isn't, the distinction doesn't suit physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14934 | Concrete and abstract are too crude for modern physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14909 | Physicalism is 'part-whole' (all parts are physical), or 'supervenience/levels' (dependence on physical) [Ladyman/Ross] |
14926 | Relations without relata must be treated as universals, with their own formal properties [Ladyman/Ross] |
14929 | A belief in relations must be a belief in things that are related [Ladyman/Ross] |
14925 | The normal assumption is that relations depend on properties of the relata [Ladyman/Ross] |
14931 | That there are existent structures not made of entities is no stranger than the theory of universals [Ladyman/Ross] |
14932 | Causal essentialism says properties are nothing but causal relations [Ladyman/Ross] |
14920 | If science captures the modal structure of things, that explains why its predictions work [Ladyman/Ross] |
14952 | Things are constructs for tracking patterns (and not linguistic, because animals do it) [Ladyman/Ross] |
14950 | Maybe individuation can be explained by thermodynamic depth [Ladyman/Ross] |
14927 | Physics seems to imply that we must give up self-subsistent individuals [Ladyman/Ross] |
14944 | There is no single view of individuals, because different sciences operate on different scales [Ladyman/Ross] |
14946 | There are no cats in quantum theory, and no mountains in astrophysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14928 | Things are abstractions from structures [Ladyman/Ross] |
14892 | The idea of composition, that parts of the world are 'made of' something, is no longer helpful [Ladyman/Ross] |
14949 | A sum of things is not a whole if the whole does not support some new generalisation [Ladyman/Ross] |
19575 | Refinement of senses increasingly distinguishes individuals [Novalis] |
14951 | We treat the core of a pattern as an essence, in order to keep track of it [Ladyman/Ross] |
14958 | A continuous object might be a type, with instances at each time [Ladyman/Ross] |
14903 | Quantum mechanics seems to imply single-case probabilities [Ladyman/Ross] |
14923 | In quantum statistics, two separate classical states of affairs are treated as one [Ladyman/Ross] |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
22067 | Poetry is true idealism, and the self-consciousness of the universe [Novalis] |
19572 | Experiences tests reason, and reason tests experience [Novalis] |
14955 | Rats find some obvious associations easier to learn than less obvious ones [Ladyman/Ross] |
19590 | Empiricists are passive thinkers, given their philosophy by the external world and fate [Novalis] |
14918 | The doctrine of empiricism does not itself seem to be empirically justified [Ladyman/Ross] |
14891 | There is no reason to think our intuitions are good for science or metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14915 | The theory of evolution was accepted because it explained, not because of its predictions [Ladyman/Ross] |
14916 | What matters is whether a theory can predict - not whether it actually does so [Ladyman/Ross] |
19594 | General statements about nature are not valid [Novalis] |
14922 | The Ramsey sentence describes theoretical entities; it skips reference, but doesn't eliminate it [Ladyman/Ross] |
14921 | The Ramsey-sentence approach preserves observations, but eliminates unobservables [Ladyman/Ross] |
14953 | Induction is reasoning from the observed to the unobserved [Ladyman/Ross] |
14914 | Inductive defences of induction may be rule-circular, but not viciously premise-circular [Ladyman/Ross] |
14913 | We explain by deriving the properties of a phenomenon by embedding it in a large abstract theory [Ladyman/Ross] |
14930 | Maybe the only way we can think about a domain is by dividing it up into objects [Ladyman/Ross] |
19591 | Desire for perfection is an illness, if it turns against what is imperfect [Novalis] |
14939 | Two versions of quantum theory say that the world is deterministic [Ladyman/Ross] |
19596 | The whole body is involved in the formation of thoughts [Novalis] |
14911 | Science is opposed to downward causation [Ladyman/Ross] |
19573 | The seat of the soul is where our inner and outer worlds interpenetrate [Novalis] |
19577 | Everything is a chaotic unity, then we abstract, then we reunify the world into a free alliance [Novalis] |
19585 | Every person has his own language [Novalis] |
19578 | Only self-illuminated perfect individuals are beautiful [Novalis] |
19582 | Morality and philosophy are mutually dependent [Novalis] |
22027 | Life isn't given to us like a novel - we write the novel [Novalis] |
19589 | The whole point of a monarch is that we accept them as a higher-born, ideal person [Novalis] |
19580 | If the pupil really yearns for the truth, they only need a hint [Novalis] |
19593 | Persons are shaped by a life history; splendid persons are shaped by world history [Novalis] |
19595 | Nature is a whole, and its individual parts cannot be wholly understood [Novalis] |
19592 | The basic relations of nature are musical [Novalis] |
14956 | Explanation by kinds and by clusters of properties just express the stability of reality [Ladyman/Ross] |
14957 | There is nothing more to a natural kind than a real pattern in nature [Ladyman/Ross] |
14954 | Causation is found in the special sciences, but may have no role in fundamental physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14902 | Science may have uninstantiated laws, inferred from approaching some unrealised limit [Ladyman/Ross] |
14937 | That the universe must be 'made of' something is just obsolete physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14900 | In physics, matter is an emergent phenomenon, not part of fundamental ontology [Ladyman/Ross] |
14924 | If spacetime is substantial, what is the substance? [Ladyman/Ross] |
14901 | Spacetime may well be emergent, rather than basic [Ladyman/Ross] |
14938 | A fixed foliation theory of quantum gravity could make presentism possible [Ladyman/Ross] |
19576 | Religion needs an intermediary, because none of us can connect directly to a godhead [Novalis] |