61 ideas
| 15957 | Essential definitions show the differences that discriminate things, and make them what they are [Boyle] |
| 15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
| 15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
| 15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
| 15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
| 11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
| 11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
| 15965 | Boyle attacked a contemporary belief that powers were occult things [Boyle, by Alexander,P] |
| 16735 | In the 17th century, 'disposition' usually just means the spatial arrangement of parts [Boyle, by Pasnau] |
| 16034 | Form is not a separate substance, but just the manner, modification or 'stamp' of matter [Boyle] |
| 15953 | To cite a substantial form tells us what produced the effect, but not how it did it [Boyle] |
| 15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
| 15962 | Boyle's term 'texture' is not something you feel, but is unobservable structures of particles [Boyle, by Alexander,P] |
| 15964 | Boyle's secondary qualities are not illusory, or 'in the mind' [Boyle, by Alexander,P] |
| 16736 | Explanation is generally to deduce it from something better known, which comes in degrees [Boyle] |
| 15960 | Explanation is deducing a phenomenon from some nature better known to us [Boyle] |
| 16737 | The best explanations get down to primary basics, but others go less deep [Boyle] |
| 4669 | Persons are conscious, they relate, they think, they feel, and they are self-aware [Glover] |
| 4656 | A problem arises in any moral system that allows more than one absolute right [Glover] |
| 4657 | Double Effect: no bad acts with good consequences, but possibly good acts despite bad consequences [Glover] |
| 4658 | Acts and Omissions: bad consequences are morally better if they result from an omission rather than an act [Glover] |
| 4659 | It doesn't seem worse to switch off a life-support machine than to forget to switch it on [Glover] |
| 4660 | Harmful omissions are unavoidable, while most harmful acts can be avoided [Glover] |
| 4661 | What matters is not intrinsic value of life or rights, but worthwhile and desired life, and avoidance of pain [Glover] |
| 4648 | 'Death' is best seen as irreversible loss of consciousness, since this is why we care about brain function [Glover] |
| 3785 | You can't separate acts from the people performing them [Glover] |
| 3786 | Aggression in defence may be beneficial but morally corrupting [Glover] |
| 4650 | The quality of a life is not altogether independent of its length [Glover] |
| 3784 | Duty prohibits some acts, whatever their consequences [Glover] |
| 3782 | Satisfaction of desires is not at all the same as achieving happiness [Glover, by PG] |
| 3787 | Rule-utilitarianism is either act-utilitarianism, or not really utilitarian [Glover] |
| 3783 | How can utilitarianism decide the ideal population size? [Glover] |
| 4675 | The sanctity of life doctrine implies a serious increase of abnormality among the population [Glover] |
| 4654 | Autonomy favours present opinions over future ones, and says nothing about the interests of potential people [Glover] |
| 4655 | If a whole community did not mind death, respect for autonomy suggests that you could kill them all [Glover] |
| 4680 | Autonomy seems to acquire greater weight when the decision is more important to a person [Glover] |
| 4670 | Being alive is not intrinsically good, and there is no 'right to life' [Glover] |
| 4668 | You can't have a right to something you can't desire, so a foetus has no 'right' to life [Glover] |
| 4649 | If someone's life is 'worth living', that gives one direct reason not to kill him [Glover] |
| 4651 | Utilitarians object to killing directly (pain, and lost happiness), and to side-effects (loss to others, and precedents) [Glover] |
| 4671 | What is wrong with killing someone, if another equally worthwhile life is substituted? [Glover] |
| 4676 | The 'no trade-off' position: killing is only justified if it prevents other deaths [Glover] |
| 4685 | Societies spend a lot to save known persons, but very little to reduce fatal accidents [Glover] |
| 4683 | Involuntary euthanasia is wrong because it violates autonomy, and it has appalling side-effects [Glover] |
| 4682 | Euthanasia is voluntary (patient's wish), or involuntary (ignore wish), or non-voluntary (no wish possible) [Glover] |
| 4684 | Maybe extreme treatment is not saving life, but prolonging the act of dying [Glover] |
| 4681 | The Nazi mass murders seem to have originated in their euthanasia programme [Glover] |
| 4667 | How would we judge abortion if mothers had transparent wombs? [Glover] |
| 4665 | Conception isn't the fixed boundary for a person's beginning, because twins are possible within two weeks [Glover] |
| 4652 | If killing is wrong because it destroys future happiness, not conceiving a happy child is also wrong [Glover] |
| 4662 | Defenders of abortion focus on early pregnancy, while opponents focus on later stages [Glover] |
| 4663 | If abortion is wrong, it is because a foetus is a human being or a person (or potentially so) [Glover] |
| 4664 | If abortion is wrong because of the 'potential' person, that makes contraception wrong too [Glover] |
| 4673 | Abortion differs morally from deliberate non-conception only in its side-effects [Glover] |
| 4666 | If viability is a test or boundary at the beginning of life, it should also be so for frail old people [Glover] |
| 4672 | Apart from side effects, it seems best to replace an inadequate foetus with one which has a better chance [Glover] |
| 4674 | It is always right for a qualified person to perform an abortion when requested by the mother [Glover] |
| 4679 | One test for a worthwhile life is to assess the amount of life for which you would rather be unconscious [Glover] |
| 15952 | The corpuscles just have shape, size and motion, which explains things without 'sympathies' or 'forces' [Boyle, by Alexander,P] |
| 15972 | The corpuscular theory allows motion, but does not include forces between the particles [Boyle, by Alexander,P] |
| 15961 | I don't see how mere moving matter can lead to the bodies of men and animals, and especially their seeds [Boyle] |