20 ideas
18859 | Metaphysics is a quest for truthmakers [Tallant] |
18861 | Maybe number statements can be paraphrased into quantifications plus identities [Tallant] |
18866 | Maybe only 'positive' truths need truth-makers [Tallant] |
18860 | A truthmaker is the minimal portion of reality that will do the job [Tallant] |
18863 | What is the truthmaker for a possible new power? [Tallant] |
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
17879 | Axiomatising set theory makes it all relative [Skolem] |
13536 | Skolem did not believe in the existence of uncountable sets [Skolem] |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
17878 | If a 1st-order proposition is satisfied, it is satisfied in a denumerably infinite domain [Skolem] |
17880 | Integers and induction are clear as foundations, but set-theory axioms certainly aren't [Skolem] |
17881 | Mathematician want performable operations, not propositions about objects [Skolem] |
18864 | The wisdom of Plato and of Socrates are not the same property [Tallant] |
18865 | Substance must have two properties: individuation, and property-bearing [Tallant] |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
18862 | Are propositions all the thoughts and sentences that are possible? [Tallant] |