41 ideas
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
23146 | Motives produce intentions, which lead to actions [Driver] |
23590 | Criminal responsibility can be fully assigned to each member of a group [Walzer] |
23578 | Double Effect needs a double intention - to achieve the good, and minimise the evil [Walzer] |
23564 | Deep ethical theory is very controversial, but we have to live with higher ethical practice [Walzer] |
23144 | Virtue should be defined by consequences, not by states of mind [Driver] |
23148 | Virtues are character traits or dispositions which produce good consequences for others [Driver] |
23150 | Control of pregnancy and knowledge of paternity have downgraded chastity [Driver] |
23147 | Good intentions are not necessary for virtue [Driver] |
23149 | If generosity systematically turned recipients into parasites, it wouldn't be a virtue [Driver] |
20595 | You can't distribute goods from behind a veil, because their social meaning is unclear [Walzer, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
20592 | Complex equality restricts equalities from spilling over, like money influencing politics and law [Walzer, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
20549 | Equality is complex, with different spheres of equality where different principles apply [Walzer, by Swift] |
23568 | If whole states possess rights, there can be social relations between states [Walzer] |
23581 | The aim of reprisals is to enforce the rules of war [Walzer] |
23567 | Even non-violent intrusive acts between states count as aggression, if they justify resistance [Walzer] |
23570 | The only good reason for fighting is in defence of rights [Walzer] |
23571 | States can rightly pre-empt real and serious threats [Walzer] |
23580 | States need not endure attacks passively, and successful reprisals are legitimate [Walzer] |
23587 | Nuclear bombs are not for normal war; they undermine the 'just war', with a new morality [Walzer] |
23572 | Just wars are self-defence, or a rightful intercession in another's troubles [Walzer] |
23582 | Reprisal is defensible, as an alternative to war [Walzer] |
23588 | With nuclear weapons we have a permanent supreme emergency (which is unstable) [Walzer] |
23593 | Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello are independent; unjust wars can be fought in a just way [Walzer] |
23573 | For moral reasons, a just war must be a limited war [Walzer] |
23577 | Napoleon said 'I don't care about the deaths of a million men' [Walzer] |
23614 | Even aggressor soldiers are not criminals, so they have equal rights with their opponents [Walzer] |
23574 | The duties and moral status of loyal and obedient soldiers is the same in defence and aggression [Walzer] |
23575 | We can't blame soldiers for anything they do which clearly promotes victory [Walzer] |
23584 | Rejecting Combatant Equality allows just soldiers to be harsher, even to the extreme [Walzer] |
23589 | Kidnapped sailors and volunteers have different obligations to the passengers [Walzer] |
23586 | What matters in war is unacceptable targets, not unacceptable weapons [Walzer] |
23591 | If the oppressor is cruel, nonviolence is either surrender, or a mere gesture [Walzer] |
23579 | Soldiers will only protect civilians if they feel safe from them [Walzer] |
23592 | We can only lead war towards peace if we firmly enforce the rules of war [Walzer] |