Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Melvin Fitting, Palle Yourgrau and Keith Donnellan

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

20 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 8. Intensional Logic
15375 If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting]
15376 Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 9. Awareness Logic
15378 Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 10. Justification Logics
15379 Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
11026 Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
7760 Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
5811 A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan]
5812 Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan]
5814 'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
11028 λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
17818 How many? must first partition an aggregate into sets, and then logic fixes its number [Yourgrau]
17822 Nothing is 'intrinsically' numbered [Yourgrau]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
17817 Defining 'three' as the principle of collection or property of threes explains set theory definitions [Yourgrau]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
17815 We can't use sets as foundations for mathematics if we must await results from the upper reaches [Yourgrau]
17821 You can ask all sorts of numerical questions about any one given set [Yourgrau]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
15377 Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
10435 A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury]
10451 Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan]
5813 A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
5815 Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan]