54 ideas
501 | Reason is a more powerful persuader than gold [Democritus (attr)] |
9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
6334 | The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich] |
6342 | Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich] |
6332 | The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich] |
6335 | The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich] |
6344 | Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich] |
6336 | No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich] |
23299 | Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson] |
6337 | The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich] |
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
6339 | Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments [Horwich] |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
8431 | Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis [Horwich] |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
2799 | Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence [Horwich] |
2798 | Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E) [Horwich] |
6338 | We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning [Horwich] |
6340 | There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture [Horwich] |
6341 | Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage [Horwich] |
514 | Beauty is merely animal without intelligence [Democritus (attr)] |
525 | Behave well when alone, and feel shame in you own eyes [Democritus (attr)] |
502 | Good breeding in men means having a good character [Democritus (attr)] |
507 | Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful [Democritus (attr)] |
521 | We should only choose pleasures which are concerned with the beautiful [Democritus (attr)] |
505 | Good and true are the same for everyone, but pleasures differ [Democritus (attr)] |
508 | Only accept beneficial pleasures [Democritus (attr)] |
520 | The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works [Democritus (attr)] |
522 | Moderation brings more pleasures, and so increases pleasure [Democritus (attr)] |
506 | Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not an adult [Democritus (attr)] |
523 | It is as brave to master pleasure as to overcome the enemy [Democritus (attr)] |
503 | Virtue doesn't just avoid evil, but also doesn't desire it [Democritus (attr)] |
518 | A bad life is just a drawn-out death [Democritus (attr)] |
497 | Be virtuous from duty, not from fear [Democritus (attr)] |
499 | Repentance of shameful deeds is salvation [Democritus (attr)] |
524 | Virtue comes more from practice than from nature [Democritus (attr)] |
519 | One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds [Democritus (attr)] |
500 | The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the person wronged [Democritus (attr)] |
1539 | The endless desire for money is a crueller slavery than poverty [Democritus (attr)] |
526 | Small appetite makes poverty equal to wealth [Democritus (attr)] |
511 | It is better to have one intelligent friend than many unintelligent [Democritus (attr)] |
498 | It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty [Democritus (attr)] |
1541 | It is better to be poor in a democracy than be rich without freedom [Democritus (attr)] |
8432 | Analyse counterfactuals using causation, not the other way around [Horwich] |