Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Melvin Fitting, Peter Simons and Roger Scruton

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190 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything [Scruton]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Amusement rests on superiority, or relief, or incongruity [Scruton]
The central object of amusement is the human [Scruton]
Since only men laugh, it seems to be an attribute of reason [Scruton]
Objects of amusement do not have to be real [Scruton]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Metaphysics attempts to give an account of everything, in terms of categories and principles [Simons]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Analytic philosophers may prefer formal systems because natural language is such mess [Simons]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p [Scruton]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
Two marxist ideas have dominated in France: base and superstructure, and ideology [Scruton]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 6. Deconstruction
On the surface of deconstructive writing, technicalities float and then drift away [Scruton]
Deconstruction is the last spasm of romanticism, now become hopeless and destructive [Scruton]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Do aesthetic reasons count as reasons, if they are rejectable without contradiction? [Scruton]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 4. Open Question
We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good [Scruton]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Defining truth presupposes that there can be a true definition [Scruton]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth [Scruton]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 8. Intensional Logic
If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting]
Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 9. Awareness Logic
Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 10. Justification Logics
Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Classical mereology doesn't apply well to the objects around us [Simons]
Complement: the rest of the Universe apart from some individual, written x-bar [Simons]
Criticisms of mereology: parts? transitivity? sums? identity? four-dimensional? [Simons]
A 'part' has different meanings for individuals, classes, and masses [Simons]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 2. Terminology of Mereology
Proper or improper part: x < y, 'x is (a) part of y' [Simons]
Disjoint: two individuals are disjoint iff they do not overlap, written 'x | y' [Simons]
Difference: the difference of individuals is the remainder of an overlap, written 'x - y' [Simons]
Overlap: two parts overlap iff they have a part in common, expressed as 'x o y' [Simons]
Product: the product of two individuals is the sum of all of their overlaps, written 'x · y' [Simons]
Sum: the sum of individuals is what is overlapped if either of them are, written 'x + y' [Simons]
General sum: the sum of objects satisfying some predicate, written σx(Fx) [Simons]
General product: the nucleus of all objects satisfying a predicate, written πx(Fx) [Simons]
Universe: the mereological sum of all objects whatever, written 'U' [Simons]
Atom: an individual with no proper parts, written 'At x' [Simons]
Dissective: stuff is dissective if parts of the stuff are always the stuff [Simons]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
Two standard formalisations of part-whole theory are the Calculus of Individuals, and Mereology [Simons]
The part-relation is transitive and asymmetric (and thus irreflexive) [Simons]
Each wheel is part of a car, but the four wheels are not a further part [Simons]
Classical mereology doesn't handle temporal or modal notions very well [Simons]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 4. Groups
A 'group' is a collection with a condition which constitutes their being united [Simons]
The same members may form two groups [Simons]
'The wolves' are the matter of 'the pack'; the latter is a group, with different identity conditions [Simons]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
Nowadays logic is seen as the science of extensions, not intensions [Scruton]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Philosophy is stuck on the Fregean view that an individual is anything with a proper name [Simons]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Some natural languages don't distinguish between singular and plural [Simons]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects? [Scruton]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs [Scruton]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Four-dimensional ontology has no change, since that needs an object, and time to pass [Simons]
There are real relational changes, as well as bogus 'Cambridge changes' [Simons]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
I don't believe in processes [Simons]
Fans of process ontology cheat, since river-stages refer to 'rivers' [Simons]
Slow and continuous events (like balding or tree-growth) are called 'processes', not 'events' [Simons]
Maybe processes behave like stuff-nouns, and events like count-nouns [Simons]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 3. Moments
Moments are things like smiles or skids, which are founded on other things [Simons]
Moving disturbances are are moments which continuously change their basis [Simons]
A smiling is an event with causes, but the smile is a continuant without causes [Simons]
A wave is maintained by a process, but it isn't a process [Simons]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
I do not think there is a general identity condition for events [Simons]
Einstein's relativity brought events into ontology, as the terms of a simultaneity relationships [Simons]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
Relativity has an ontology of things and events, not on space-time diagrams [Simons]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Independent objects can exist apart, and maybe even entirely alone [Simons]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Mass nouns admit 'much' and 'a little', and resist 'many' and 'few'. [Simons]
Mass terms (unlike plurals) are used with indifference to whether they can exist in units [Simons]
Gold is not its atoms, because the atoms must be all gold, but gold contains neutrons [Simons]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
Mixtures disappear if nearly all of the mixture is one ingredient [Simons]
A mixture can have different qualities from its ingredients. [Simons]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
To individuate something we must pick it out, but also know its limits of variation [Simons]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Sortal nouns for continuants tell you their continuance- and cessation-conditions [Simons]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
A whole requires some unique relation which binds together all of the parts [Simons]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
Tibbles isn't Tib-plus-tail, because Tibbles can survive its loss, but the sum can't [Simons]
Does Tibbles remain the same cat when it loses its tail? [Simons]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Without extensional mereology two objects can occupy the same position [Simons]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
Composition is asymmetric and transitive [Simons]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
A hand constitutes a fist (when clenched), but a fist is not composed of an augmented hand [Simons]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
We say 'b is part of a', 'b is a part of a', 'b are a part of a', or 'b are parts of a'. [Simons]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
Classical mereology says there are 'sums', for whose existence there is no other evidence [Simons]
'Mereological extensionality' says objects with the same parts are identical [Simons]
If there are c atoms, this gives 2^c - 1 individuals, so there can't be just 2 or 12 individuals [Simons]
Sums are more plausible for pluralities and masses than they are for individuals [Simons]
Sums of things in different categories are found within philosophy. [Simons]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
The wholeness of a melody seems conventional, but of an explosion it seems natural [Simons]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Objects have their essential properties because of the kind of objects they are [Simons]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
We must distinguish the de dicto 'must' of propositions from the de re 'must' of essence [Simons]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Original parts are the best candidates for being essential to artefacts [Simons]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
An essential part of an essential part is an essential part of the whole [Simons]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
Four dimensional-objects are stranger than most people think [Simons]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
Intermittent objects would be respectable if they occurred in nature, as well as in artefacts [Simons]
Objects like chess games, with gaps in them, are thereby less unified [Simons]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
An entrepreneur and a museum curator would each be happy with their ship at the end [Simons]
The 'best candidate' theories mistakenly assume there is one answer to 'Which is the real ship?' [Simons]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
The zygote is an essential initial part, for a sexually reproduced organism [Simons]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re [Scruton]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable [Scruton]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting]
The limits of change for an individual depend on the kind of individual [Simons]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge [Scruton]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
Having beliefs involves recognition, expectation and surprise [Scruton]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
If an animal has beliefs, that implies not only that it can make mistakes, but that it can learn from them [Scruton]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception (which involves an assessment) is a higher state than sensation [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton]
If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion [Scruton]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths? [Scruton]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity [Scruton]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law [Scruton]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same [Scruton]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence [Scruton]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Conditioning may change behaviour without changing the mind [Scruton]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling [Scruton]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Only rational beings are attentive without motive or concern [Scruton]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
Do we use reason to distinguish people from animals, or use that difference to define reason? [Scruton]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
Cartesian 'ideas' confuse concepts and propositions [Scruton]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Any equivalence relation among similar things allows the creation of an abstractum [Simons]
Abstraction is usually seen as producing universals and numbers, but it can do more [Simons]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private [Scruton]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
With activities if you are doing it you've done it, with performances you must finish to have done it [Simons]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
Aesthetics has risen and fallen with Romanticism [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Aesthetic experience informs the world with the values of the observer [Scruton]
Art gives us imaginary worlds which we can view impartially [Scruton]
The pleasure taken in beauty also aims at understanding and valuing [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
Literary meaning emerges in comparisons, and tradition shows which comparisons are relevant [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Maybe 'beauty' is too loaded, and we should talk of fittingness or harmony [Scruton]
Beauty shows us what we should want in order to achieve human fulfilment [Scruton]
Beauty is rationally founded, inviting meaning, comparison and self-reflection [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Natural beauty reassures us that the world is where we belong [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
Romantics say music expresses ideas, or the Will, or intuitions, or feelings [Scruton]
Croce says art makes inarticulate intuitions conscious; rival views say the audience is the main concern [Scruton]
Reference without predication is the characteristic of expression [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 5. Art as Language
In literature, word replacement changes literary meaning [Scruton]
If music refers to love, it contains no predication, so it is expression, not language [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
Music is not representational, since thoughts about a subject are never essential to it [Scruton]
One false note doesn't make it a performance of a different work [Simons]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions
Without intentions we can't perceive sculpture, but that is not the whole story [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 3. Artistic Representation
In aesthetic interest, even what is true is treated as though it were not [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 4. Emotion in Art
Expressing melancholy is a good thing, but arousing it is a bad thing [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
We can be objective about conventions, but love of art is needed to understand its traditions [Scruton]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
All moral life depends ultimately on piety, which is our recognition of our own dependence [Scruton]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Beauty (unlike truth and goodness) is questionable as an ultimate value [Scruton]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Consequentialism emphasises value rather than obligation in morality [Scruton]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Kant's Moral Law is the rules rational beings would accept when trying to live by agreement [Scruton]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The modern virtues are courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance, justice, charity and loyalty [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Only just people will drop their own self-interests when faced with an impartial verdict [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Altruism is either emotional (where your interests are mine) or moral (where they are reasons for me) [Scruton]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Membership is the greatest source of obligation [Scruton]
That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done [Scruton]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
As soon as we drop self-interest and judge impartially, we find ourselves agreeing about conflicts [Scruton]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers [Scruton]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is wrong precisely because it can't distinguish animals from people [Scruton]
Utilitarianism merely guides us (by means of sympathy) when the moral law is silent [Scruton]
Morality is not a sort of calculation, it is what sets the limits to when calculation is appropriate [Scruton]
Utilitarianism says we can't blame Stalin yet, but such a theory is a sick joke [Scruton]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Allegiance is prior to the recognition of individual rights [Scruton]
The idea of a right seems fairly basic; justice may be the disposition to accord rights to people [Scruton]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
The benefits of social freedom outweigh the loneliness, doubt and alienation it brings [Scruton]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
Allegiance is fundamental to the conservative view of society [Scruton]
So-called 'liberation' is the enemy of freedom, destroying the very structures that are needed [Scruton]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Democrats are committed to a belief and to its opposite, if the majority prefer the latter [Scruton]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberals focus on universal human freedom, natural rights, and tolerance [Scruton, by PG]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
A right is a power which is enforced in the name of justice [Scruton]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / d. Legal positivism
For positivists law is a matter of form, for naturalists it is a matter of content [Scruton]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
The issue of abortion seems insoluble, because there is nothing with which to compare it [Scruton]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
Prostitution is wrong because it hardens the soul, since soul and body are one [Scruton]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Animals command our sympathy and moral concern initially because of their intentionality [Scruton]
Letting your dog kill wild rats, and keeping rats for your dog to kill, are very different [Scruton]
Many of the stranger forms of life (e.g. worms) interest us only as a species, not as individuals [Scruton]
An animal has individuality if it is nameable, and advanced animals can respond to their name [Scruton]
I may avoid stepping on a spider or flower, but fellow-feeling makes me protect a rabbit [Scruton]
Lucky animals are eaten by large predators, the less lucky starve, and worst is death by small predators [Scruton]
We can easily remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but we shouldn't do it [Scruton]
Sheep and cattle live comfortable lives, and die an enviably easy death [Scruton]
Concern for one animal may harm the species, if the individual is part of a bigger problem [Scruton]
Animals are outside the community of rights, but we still have duties towards them [Scruton]
We favour our own animals over foreign ones because we see them as fellow citizens [Scruton]
Brutal animal sports are banned because they harm the personality of the watcher [Scruton]
Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them [Scruton]
Introducing a natural means of controlling animal population may not be very compassionate [Scruton]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation [Scruton]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Measuring space requires no movement while I do it [Scruton]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance [Scruton]