Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Melvin Fitting, Philip Kitcher and Peter Singer

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59 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
Intuitionists rely on assertability instead of truth, but assertability relies on truth [Kitcher]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 8. Intensional Logic
If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting]
Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 9. Awareness Logic
Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 10. Justification Logics
Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Classical logic is our preconditions for assessing empirical evidence [Kitcher]
I believe classical logic because I was taught it and use it, but it could be undermined [Kitcher]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Kitcher says maths is an idealisation of the world, and our operations in dealing with it [Kitcher, by Resnik]
Mathematical a priorism is conceptualist, constructivist or realist [Kitcher]
The interest or beauty of mathematics is when it uses current knowledge to advance undestanding [Kitcher]
The 'beauty' or 'interest' of mathematics is just explanatory power [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Real numbers stand to measurement as natural numbers stand to counting [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / j. Complex numbers
Complex numbers were only accepted when a geometrical model for them was found [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
A one-operation is the segregation of a single object [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
The old view is that mathematics is useful in the world because it describes the world [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
With infinitesimals, you divide by the time, then set the time to zero [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
Mathematical intuition is not the type platonism needs [Kitcher]
If mathematics comes through intuition, that is either inexplicable, or too subjective [Kitcher]
Intuition is no basis for securing a priori knowledge, because it is fallible [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Mathematical knowledge arises from basic perception [Kitcher]
My constructivism is mathematics as an idealization of collecting and ordering objects [Kitcher]
We derive limited mathematics from ordinary things, and erect powerful theories on their basis [Kitcher]
The defenders of complex numbers had to show that they could be expressed in physical terms [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Analyticity avoids abstract entities, but can there be truth without reference? [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
Arithmetic is an idealizing theory [Kitcher]
Arithmetic is made true by the world, but is also made true by our constructions [Kitcher]
We develop a language for correlations, and use it to perform higher level operations [Kitcher]
Constructivism is ontological (that it is the work of an agent) and epistemological (knowable a priori) [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / c. Conceptualism
Conceptualists say we know mathematics a priori by possessing mathematical concepts [Kitcher]
If meaning makes mathematics true, you still need to say what the meanings refer to [Kitcher]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
Abstract objects were a bad way of explaining the structure in mathematics [Kitcher]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Many necessities are inexpressible, and unknowable a priori [Kitcher]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
Knowing our own existence is a priori, but not necessary [Kitcher]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
A priori knowledge comes from available a priori warrants that produce truth [Kitcher]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
In long mathematical proofs we can't remember the original a priori basis [Kitcher]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
Knowledge is a priori if the experience giving you the concepts thus gives you the knowledge [Kitcher]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
We have some self-knowledge a priori, such as knowledge of our own existence [Kitcher]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
A 'warrant' is a process which ensures that a true belief is knowledge [Kitcher]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
If experiential can defeat a belief, then its justification depends on the defeater's absence [Kitcher, by Casullo]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
Idealisation trades off accuracy for simplicity, in varying degrees [Kitcher]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Ethics is universalisable - it must involve an impartial and universal view of things [Singer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Following an inner voice for morality is irresponsible in a rational agent [Singer]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / c. Life
The sanctity of a human life depends either on being of our species, or on being a person [Singer]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
'Marginal utility' says something is more useful if it is in short supply [Singer]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Why should I do anything for posterity? What has posterity ever done for me? [Singer]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Conflict of rules might be avoided by greater complexity, or by a hierarchy of rules [Singer]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Psychopaths may just be bored, because they cannot participate in normal emotional life [Singer]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
You can't condemn violent revolution without assessing the evils it prevents [Singer]
In Marxism the state will be superseded [Singer]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
If 49% of the population can be wrong, so can 51% [Singer]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
Materialist history says we are subject to incomprehensible forces [Singer]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Equality of interests is a minimal principle, not implying equal treatment [Singer]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Equality of opportunity unfairly rewards those lucky enough to have great ability [Singer]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
If a right entails having the relevant desire, many creatures might have no right to life [Singer]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Why should a potential person have the rights of an actual person? [Singer]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Killing a chimp is worse than killing a human too defective to be a person [Singer]