15 ideas
| 5831 | The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP] |
| 15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
| 15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
| 15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
| 15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
| 11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
| 5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
| 5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
| 11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
| 15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
| 8808 | Involuntary beliefs can still be evaluated [Feldman/Conee] |
| 8807 | Evidentialism is the view that justification is determined by the quality of the evidence [Feldman/Conee] |
| 8809 | Beliefs should fit evidence, and if you ought to believe it, then you are justified [Feldman/Conee] |
| 8810 | If someone rejects good criticism through arrogance, that is irrelevant to whether they have knowledge [Feldman/Conee] |
| 5826 | The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP] |