15 ideas
11257 | The Pythagoreans were the first to offer definitions [Politis, by Politis] |
5831 | The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP] |
11235 | 'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words [Politis] |
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
11277 | Maybe 'What is being? is confusing because we can't ask what non-being is like [Politis] |
11248 | Necessary truths can be two-way relational, where essential truths are one-way or intrinsic [Politis] |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
5826 | The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP] |