Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Melvin Fitting, Stephen Wolfram and Carl Hempel

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14 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 8. Intensional Logic
If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting]
Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 9. Awareness Logic
Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 10. Justification Logics
Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
At one level maths and nature are very similar, suggesting some deeper origin [Wolfram]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Explanatory facts also predict, and predictive facts also explain [Hempel, by Okasha]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Scientific explanation aims at a unifying account of underlying structures and processes [Hempel]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
For Hempel, explanations are deductive-nomological or probabilistic-statistical [Hempel, by Bird]
The covering-law model is for scientific explanation; historical explanation is quite different [Hempel]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Hempel rejects causation as part of explanation [Hempel, by Salmon]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Space and its contents seem to be one stuff - so space is the only existing thing [Wolfram]