Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Michael Burke, J. Alberto Coffa and H.H. Price

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26 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
Choice suggests that intensions are not needed to ensure classes [Coffa]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Some dispositional properties (such as mental ones) may have no categorical base [Price,HH]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley]
The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley]
Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
The semantic tradition aimed to explain the a priori semantically, not by Kantian intuition [Coffa]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
Platonism defines the a priori in a way that makes it unknowable [Coffa]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Before we can abstract from an instance of violet, we must first recognise it [Price,HH]
If judgement of a characteristic is possible, that part of abstraction must be complete [Price,HH]
There may be degrees of abstraction which allow recognition by signs, without full concepts [Price,HH]
There is pre-verbal sign-based abstraction, as when ice actually looks cold [Price,HH]
Intelligent behaviour, even in animals, has something abstract about it [Price,HH]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Mathematics generalises by using variables [Coffa]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Recognition must precede the acquisition of basic concepts, so it is the fundamental intellectual process [Price,HH]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
We reach concepts by clarification, or by definition, or by habitual experience [Price,HH]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
Abstractions can be interpreted dispositionally, as the ability to recognise or imagine an item [Price,HH]
If ideas have to be images, then abstract ideas become a paradoxical problem [Price,HH]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
A 'felt familiarity' with universals is more primitive than abstraction [Price,HH]
Our understanding of 'dog' or 'house' arises from a repeated experience of concomitances [Price,HH]
The basic concepts of conceptual cognition are acquired by direct abstraction from instances [Price,HH]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Relativity is as absolutist about space-time as Newton was about space [Coffa]