Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Michael Burke, James Pryor and David Marshall

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15 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley]
The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley]
Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
The best argument for immediate justification is not the Regress Argument, but considering examples [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Impure coherentists accept that perceptions can justify, unlike pure coherentists [Pryor]
Coherentism rests on the claim that justifications must be beliefs, with propositional content [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Reasons for beliefs can be cited to others, unlike a raw headache experience [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
Beliefs are not chosen, but you can seek ways to influence your belief [Pryor]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
If the present does not exist, then consciousness must be memory of the immediate past [Marshall]