Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Michael Burke, José A. Benardete and Jonathan Glover

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75 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics focuses on Platonism, essentialism, materialism and anti-realism [Benardete,JA]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
There are the 'is' of predication (a function), the 'is' of identity (equals), and the 'is' of existence (quantifier) [Benardete,JA]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Analytical philosophy analyses separate concepts successfully, but lacks a synoptic vision of the results [Benardete,JA]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
Presumably the statements of science are true, but should they be taken literally or not? [Benardete,JA]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Set theory attempts to reduce the 'is' of predication to mathematics [Benardete,JA]
The set of Greeks is included in the set of men, but isn't a member of it [Benardete,JA]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
The standard Z-F Intuition version of set theory has about ten agreed axioms [Benardete,JA, by PG]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Greeks saw the science of proportion as the link between geometry and arithmetic [Benardete,JA]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Negatives, rationals, irrationals and imaginaries are all postulated to solve baffling equations [Benardete,JA]
Natural numbers are seen in terms of either their ordinality (Peano), or cardinality (set theory) [Benardete,JA]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
If slowness is a property of walking rather than the walker, we must allow that events exist [Benardete,JA]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns [Benardete,JA]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
If there is no causal interaction with transcendent Platonic objects, how can you learn about them? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley]
The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley]
Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
Why should packed-together particles be a thing (Mt Everest), but not scattered ones? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Could a horse lose the essential property of being a horse, and yet continue to exist? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
If a soldier continues to exist after serving as a soldier, does the wind cease to exist after it ceases to blow? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
One can step into the same river twice, but not into the same water [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Maybe self-identity isn't existence, if Pegasus can be self-identical but non-existent [Benardete,JA]
Absolutists might accept that to exist is relative, but relative to what? How about relative to itself? [Benardete,JA]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
The clearest a priori knowledge is proving non-existence through contradiction [Benardete,JA]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
Appeals to intuition seem to imply synthetic a priori knowledge [Benardete,JA]
Logical positivism amounts to no more than 'there is no synthetic a priori' [Benardete,JA]
Assertions about existence beyond experience can only be a priori synthetic [Benardete,JA]
If we know truths about prime numbers, we seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge of Platonic objects [Benardete,JA]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
Persons are conscious, they relate, they think, they feel, and they are self-aware [Glover]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
A problem arises in any moral system that allows more than one absolute right [Glover]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
Double Effect: no bad acts with good consequences, but possibly good acts despite bad consequences [Glover]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
Harmful omissions are unavoidable, while most harmful acts can be avoided [Glover]
Acts and Omissions: bad consequences are morally better if they result from an omission rather than an act [Glover]
It doesn't seem worse to switch off a life-support machine than to forget to switch it on [Glover]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / c. Life
What matters is not intrinsic value of life or rights, but worthwhile and desired life, and avoidance of pain [Glover]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
'Death' is best seen as irreversible loss of consciousness, since this is why we care about brain function [Glover]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
You can't separate acts from the people performing them [Glover]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
Aggression in defence may be beneficial but morally corrupting [Glover]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
The quality of a life is not altogether independent of its length [Glover]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Duty prohibits some acts, whatever their consequences [Glover]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Satisfaction of desires is not at all the same as achieving happiness [Glover, by PG]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 5. Rule Utilitarianism
Rule-utilitarianism is either act-utilitarianism, or not really utilitarian [Glover]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / a. Human population
How can utilitarianism decide the ideal population size? [Glover]
The sanctity of life doctrine implies a serious increase of abnormality among the population [Glover]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
Autonomy favours present opinions over future ones, and says nothing about the interests of potential people [Glover]
If a whole community did not mind death, respect for autonomy suggests that you could kill them all [Glover]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Autonomy seems to acquire greater weight when the decision is more important to a person [Glover]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 2. Moral rights
Being alive is not intrinsically good, and there is no 'right to life' [Glover]
You can't have a right to something you can't desire, so a foetus has no 'right' to life [Glover]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 1. Causing Death
If someone's life is 'worth living', that gives one direct reason not to kill him [Glover]
Utilitarians object to killing directly (pain, and lost happiness), and to side-effects (loss to others, and precedents) [Glover]
What is wrong with killing someone, if another equally worthwhile life is substituted? [Glover]
The 'no trade-off' position: killing is only justified if it prevents other deaths [Glover]
Societies spend a lot to save known persons, but very little to reduce fatal accidents [Glover]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 2. Euthanasia
Euthanasia is voluntary (patient's wish), or involuntary (ignore wish), or non-voluntary (no wish possible) [Glover]
Involuntary euthanasia is wrong because it violates autonomy, and it has appalling side-effects [Glover]
Maybe extreme treatment is not saving life, but prolonging the act of dying [Glover]
The Nazi mass murders seem to have originated in their euthanasia programme [Glover]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
If killing is wrong because it destroys future happiness, not conceiving a happy child is also wrong [Glover]
Defenders of abortion focus on early pregnancy, while opponents focus on later stages [Glover]
If abortion is wrong, it is because a foetus is a human being or a person (or potentially so) [Glover]
If abortion is wrong because of the 'potential' person, that makes contraception wrong too [Glover]
Conception isn't the fixed boundary for a person's beginning, because twins are possible within two weeks [Glover]
How would we judge abortion if mothers had transparent wombs? [Glover]
Abortion differs morally from deliberate non-conception only in its side-effects [Glover]
If viability is a test or boundary at the beginning of life, it should also be so for frail old people [Glover]
Apart from side effects, it seems best to replace an inadequate foetus with one which has a better chance [Glover]
It is always right for a qualified person to perform an abortion when requested by the mother [Glover]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
One test for a worthwhile life is to assess the amount of life for which you would rather be unconscious [Glover]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
Rationalists see points as fundamental, but empiricists prefer regions [Benardete,JA]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
In the ontological argument a full understanding of the concept of God implies a contradiction in 'There is no God' [Benardete,JA]