Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Michael Burke, Juan Comesaña and H. Paul Grice

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
22140 The greatest philosophers are methodical; it is what makes them great [Grice]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
16235 Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley]
14753 The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
16072 'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
14751 Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
16071 Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
16234 Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley]
13278 Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
14750 Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
13856 Conditionals are truth-functional, but we must take care with misleading ones [Grice, by Edgington]
8948 The odd truth table for material conditionals is explained by conversational conventions [Grice, by Fisher]
13767 Conditionals might remain truth-functional, despite inappropriate conversational remarks [Edgington on Grice]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
10990 Conditionals are truth-functional, but unassertable in tricky cases? [Grice, by Read]
14277 A person can be justified in believing a proposition, though it is unreasonable to actually say it [Grice, by Edgington]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
19727 Reliabilist knowledge is evidence based belief, with high conditional probability [Comesaña]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19725 In a sceptical scenario belief formation is unreliable, so no beliefs at all are justified? [Comesaña]
19726 How do we decide which exact process is the one that needs to be reliable? [Comesaña]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
7752 Only the utterer's primary intention is relevant to the meaning [Grice]
7751 Meaning needs an intention to induce a belief, and a recognition that this is the speaker's intention [Grice]
7753 We judge linguistic intentions rather as we judge non-linguistic intentions, so they are alike [Grice]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
22330 Grice said patterns of use are often semantically irrelevant, because it is a pragmatic matter [Grice, by Glock]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
18045 Grice's maxim of quality says do not assert what you believe to be false [Grice, by Magidor]
18044 Grice's maxim of manner requires one to be as brief as possible [Grice, by Magidor]
10991 Key conversational maxims are 'quality' (assert truth) and 'quantity' (leave nothing out) [Grice, by Read]
18046 Grice's maxim of quantity says be sufficiently informative [Grice, by Magidor]