22 ideas
10061 | The If-thenist view only seems to work for the axiomatised portions of mathematics [Musgrave] |
10065 | Perhaps If-thenism survives in mathematics if we stick to first-order logic [Musgrave] |
10049 | Logical truths may contain non-logical notions, as in 'all men are men' [Musgrave] |
10050 | A statement is logically true if it comes out true in all interpretations in all (non-empty) domains [Musgrave] |
10058 | No two numbers having the same successor relies on the Axiom of Infinity [Musgrave] |
10062 | Formalism seems to exclude all creative, growing mathematics [Musgrave] |
10063 | Formalism is a bulwark of logical positivism [Musgrave] |
16052 | 'Superdupervenience' is supervenience that has a robustly materialistic explanation [Horgan,T] |
16053 | 'Global' supervenience is facts tracking varying physical facts in every possible world [Horgan,T] |
16056 | Don't just observe supervenience - explain it! [Horgan,T] |
16054 | Physicalism needs more than global supervenience on the physical [Horgan,T] |
16055 | Materialism requires that physics be causally complete [Horgan,T] |
16235 | Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley] |
14753 | The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider] |
16072 | 'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman] |
14751 | Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider] |
16071 | Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman] |
16234 | Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley] |
13278 | Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki] |
14750 | Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider] |
16057 | Instrumentalism normally says some discourse is useful, but not genuinely true [Horgan,T] |
10060 | Logical positivists adopted an If-thenist version of logicism about numbers [Musgrave] |