Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Michael Burke, William Lyons and Diodorus Cronus

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


18 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley]
The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley]
Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
From the necessity of the past we can infer the impossibility of what never happens [Diod.Cronus, by White,MJ]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
The Master Argument seems to prove that only what will happen is possible [Diod.Cronus, by Epictetus]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
Conditionals are true when the antecedent is true, and the consequent has to be true [Diod.Cronus]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Belief is the most important propositional attitude [Lyons]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Consciousness no longer seems essential to intentionality [Lyons]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Perceptions could give us information without symbolic representation [Lyons]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
Propositional attitudes require representation [Lyons]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology works badly for alien cultures [Lyons]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
All thinking has content [Lyons]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Thought is unambiguous, and you should stick to what the speaker thinks they are saying [Diod.Cronus, by Gellius]