24 ideas
8502 | Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt] |
8503 | The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt] |
8501 | Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt] |
10414 | Abstract objects are constituted by encoded collections of properties [Zalta, by Swoyer] |
10558 | Abstract objects are actually constituted by the properties by which we conceive them [Zalta] |
10415 | Properties make round squares and round triangles distinct, unlike exemplification [Zalta, by Swoyer] |
17368 | Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category [Devitt] |
17370 | Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences [Devitt] |
9354 | Why should necessities only be knowable a priori? That Hesperus is Phosporus is known empirically [Devitt] |
19565 | How could the mind have a link to the necessary character of reality? [Devitt] |
9353 | We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical [Devitt] |
9356 | The idea of the a priori is so obscure that it won't explain anything [Devitt] |
19564 | Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that [Devitt] |
10557 | Abstract objects are captured by second-order modal logic, plus 'encoding' formulas [Zalta] |
22594 | In 1794 France all individual and legal rights were suppressed by the general will [Dunt] |
22602 | Over several centuries a set of eight main liberal values was established [Dunt] |
22596 | No government, or the whole nation, can control an individual beyond legitimate scope [Dunt] |
22603 | Laissez-faire liberalism failed to give people the protections and freedoms needed for a good life [Dunt] |
22592 | Nationalism pretends that we can only have a single identity [Dunt] |
17371 | Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt] |
17369 | We name species as small to share properties, but large enough to yield generalisations [Devitt] |
17367 | Species are phenetic, biological, niche, or phylogenetic-cladistic [Devitt, by PG] |
17372 | The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt] |
17373 | Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt] |