198 ideas
| 21887 | Derrida focuses on other philosophers, rather than on science [Derrida] |
| 21888 | Philosophy is just a linguistic display [Derrida] |
| 19066 | Philosophy aims to understand the world, through ordinary experience and science [Dummett] |
| 21896 | Philosophy aims to build foundations for thought [Derrida, by May] |
| 21893 | Philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and its writing is aesthetic [Derrida] |
| 10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
| 21892 | Interpretations can be interpreted, so there is no original 'meaning' available [Derrida] |
| 20925 | Hermeneutics blunts truth, by conforming it to the interpreter [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
| 20934 | Hermeneutics is hostile, trying to overcome the other person's difference [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
| 21895 | Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning [Derrida] |
| 8210 | Deconstructing philosophy gives the history of concepts, and the repressions behind them [Derrida] |
| 8211 | The movement of 'différance' is the root of all the oppositional concepts in our language [Derrida] |
| 6840 | Derrida came to believe in the undeconstructability of justice, which cannot be relativised [Derrida, by Critchley] |
| 21934 | The idea of being as persistent presence, and meaning as conscious intelligibility, are self-destructive [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
| 21883 | Sincerity can't be verified, so fiction infuses speech, and hence reality also [Derrida] |
| 21882 | Sentences are contradictory, as they have opposite meanings in some contexts [Derrida] |
| 8216 | Deconstruction is not neutral; it intervenes [Derrida] |
| 21881 | We aim to explore the limits of expression (as in Mallarmé's poetry) [Derrida] |
| 17621 | What matters in mathematics is its objectivity, not the existence of the objects [Dummett] |
| 8213 | I try to analyse certain verbal concepts which block and confuse the dialectical process [Derrida] |
| 9847 | A contextual definition permits the elimination of the expression by a substitution [Dummett] |
| 19067 | A successful proof requires recognition of truth at every step [Dummett] |
| 10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
| 10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |
| 4756 | Derrida says that all truth-talk is merely metaphor [Derrida, by Engel] |
| 21877 | True thoughts are inaccessible, in the subconscious, prior to speech or writing [Derrida] |
| 19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
| 8166 | Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth [Dummett] |
| 19053 | Logic would be more natural if negation only referred to predicates [Dummett] |
| 14273 | Conditional Proof is only valid if we accept the truth-functional reading of 'if' [Edgington] |
| 19060 | Truth-tables are dubious in some cases, and may be a bad way to explain connective meaning [Dummett] |
| 16951 | It was realised that possible worlds covered all modal logics, if they had a structure [Dummett] |
| 16952 | If something is only possible relative to another possibility, the possibility relation is not transitive [Dummett] |
| 16953 | Relative possibility one way may be impossible coming back, so it isn't symmetrical [Dummett] |
| 16960 | If possibilitiy is relative, that might make accessibility non-transitive, and T the correct system [Dummett] |
| 16958 | In S4 the actual world has a special place [Dummett] |
| 18073 | Dummett says classical logic rests on meaning as truth, while intuitionist logic rests on assertability [Dummett, by Kitcher] |
| 18832 | Mathematical statements and entities that result from an infinite process must lack a truth-value [Dummett] |
| 10537 | The ordered pairs <x,y> can be reduced to the class of sets of the form {{x},{x,y}} [Dummett] |
| 9193 | ZF set theory has variables which range over sets, 'equals' and 'member', and extensionality [Dummett] |
| 9194 | The main alternative to ZF is one which includes looser classes as well as sets [Dummett] |
| 10542 | To associate a cardinal with each set, we need the Axiom of Choice to find a representative [Dummett] |
| 11066 | Deduction is justified by the semantics of its metalanguage [Dummett, by Hanna] |
| 9820 | In classical logic, logical truths are valid formulas; in higher-order logics they are purely logical [Dummett] |
| 19058 | Syntactic consequence is positive, for validity; semantic version is negative, with counterexamples [Dummett] |
| 8173 | Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates [Dummett] |
| 8195 | Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett] |
| 7334 | Anti-realism needs an intuitionist logic with no law of excluded middle [Dummett, by Miller,A] |
| 8179 | The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence [Dummett] |
| 9195 | Intuitionists reject excluded middle, not for a third value, but for possibility of proof [Dummett] |
| 19052 | Natural language 'not' doesn't apply to sentences [Dummett] |
| 18801 | Classical negation is circular, if it relies on knowing negation-conditions from truth-conditions [Dummett] |
| 9182 | Ancient names like 'Obadiah' depend on tradition, not on where the name originated [Dummett] |
| 21878 | Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida] |
| 21889 | 'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida] |
| 21879 | Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida] |
| 19057 | Classical quantification is an infinite conjunction or disjunction - but you may not know all the instances [Dummett] |
| 9186 | First-order logic concerns objects; second-order adds properties, kinds, relations and functions [Dummett] |
| 19063 | Beth trees show semantics for intuitionistic logic, in terms of how truth has been established [Dummett] |
| 19059 | In standard views you could replace 'true' and 'false' with mere 0 and 1 [Dummett] |
| 19062 | Classical two-valued semantics implies that meaning is grasped through truth-conditions [Dummett] |
| 9187 | Logical truths and inference are characterized either syntactically or semantically [Dummett] |
| 19065 | Soundness and completeness proofs test the theory of meaning, rather than the logic theory [Dummett] |
| 8194 | Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett] |
| 9896 | A prime number is one which is measured by a unit alone [Dummett] |
| 18255 | Addition of quantities is prior to ordering, as shown in cyclic domains like angles [Dummett] |
| 9191 | Ordinals seem more basic than cardinals, since we count objects in sequence [Dummett] |
| 9895 | A number is a multitude composed of units [Dummett] |
| 9852 | We understand 'there are as many nuts as apples' as easily by pairing them as by counting them [Dummett] |
| 15938 | Platonists ruin infinity, which is precisely a growing structure which is never completed [Dummett] |
| 10554 | Intuitionists find the Incompleteness Theorem unsurprising, since proof is intuitive, not formal [Dummett] |
| 9829 | The identity of a number may be fixed by something outside structure - by counting [Dummett] |
| 9828 | Numbers aren't fixed by position in a structure; it won't tell you whether to start with 0 or 1 [Dummett] |
| 9192 | The number 4 has different positions in the naturals and the wholes, with the same structure [Dummett] |
| 9876 | Set theory isn't part of logic, and why reduce to something more complex? [Dummett] |
| 15939 | For intuitionists it is constructed proofs (which take time) which make statements true [Dummett] |
| 10552 | Intuitionism says that totality of numbers is only potential, but is still determinate [Dummett] |
| 8190 | Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett] |
| 8198 | A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett] |
| 10540 | We can't say that light is concrete but radio waves abstract [Dummett] |
| 10515 | Ostension is possible for concreta; abstracta can only be referred to via other objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
| 10544 | The concrete/abstract distinction seems crude: in which category is the Mistral? [Dummett] |
| 10546 | We don't need a sharp concrete/abstract distinction [Dummett] |
| 9884 | The distinction of concrete/abstract, or actual/non-actual, is a scale, not a dichotomy [Dummett] |
| 22297 | Dummett saw realism as acceptance of bivalence, rather than of mind-independent entities [Dummett, by Potter] |
| 9869 | Realism is just the application of two-valued semantics to sentences [Dummett] |
| 15049 | Metaphysical realists are committed to all unambiguous statements being true or not true [Dummett] |
| 8184 | Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it [Dummett] |
| 8185 | We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind [Dummett] |
| 8192 | I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett] |
| 3303 | For anti-realists there are no natural distinctions between objects [Dummett, by Benardete,JA] |
| 8163 | Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts [Dummett] |
| 8161 | We know we can state facts, with true statements [Dummett] |
| 21628 | To say reality itself is vague is not properly intelligible [Dummett] |
| 8180 | 'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not [Dummett] |
| 10281 | The objects we recognise the world as containing depends on the structure of our language [Dummett] |
| 10548 | The context principle for names rules out a special philosophical sense for 'existence' [Dummett] |
| 10532 | We can understand universals by studying predication [Dummett] |
| 10534 | 'Nominalism' used to mean denial of universals, but now means denial of abstract objects [Dummett] |
| 9880 | Nominalism assumes unmediated mental contact with objects [Dummett] |
| 10541 | Concrete objects such as sounds and smells may not be possible objects of ostension [Dummett] |
| 10545 | Abstract objects may not cause changes, but they can be the subject of change [Dummett] |
| 9885 | The existence of abstract objects is a pseudo-problem [Dummett] |
| 10555 | If we can intuitively apprehend abstract objects, this makes them observable and causally active [Dummett] |
| 9858 | Abstract objects nowadays are those which are objective but not actual [Dummett] |
| 10543 | Abstract objects must have names that fall within the range of some functional expression [Dummett] |
| 9859 | It is absurd to deny the Equator, on the grounds that it lacks causal powers [Dummett] |
| 9860 | 'We've crossed the Equator' has truth-conditions, so accept the Equator - and it's an object [Dummett] |
| 10320 | If a genuine singular term needs a criterion of identity, we must exclude abstract nouns [Dummett, by Hale] |
| 10547 | Abstract objects can never be confronted, and need verbal phrases for reference [Dummett] |
| 9872 | Abstract objects need the context principle, since they can't be encountered directly [Dummett] |
| 10531 | There is a modern philosophical notion of 'object', first introduced by Frege [Dummett] |
| 9848 | Content is replaceable if identical, so replaceability can't define identity [Dummett, by Dummett] |
| 9842 | Frege introduced criteria for identity, but thought defining identity was circular [Dummett] |
| 12205 | There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength [Edgington] |
| 12207 | Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature [Edgington] |
| 12206 | Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion [Edgington] |
| 12185 | Logical necessity is epistemic necessity, which is the old notion of a priori [Edgington, by McFetridge] |
| 12208 | An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary [Edgington] |
| 13857 | Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake [Edgington] |
| 14281 | A thing works like formal probability if all the options sum to 100% [Edgington] |
| 14284 | Conclusion improbability can't exceed summed premise improbability in valid arguments [Edgington] |
| 13768 | Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington] |
| 13853 | It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is [Edgington] |
| 14270 | Simple indicatives about past, present or future do seem to form a single semantic kind [Edgington] |
| 14269 | Maybe forward-looking indicatives are best classed with the subjunctives [Edgington] |
| 13770 | There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington] |
| 14275 | Truth-function problems don't show up in mathematics [Edgington] |
| 13764 | Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington] |
| 13765 | 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington] |
| 14274 | Inferring conditionals from disjunctions or negated conjunctions gives support to truth-functionalism [Edgington] |
| 14276 | The truth-functional view makes conditionals with unlikely antecedents likely to be true [Edgington] |
| 14290 | Doctor:'If patient still alive, change dressing'; Nurse:'Either dead patient, or change dressing'; kills patient! [Edgington] |
| 13855 | A conditional does not have truth conditions [Edgington] |
| 13859 | X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B [Edgington] |
| 14271 | Non-truth-functionalist say 'If A,B' is false if A is T and B is F, but deny that is always true for TT,FT and FF [Edgington] |
| 14272 | I say "If you touch that wire you'll get a shock"; you don't touch it. How can that make the conditional true? [Edgington] |
| 13854 | Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition [Edgington] |
| 14282 | On the supposition view, believe if A,B to the extent that A&B is nearly as likely as A [Edgington] |
| 14278 | Truth-functionalists support some conditionals which we assert, but should not actually believe [Edgington] |
| 14287 | Does 'If A,B' say something different in each context, because of the possibiites there? [Edgington] |
| 16957 | Possible worlds aren't how the world might be, but how a world might be, given some possibility [Dummett] |
| 16959 | If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality [Dummett] |
| 8199 | The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett] |
| 8178 | Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale [Dummett] |
| 19061 | An explanation is often a deduction, but that may well beg the question [Dummett] |
| 21890 | Heidegger showed that passing time is the key to consciousness [Derrida] |
| 21880 | 'Tacit theory' controls our thinking (which is why Freud is important) [Derrida] |
| 8175 | A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions [Dummett] |
| 8174 | The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought [Dummett] |
| 19168 | Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects [Dummett, by Davidson] |
| 9849 | Maybe a concept is 'prior' to another if it can be defined without the second concept [Dummett] |
| 9850 | An argument for conceptual priority is greater simplicity in explanation [Dummett] |
| 9873 | Abstract terms are acceptable as long as we know how they function linguistically [Dummett] |
| 10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |
| 10549 | Since abstract objects cannot be picked out, we must rely on identity statements [Dummett] |
| 9993 | There is no reason why abstraction by equivalence classes should be called 'logical' [Dummett, by Tait] |
| 9857 | We arrive at the concept 'suicide' by comparing 'Cato killed Cato' with 'Brutus killed Brutus' [Dummett] |
| 9833 | To abstract from spoons (to get the same number as the forks), the spoons must be indistinguishable too [Dummett] |
| 8165 | To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view [Dummett] |
| 21932 | 'Différance' is the interwoven history of each sign [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
| 21886 | Meanings depend on differences and contrasts [Derrida] |
| 21930 | For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language [Derrida] |
| 21884 | Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language [Derrida] |
| 21935 | The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences [Derrida] |
| 21933 | Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
| 21894 | Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language [Derrida] |
| 8212 | Everything that is experienced in consciousness is meaning [Derrida] |
| 19055 | Stating a sentence's truth-conditions is just paraphrasing the sentence [Dummett] |
| 19056 | If a sentence is effectively undecidable, we can never know its truth conditions [Dummett] |
| 8168 | To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett] |
| 8193 | Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett] |
| 8181 | A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic [Dummett] |
| 8182 | Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power [Dummett] |
| 8183 | If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change [Dummett] |
| 19054 | Meaning as use puts use beyond criticism, and needs a holistic view of language [Dummett] |
| 8176 | We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used [Dummett] |
| 8170 | Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something [Dummett] |
| 21929 | Derrida focuses on ambiguity, but talks of 'dissemination', not traditional multiple meanings [Derrida] |
| 21931 | 'Dissemination' is opposed to polysemia, since that is irreducible, because of multiple understandings [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
| 21885 | Words exist in 'spacing', so meanings are never synchronic except in writing [Derrida] |
| 19064 | Holism is not a theory of meaning; it is the denial that a theory of meaning is possible [Dummett] |
| 10516 | A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
| 9181 | The causal theory of reference can't distinguish just hearing a name from knowing its use [Dummett] |
| 9836 | Fregean semantics assumes a domain articulated into individual objects [Dummett] |
| 8189 | Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett] |
| 8191 | The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett] |
| 8169 | We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett] |
| 21891 | The good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there is no pure good [Derrida] |
| 16956 | To explain generosity in a person, you must understand a generous action [Dummett] |
| 21936 | A community must consist of singular persons, with nothing in common [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
| 21937 | Can there be democratic friendship without us all becoming identical? [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
| 16954 | Generalised talk of 'natural kinds' is unfortunate, as they vary too much [Dummett] |
| 18257 | Why should the limit of measurement be points, not intervals? [Dummett] |
| 8186 | Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change [Dummett] |
| 8197 | Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett] |
| 8167 | If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes [Dummett] |
| 8196 | The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett] |