331 ideas
19066 | Philosophy aims to understand the world, through ordinary experience and science [Dummett] |
9414 | Metaphysics is the mapping of possibilities [Lowe, by Mumford] |
16414 | Science needs metaphysics to weed out its presuppositions [Lowe, by Hofweber] |
13917 | Metaphysics aims to identify categories of being, and show their interdependency [Lowe] |
4194 | Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole [Lowe] |
8282 | Only metaphysics can decide whether identity survives through change [Lowe] |
16127 | Metaphysics tells us what there could be, rather than what there is [Lowe] |
4214 | Maybe such concepts as causation, identity and existence are primitive and irreducible [Lowe] |
13919 | Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things [Lowe] |
10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
4222 | If all that exists is what is being measured, what about the people and instruments doing the measuring? [Lowe] |
17621 | What matters in mathematics is its objectivity, not the existence of the objects [Dummett] |
4217 | It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology [Lowe] |
16539 | A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle [Lowe] |
16540 | Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse [Lowe] |
16548 | An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right [Lowe] |
9847 | A contextual definition permits the elimination of the expression by a substitution [Dummett] |
16549 | Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions [Lowe] |
8262 | How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea? [Lowe] |
19067 | A successful proof requires recognition of truth at every step [Dummett] |
10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |
18351 | Propositions are made true, in virtue of something which explains its truth [Lowe] |
8315 | Maybe facts are just true propositions [Lowe] |
8319 | One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items [Lowe] |
19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
8166 | Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth [Dummett] |
19053 | Logic would be more natural if negation only referred to predicates [Dummett] |
19060 | Truth-tables are dubious in some cases, and may be a bad way to explain connective meaning [Dummett] |
16951 | It was realised that possible worlds covered all modal logics, if they had a structure [Dummett] |
16952 | If something is only possible relative to another possibility, the possibility relation is not transitive [Dummett] |
16953 | Relative possibility one way may be impossible coming back, so it isn't symmetrical [Dummett] |
16960 | If possibilitiy is relative, that might make accessibility non-transitive, and T the correct system [Dummett] |
16958 | In S4 the actual world has a special place [Dummett] |
18073 | Dummett says classical logic rests on meaning as truth, while intuitionist logic rests on assertability [Dummett, by Kitcher] |
18832 | Mathematical statements and entities that result from an infinite process must lack a truth-value [Dummett] |
8309 | A set is a 'number of things', not a 'collection', because nothing actually collects the members [Lowe] |
10537 | The ordered pairs <x,y> can be reduced to the class of sets of the form {{x},{x,y}} [Dummett] |
8322 | I don't believe in the empty set, because (lacking members) it lacks identity-conditions [Lowe] |
9193 | ZF set theory has variables which range over sets, 'equals' and 'member', and extensionality [Dummett] |
9194 | The main alternative to ZF is one which includes looser classes as well as sets [Dummett] |
10542 | To associate a cardinal with each set, we need the Axiom of Choice to find a representative [Dummett] |
11066 | Deduction is justified by the semantics of its metalanguage [Dummett, by Hanna] |
9820 | In classical logic, logical truths are valid formulas; in higher-order logics they are purely logical [Dummett] |
19058 | Syntactic consequence is positive, for validity; semantic version is negative, with counterexamples [Dummett] |
8173 | Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates [Dummett] |
8195 | Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett] |
7334 | Anti-realism needs an intuitionist logic with no law of excluded middle [Dummett, by Miller,A] |
8179 | The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence [Dummett] |
9195 | Intuitionists reject excluded middle, not for a third value, but for possibility of proof [Dummett] |
19052 | Natural language 'not' doesn't apply to sentences [Dummett] |
18801 | Classical negation is circular, if it relies on knowing negation-conditions from truth-conditions [Dummett] |
9182 | Ancient names like 'Obadiah' depend on tradition, not on where the name originated [Dummett] |
19057 | Classical quantification is an infinite conjunction or disjunction - but you may not know all the instances [Dummett] |
8312 | It is better if the existential quantifier refers to 'something', rather than a 'thing' which needs individuation [Lowe] |
9186 | First-order logic concerns objects; second-order adds properties, kinds, relations and functions [Dummett] |
19063 | Beth trees show semantics for intuitionistic logic, in terms of how truth has been established [Dummett] |
19059 | In standard views you could replace 'true' and 'false' with mere 0 and 1 [Dummett] |
19062 | Classical two-valued semantics implies that meaning is grasped through truth-conditions [Dummett] |
6653 | Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth [Lowe] |
9187 | Logical truths and inference are characterized either syntactically or semantically [Dummett] |
19065 | Soundness and completeness proofs test the theory of meaning, rather than the logic theory [Dummett] |
4229 | An infinite series of tasks can't be completed because it has no last member [Lowe] |
8194 | Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett] |
4240 | It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth [Lowe] |
9896 | A prime number is one which is measured by a unit alone [Dummett] |
18255 | Addition of quantities is prior to ordering, as shown in cyclic domains like angles [Dummett] |
9191 | Ordinals seem more basic than cardinals, since we count objects in sequence [Dummett] |
9895 | A number is a multitude composed of units [Dummett] |
9852 | We understand 'there are as many nuts as apples' as easily by pairing them as by counting them [Dummett] |
15938 | Platonists ruin infinity, which is precisely a growing structure which is never completed [Dummett] |
10554 | Intuitionists find the Incompleteness Theorem unsurprising, since proof is intuitive, not formal [Dummett] |
8297 | Numbers are universals, being sets whose instances are sets of appropriate cardinality [Lowe] |
8266 | Simple counting is more basic than spotting that one-to-one correlation makes sets equinumerous [Lowe] |
8302 | Fs and Gs are identical in number if they one-to-one correlate with one another [Lowe] |
9829 | The identity of a number may be fixed by something outside structure - by counting [Dummett] |
9828 | Numbers aren't fixed by position in a structure; it won't tell you whether to start with 0 or 1 [Dummett] |
9192 | The number 4 has different positions in the naturals and the wholes, with the same structure [Dummett] |
8298 | Sets are instances of numbers (rather than 'collections'); numbers explain sets, not vice versa [Lowe] |
8311 | If 2 is a particular, then adding particulars to themselves does nothing, and 2+2=2 [Lowe] |
4241 | If there are infinite numbers and finite concrete objects, this implies that numbers are abstract objects [Lowe] |
8310 | Does the existence of numbers matter, in the way space, time and persons do? [Lowe] |
9876 | Set theory isn't part of logic, and why reduce to something more complex? [Dummett] |
15939 | For intuitionists it is constructed proofs (which take time) which make statements true [Dummett] |
10552 | Intuitionism says that totality of numbers is only potential, but is still determinate [Dummett] |
8190 | Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett] |
8321 | All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects [Lowe] |
4239 | Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence [Lowe] |
8300 | Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void) [Lowe] |
4202 | Change can be of composition (the component parts), or quality (properties), or substance [Lowe] |
8198 | A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett] |
15541 | Maybe particles are unchanging, and intrinsic change in things is their rearrangement [Lowe, by Lewis] |
8281 | Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance [Lowe] |
4201 | Four theories of qualitative change are 'a is F now', or 'a is F-at-t', or 'a-at-t is F', or 'a is-at-t F' [Lowe, by PG] |
8270 | Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects [Lowe] |
4219 | Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time [Lowe] |
4221 | Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology [Lowe] |
8308 | Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations [Lowe] |
4220 | Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time [Lowe] |
4225 | Events are changes in the properties of or relations between things [Lowe] |
10540 | We can't say that light is concrete but radio waves abstract [Dummett] |
10515 | Ostension is possible for concreta; abstracta can only be referred to via other objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
10544 | The concrete/abstract distinction seems crude: in which category is the Mistral? [Dummett] |
10546 | We don't need a sharp concrete/abstract distinction [Dummett] |
9884 | The distinction of concrete/abstract, or actual/non-actual, is a scale, not a dichotomy [Dummett] |
22297 | Dummett saw realism as acceptance of bivalence, rather than of mind-independent entities [Dummett, by Potter] |
9869 | Realism is just the application of two-valued semantics to sentences [Dummett] |
15049 | Metaphysical realists are committed to all unambiguous statements being true or not true [Dummett] |
8184 | Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it [Dummett] |
8185 | We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind [Dummett] |
8192 | I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett] |
3303 | For anti-realists there are no natural distinctions between objects [Dummett, by Benardete,JA] |
8314 | Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? [Lowe] |
8316 | Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations [Lowe] |
8318 | The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents [Lowe] |
8323 | It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? [Lowe] |
8163 | Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts [Dummett] |
8161 | We know we can state facts, with true statements [Dummett] |
8313 | Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria [Lowe] |
21628 | To say reality itself is vague is not properly intelligible [Dummett] |
8180 | 'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not [Dummett] |
10281 | The objects we recognise the world as containing depends on the structure of our language [Dummett] |
8258 | Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs [Lowe] |
8301 | Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them [Lowe] |
10548 | The context principle for names rules out a special philosophical sense for 'existence' [Dummett] |
9558 | All scientific tests will verify mathematics, so it is a background, not something being tested [Sober] |
8283 | Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former [Lowe] |
8284 | The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent [Lowe] |
13122 | Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete [Lowe, by Westerhoff] |
4196 | The main categories of existence are either universal and particular, or abstract and concrete [Lowe] |
18353 | Modes are beings that are related both to substances and to universals [Lowe] |
8273 | Is 'the Thames is broad in London' relational, or adverbial, or segmental? [Lowe] |
8285 | I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence [Lowe] |
4234 | Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere [Lowe] |
4235 | Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness [Lowe] |
4236 | Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles [Lowe] |
8295 | Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle? [Lowe] |
8286 | Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects [Lowe] |
8294 | How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes? [Lowe] |
8296 | Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide? [Lowe] |
18352 | Tropes have existence independently of any entities [Lowe] |
4197 | The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations [Lowe] |
10532 | We can understand universals by studying predication [Dummett] |
8288 | Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not [Lowe] |
8293 | Real universals are needed to explain laws of nature [Lowe] |
8307 | Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables [Lowe] |
10534 | 'Nominalism' used to mean denial of universals, but now means denial of abstract objects [Dummett] |
9880 | Nominalism assumes unmediated mental contact with objects [Dummett] |
4232 | Nominalists believe that only particulars exist [Lowe] |
7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
4205 | 'Is non-self-exemplifying' is a predicate which cannot denote a property (as it would be a contradiction) [Lowe] |
8967 | Not all predicates can be properties - 'is non-self-exemplifying', for example [Lowe] |
4233 | If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set [Lowe] |
10541 | Concrete objects such as sounds and smells may not be possible objects of ostension [Dummett] |
8267 | Perhaps concrete objects are entities which are in space-time and subject to causality [Lowe] |
16130 | To be an object at all requires identity-conditions [Lowe] |
8265 | Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value [Lowe] |
8275 | Objects are entities with full identity-conditions, but there are entities other than objects [Lowe] |
10545 | Abstract objects may not cause changes, but they can be the subject of change [Dummett] |
9885 | The existence of abstract objects is a pseudo-problem [Dummett] |
10555 | If we can intuitively apprehend abstract objects, this makes them observable and causally active [Dummett] |
9858 | Abstract objects nowadays are those which are objective but not actual [Dummett] |
10543 | Abstract objects must have names that fall within the range of some functional expression [Dummett] |
9859 | It is absurd to deny the Equator, on the grounds that it lacks causal powers [Dummett] |
9860 | 'We've crossed the Equator' has truth-conditions, so accept the Equator - and it's an object [Dummett] |
7783 | Bodies, properties, relations, events, numbers, sets and propositions are 'things' if they exist [Lowe] |
10320 | If a genuine singular term needs a criterion of identity, we must exclude abstract nouns [Dummett, by Hale] |
10547 | Abstract objects can never be confronted, and need verbal phrases for reference [Dummett] |
9872 | Abstract objects need the context principle, since they can't be encountered directly [Dummett] |
10531 | There is a modern philosophical notion of 'object', first introduced by Frege [Dummett] |
8263 | An object is an entity which has identity-conditions [Lowe] |
8268 | Some things (such as electrons) can be countable, while lacking proper identity [Lowe] |
8965 | Neither mere matter nor pure form can individuate a sphere, so it must be a combination [Lowe] |
8303 | Criteria of identity cannot individuate objects, because they are shared among different types [Lowe] |
8292 | Diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time; difference of matter is a consequence [Lowe] |
8291 | Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind [Lowe] |
4206 | Conventionalists see the world as an amorphous lump without identities, but are we part of the lump? [Lowe] |
16128 | A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects [Lowe] |
7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
4204 | Statues can't survive much change to their shape, unlike lumps of bronze, which must retain material [Lowe] |
16545 | The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct [Lowe] |
16546 | The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze [Lowe] |
13918 | Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical [Lowe] |
8279 | The identity of composite objects isn't fixed by original composition, because how do you identify the origin? [Lowe] |
16551 | Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe] |
13921 | All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe] |
16542 | Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe] |
13922 | Knowing an essence is just knowing what the thing is, not knowing some further thing [Lowe] |
16552 | If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that [Lowe] |
6618 | A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change [Lowe] |
8271 | An object 'endures' if it is always wholly present, and 'perdures' if different parts exist at different times [Lowe] |
8272 | How can you identify temporal parts of tomatoes without referring to tomatoes? [Lowe] |
4198 | If 5% replacement preserves a ship, we can replace 4% and 4% again, and still retain the ship [Lowe] |
4199 | A renovation or a reconstruction of an original ship would be accepted, as long as the other one didn't exist [Lowe] |
4200 | If old parts are stored and then appropriated, they are no longer part of the original (which is the renovated ship). [Lowe] |
9848 | Content is replaceable if identical, so replaceability can't define identity [Dummett, by Dummett] |
9842 | Frege introduced criteria for identity, but thought defining identity was circular [Dummett] |
8305 | A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it [Lowe] |
8290 | One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter [Lowe] |
13920 | Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe] |
4203 | Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing) ) is not Leibniz's Law (same thing, same properties) [Lowe] |
15079 | 'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws [Lowe] |
16533 | Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities [Lowe] |
16063 | Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed' [Lowe, by Lynch/Glasgow] |
16531 | 'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity [Lowe] |
8260 | Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds) [Lowe] |
4195 | It is impossible to reach a valid false conclusion from true premises, so reason itself depends on possibility [Lowe] |
16131 | The metaphysically possible is what acceptable principles and categories will permit [Lowe] |
16532 | 'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty' [Lowe] |
16543 | If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe] |
16544 | Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe] |
16957 | Possible worlds aren't how the world might be, but how a world might be, given some possibility [Dummett] |
4207 | We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds [Lowe] |
16959 | If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality [Dummett] |
8320 | Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world? [Lowe] |
16538 | We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe] |
6635 | Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future [Lowe] |
6619 | Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining' [Lowe] |
6643 | 'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality [Lowe] |
8199 | The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett] |
8280 | While space may just be appearance, time and change can't be, because the appearances change [Lowe] |
8276 | Properties or qualities are essentially adjectival, not objectual [Lowe] |
6638 | One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form [Lowe] |
6644 | Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information [Lowe] |
6647 | Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation [Lowe] |
6639 | The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe] |
7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
6640 | A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe] |
6645 | If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe] |
6637 | How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially? [Lowe] |
8178 | Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale [Dummett] |
16534 | 'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously [Lowe] |
6667 | There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory [Lowe] |
6642 | Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations [Lowe] |
4223 | Unfalsifiability may be a failure in an empirical theory, but it is a virtue in metaphysics [Lowe] |
8968 | If the flagpole causally explains the shadow, the shadow cannot explain the flagpole [Lowe] |
4193 | The behaviour of persons and social groups seems to need rational rather than causal explanation [Lowe] |
19061 | An explanation is often a deduction, but that may well beg the question [Dummett] |
6641 | Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity [Lowe] |
6617 | The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? [Lowe] |
6626 | 'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires [Lowe] |
6646 | The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight [Lowe] |
8966 | Properties are facets of objects, only discussable separately by an act of abstraction [Lowe] |
6665 | Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge [Lowe] |
6670 | If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body [Lowe] |
6671 | It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation [Lowe] |
7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
6666 | All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I' [Lowe] |
8289 | The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted [Lowe] |
6625 | If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe] |
6621 | You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe] |
6654 | A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe] |
6629 | Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe] |
6623 | Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe] |
6628 | Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe] |
6622 | Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe] |
6634 | Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) [Lowe] |
6630 | Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes [Lowe] |
6648 | Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech [Lowe] |
8175 | A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions [Dummett] |
8174 | The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought [Dummett] |
6651 | People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event [Lowe] |
6652 | 'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background [Lowe] |
7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
6655 | The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge [Lowe] |
6657 | Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity [Lowe] |
6656 | The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods [Lowe] |
6636 | The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory [Lowe] |
6633 | Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe] |
16535 | A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe] |
19168 | Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects [Dummett, by Davidson] |
9849 | Maybe a concept is 'prior' to another if it can be defined without the second concept [Dummett] |
9850 | An argument for conceptual priority is greater simplicity in explanation [Dummett] |
9873 | Abstract terms are acceptable as long as we know how they function linguistically [Dummett] |
8299 | Abstractions are non-spatial, or dependent, or derived from concepts [Lowe] |
10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |
4237 | Concrete and abstract objects are distinct because the former have causal powers and relations [Lowe] |
4238 | The centre of mass of the solar system is a non-causal abstract object, despite having a location [Lowe] |
10549 | Since abstract objects cannot be picked out, we must rely on identity statements [Dummett] |
9993 | There is no reason why abstraction by equivalence classes should be called 'logical' [Dummett, by Tait] |
9857 | We arrive at the concept 'suicide' by comparing 'Cato killed Cato' with 'Brutus killed Brutus' [Dummett] |
8306 | You can think of a direction without a line, but a direction existing with no lines is inconceivable [Lowe] |
9833 | To abstract from spoons (to get the same number as the forks), the spoons must be indistinguishable too [Dummett] |
8165 | To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view [Dummett] |
7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |
19055 | Stating a sentence's truth-conditions is just paraphrasing the sentence [Dummett] |
19056 | If a sentence is effectively undecidable, we can never know its truth conditions [Dummett] |
8168 | To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett] |
8193 | Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett] |
8181 | A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic [Dummett] |
8182 | Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power [Dummett] |
8183 | If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change [Dummett] |
19054 | Meaning as use puts use beyond criticism, and needs a holistic view of language [Dummett] |
8176 | We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used [Dummett] |
8170 | Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something [Dummett] |
19064 | Holism is not a theory of meaning; it is the denial that a theory of meaning is possible [Dummett] |
16550 | Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe] |
10516 | A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
9181 | The causal theory of reference can't distinguish just hearing a name from knowing its use [Dummett] |
9836 | Fregean semantics assumes a domain articulated into individual objects [Dummett] |
8189 | Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett] |
8191 | The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett] |
8169 | We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett] |
6632 | The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe] |
6631 | If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe] |
6659 | The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent [Lowe] |
6661 | Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation [Lowe] |
6662 | We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice [Lowe] |
6663 | People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes [Lowe] |
16956 | To explain generosity in a person, you must understand a generous action [Dummett] |
16954 | Generalised talk of 'natural kinds' is unfortunate, as they vary too much [Dummett] |
4210 | If the concept of a cause says it precedes its effect, that rules out backward causation by definition [Lowe] |
4215 | It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers [Lowe] |
4209 | The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration [Lowe] |
8317 | To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects [Lowe] |
4211 | Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case [Lowe] |
4213 | Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities) [Lowe] |
4212 | Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity [Lowe] |
14581 | The normative view says laws show the natural behaviour of natural kind members [Lowe, by Mumford/Anjum] |
16547 | H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe] |
4208 | 'If he wasn't born he wouldn't have died' doesn't mean birth causes death, so causation isn't counterfactual [Lowe] |
4224 | If motion is change of distance between objects, it involves no intrinsic change in the objects [Lowe] |
4227 | Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space, but 'limits', which are abstract [Lowe] |
18257 | Why should the limit of measurement be points, not intervals? [Dummett] |
8269 | Points are limits of parts of space, so parts of space cannot be aggregates of them [Lowe] |
4228 | If space is entirely relational, what makes a boundary, or a place unoccupied by physical objects? [Lowe] |
8186 | Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change [Dummett] |
8197 | Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett] |
8167 | If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes [Dummett] |
8196 | The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett] |