54 ideas
21032 | Speak truth only to those who deserve the truth [Sandel] |
21033 | Careful evasions of truth at least show respect for it [Sandel] |
9065 | S5 collapses iterated modalities (◊□P→□P, and ◊◊P→◊P) [Keefe/Smith] |
9064 | Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature [Keefe/Smith] |
9044 | If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question [Keefe/Smith] |
9048 | The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics [Keefe/Smith] |
9055 | The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary [Keefe/Smith] |
9049 | Supervaluationism keeps true-or-false where precision can be produced, but not otherwise [Keefe/Smith] |
9056 | Vague statements lack truth value if attempts to make them precise fail [Keefe/Smith] |
9058 | Some of the principles of classical logic still fail with supervaluationism [Keefe/Smith] |
9059 | The semantics of supervaluation (e.g. disjunction and quantification) is not classical [Keefe/Smith] |
9060 | Supervaluation misunderstands vagueness, treating it as a failure to make things precise [Keefe/Smith] |
9050 | A third truth-value at borderlines might be 'indeterminate', or a value somewhere between 0 and 1 [Keefe/Smith] |
9061 | People can't be placed in a precise order according to how 'nice' they are [Keefe/Smith] |
9062 | If truth-values for vagueness range from 0 to 1, there must be someone who is 'completely tall' [Keefe/Smith] |
9063 | How do we decide if my coat is red to degree 0.322 or 0.321? [Keefe/Smith] |
9045 | Vague predicates involve uncertain properties, uncertain objects, and paradoxes of gradual change [Keefe/Smith] |
9047 | Many vague predicates are multi-dimensional; 'big' involves height and volume; heaps include arrangement [Keefe/Smith] |
9053 | If there is a precise borderline area, that is not a case of vagueness [Keefe/Smith] |
21036 | Not all deals are fair deals [Sandel] |
21038 | Does consent create the obligation, or must there be some benefit? [Sandel] |
21039 | Moral contracts involve both consent and reciprocity; making the deal, and keeping it [Sandel] |
21030 | The categorical imperative is not the Golden Rule, which concerns contingent desires [Sandel] |
22262 | Kant's moral law has no foundation - because that would undermine its priority [Sandel] |
21031 | Man cannot dispose of himself, because he is not a thing to be owned [Sandel] |
20594 | Choosers in the 'original position' have been stripped of most human characteristics [Sandel, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
21035 | Just visiting (and using roads) is hardly ratifying the Constitution [Sandel] |
21037 | A ratified constitution may not be a just constitution [Sandel] |
21034 | A just constitution harmonises the different freedoms [Sandel] |
22258 | Passion for progress is always short-lived [Sandel] |
22259 | Conservatives are either individualistic, or communal [Sandel] |
22264 | Modern liberal rights in democracies protect individuals against the majority [Sandel] |
22261 | Liberals say rights always come first, and justice is neutral on social values [Sandel] |
23104 | Dworkin believed we should promote equality, to increase autonomy [Dworkin, by Kekes] |
21120 | The self is 'unencumbered' if it can abandon its roles and commitments without losing identity [Sandel, by Shorten] |
22263 | Liberal justice means the withdrawal of the self, as transcendental or as unencumbered [Sandel] |
21049 | Liberal freedom was a response to assigned destinies like caste and class [Sandel] |
22805 | Liberalism concerns rights, and communitarianism concerns the common good [Sandel, by Avineri/De-Shalit] |
22260 | Modern liberalism fails to articulate a vision of the common good [Sandel] |
22265 | I can't defend the view that the majority values of a community are thereby right [Sandel] |
22268 | If persons define themselves by a group membership, insults to that group are a real harm [Sandel] |
22267 | In the liberal view an insult to my group doesn't hurt me, since I'm defined by choices not groups [Sandel] |
23257 | We can treat people as equals, or actually treat them equally [Dworkin, by Grayling] |
18621 | Treating people as equals is the one basic value of all plausible political theories [Dworkin, by Kymlicka] |
21040 | Libertarians just want formal equality in a free market; the meritocratic view wants fair equality [Sandel] |
21028 | We can approach justice through welfare, or freedom, or virtue [Sandel] |
21027 | Justice concerns how a society distributes what it prizes - wealth, rights, power and honours [Sandel] |
21042 | Should we redress wrongs done by a previous generation? [Sandel] |
21043 | Distributive justice concern deserts, as well as who gets what [Sandel] |
21052 | Justice is about how we value things, and not just about distributions [Sandel] |
21048 | Work is not fair if it is negotiated, even in a fair situation, but if it suits the nature of the worker [Sandel] |
22266 | The case for religious liberty depends on the religion contributing to a morally good life [Sandel] |
18639 | If we assess what people would buy in an imaginary insurance market, our taxes could copy it [Dworkin, by Kymlicka] |
21045 | Teleological thinking is essential for social and political issues [Sandel] |