45 ideas
| 21032 | Speak truth only to those who deserve the truth [Sandel] |
| 21033 | Careful evasions of truth at least show respect for it [Sandel] |
| 21036 | Not all deals are fair deals [Sandel] |
| 21038 | Does consent create the obligation, or must there be some benefit? [Sandel] |
| 21039 | Moral contracts involve both consent and reciprocity; making the deal, and keeping it [Sandel] |
| 21030 | The categorical imperative is not the Golden Rule, which concerns contingent desires [Sandel] |
| 22262 | Kant's moral law has no foundation - because that would undermine its priority [Sandel] |
| 21031 | Man cannot dispose of himself, because he is not a thing to be owned [Sandel] |
| 20594 | Choosers in the 'original position' have been stripped of most human characteristics [Sandel, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 21035 | Just visiting (and using roads) is hardly ratifying the Constitution [Sandel] |
| 21037 | A ratified constitution may not be a just constitution [Sandel] |
| 21034 | A just constitution harmonises the different freedoms [Sandel] |
| 22258 | Passion for progress is always short-lived [Sandel] |
| 22259 | Conservatives are either individualistic, or communal [Sandel] |
| 22264 | Modern liberal rights in democracies protect individuals against the majority [Sandel] |
| 22261 | Liberals say rights always come first, and justice is neutral on social values [Sandel] |
| 21120 | The self is 'unencumbered' if it can abandon its roles and commitments without losing identity [Sandel, by Shorten] |
| 22263 | Liberal justice means the withdrawal of the self, as transcendental or as unencumbered [Sandel] |
| 21049 | Liberal freedom was a response to assigned destinies like caste and class [Sandel] |
| 22805 | Liberalism concerns rights, and communitarianism concerns the common good [Sandel, by Avineri/De-Shalit] |
| 22260 | Modern liberalism fails to articulate a vision of the common good [Sandel] |
| 22265 | I can't defend the view that the majority values of a community are thereby right [Sandel] |
| 20525 | Free markets lead to boom and bust, pointless middlemen, and alienated workers [Engels] |
| 22268 | If persons define themselves by a group membership, insults to that group are a real harm [Sandel] |
| 22267 | In the liberal view an insult to my group doesn't hurt me, since I'm defined by choices not groups [Sandel] |
| 21040 | Libertarians just want formal equality in a free market; the meritocratic view wants fair equality [Sandel] |
| 21028 | We can approach justice through welfare, or freedom, or virtue [Sandel] |
| 21027 | Justice concerns how a society distributes what it prizes - wealth, rights, power and honours [Sandel] |
| 21042 | Should we redress wrongs done by a previous generation? [Sandel] |
| 21043 | Distributive justice concern deserts, as well as who gets what [Sandel] |
| 21052 | Justice is about how we value things, and not just about distributions [Sandel] |
| 21048 | Work is not fair if it is negotiated, even in a fair situation, but if it suits the nature of the worker [Sandel] |
| 22266 | The case for religious liberty depends on the religion contributing to a morally good life [Sandel] |
| 21045 | Teleological thinking is essential for social and political issues [Sandel] |
| 8388 | Causation is either direct realism, Humean reduction, non-Humean reduction or theoretical realism [Tooley] |
| 8389 | Causation distinctions: reductionism/realism; Humean/non-Humean states; observable/non-observable [Tooley] |
| 8416 | Reductionists can't explain accidents, uninstantiated laws, probabilities, or the existence of any laws [Tooley] |
| 8393 | We can only reduce the direction of causation to the direction of time if we are realist about the latter [Tooley] |
| 8390 | Causation is directly observable in pressure on one's body, and in willed action [Tooley] |
| 8418 | Quantum physics suggests that the basic laws of nature are probabilistic [Tooley] |
| 8392 | Probabilist laws are compatible with effects always or never happening [Tooley] |
| 8399 | The actual cause may not be the most efficacious one [Tooley] |
| 8391 | In counterfactual worlds there are laws with no instances, so laws aren't supervenient on actuality [Tooley] |
| 8394 | Explaining causation in terms of laws can't explain the direction of causation [Tooley] |
| 8398 | Causation is a concept of a relation the same in all worlds, so it can't be a physical process [Tooley] |